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ABSTRACT 
 
PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS AS COMPLEX 
ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS 
by 
Daniel Martin Katz 
 
Chair: Jenna Bednar 
 
This dissertation employs various theoretical and methodological perspectives to 
consider the “evolution” of the law and “law as a complex adaptive system.”  Chapter 2 
addresses the strategic institutional conditions that produced Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
majority opinion in Dickerson v. United States. In the wake of the Chief Justice’s ruling, 
legal scholars grappled to interpret this apparently anomalous decision.  This process 
produced a litany of deeply unsatisfactory explanations for the Chief’s behavior. Chapter 
2 rejects all of these existing explanations and instead outlines a game theoretic account 
for the Chief’s decision in this very important Miranda related case. 
  
 ix 
 Applying network theory, Chapter 3 considers the social topology of the 
American federal judiciary.  Scholars have long asserted that social structure is an 
important feature of a variety of societal institutions. However, to date, such social 
considerations have not been formally integrated in positive legal theory. Using the flow 
of law clerks as a proxy for social and professional linkages between jurists, Chapter 3 
offers a variety of visualizations and analytics useful for considering the physical 
properties of the judicial social network.   
Chapter 4 considers the ‘evolution’ of the law in the early jurisprudence of the 
United States Supreme Court. Relevant dynamics include but are not limited to doctrinal 
importation, path dependence, cross-fertilization, mutation, fitness and selection. 
Chapter 4 explores a subset of these dynamics in the applied context of the early United 
States Supreme Court (1791-1835). Justices on the early United States Supreme Court 
relied upon a wide variety of sources as evidence in support of their arguments. Chapter 
4 offers both descriptive data regarding the magnitude of references and identifies the 
extent to which those references imported ideas from foreign sources.  Next, it applies 
the tools of network science to measure the structural importance of these foreign law 
infused decisions. While the empirical results are relevant to the ongoing debate 
regarding the Supreme Court's reliance upon foreign sources, there is something far 
more fundamental at stake. Specifically, Chapter 4 introduces the “legal genome 
project” a new conceptual framework useful for understanding the “evolution” of the 
law.  
  
 1 
CHAPTER ONE  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Continuity and change are fundamental features of social institutions.  While any 
theory of change is primarily a theory of continuity, evaluating the conditions that give 
rise to institutional change is a critical inquiry.  The exploration of the mechanics of 
social and institutional change is the hallmark of the social scientific enterprise.  
Methodology, intellectual paradigms are the vehicles scholars employ to provide 
perspective on these processes. One emerging approach – the complex systems 
perspective – is a vehicle to consider the dynamic evolution of various institutions 
including various legal and political institutions.  Indeed, a growing literature argues that 
the complex systems paradigm is the appropriate lens through with which to consider the 
development of the common law and the dynamic interaction of its constitutive actors.  
This perspective of law as a complex adaptive system is one that does justice to the 
dynamic interplay between judges (and their preferences and strategies) as well as the 
time evolving content of their jurisprudence. Seeking to contribute to this growing 
literature, this dissertation offers several perspectives on the proposition that law is a 
complex adaptive system.  
Institutional Rules and Strategic Behavior 
The complex systems paradigm is in large part interested in how behavior 
observed at the micro level aggregates into larger macro patterns.  Thus, this dissertation 
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begins in Chapter 2 with a case study of one specific unit of micro judicial behavior – 
Justice Rehnquist’s otherwise anomalous decision in Dickerson v. United States.   
Despite his long-standing opposition to the Miranda doctrine, in Dickerson v. 
United States Justice Rehnquist both voted to save the Miranda doctrine and author the 
majority opinion.  Why?  As written, many prevailing accounts accept Justice Rehnquist's 
opinion in Dickerson v. United States at face value and immediately disavow the 
potential of a strategic explanation for his behavior. The difficulty with the non-strategic 
accounts is their failure to outline explicitly the evidence supporting the uniqueness of 
their theory. Specifically, these explanations largely ignore the alternative set of 
preferences that could have produced the Chief's decision. This is troubling because prior 
social science scholarship demonstrates that a Chief Justice possesses a unique set of 
institutional powers that provides significant incentive for him to behave sophisticatedly. 
At a minimum, many prevailing explanations for Dickerson at a minimum are 
incomplete because they fail to determine whether his vote and opinion were the result of 
moderation, fidelity to traditional legal principles, or, in fact, strategic behavior. This 
Chapter pursues a uniqueness claim, arguing the available evidence supports a strategic 
explanation for Justice Rehnquist's behavior in Dickerson. To do this, Chapter 2 first 
reviews the methodological debate that exists within the social science scholarship, a 
debate relevant to the competing explanations for the Dickerson decision. Next, the 
Chapter explores a strategic or quasi-game theoretic approach by describing the 
multistage sophisticated process that produces all Supreme Court decisions. It culminates 
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in a general form diagram that maps the behavioral choice faced by all similarly situated 
Chief Justices.   
This diagram, inspired by game theoretic literature on judicial decision-making, is 
carried forward into the balance of the Chapter. Starting with a description of the 
Supreme Court's Miranda jurisprudence, Chapter 2 next reviews Justice Rehnquist's 
Miranda-related decisions which taken together demonstrate the truly anomalous nature 
of his Dickerson opinion. The Chapter then outlines a strategic account, an approach 
rejecting many prevailing explanations of Rehnquist's behavior. Strategic and non-
strategic behaviors are often observationally equivalent. Thus, in order firmly to support 
its strategic theory, this Chapter concludes with a discussion of several important post-
Dickerson decisions, where the Chief Justice surprisingly supports the preservation of 
certain exceptions to Miranda even after his Dickerson opinion supposedly afforded 
Miranda full constitutional status. The cases are critical to the analysis because they help 
determine what end Chief Justice Rehnquist actually achieved in his Dickerson opinion. 
He successfully froze a set of pre-Dickerson Miranda exceptions that he personally 
developed during his thirty-year tenure on the Court. It is from this perspective that 
commentators in fact are correct to argue that Dickerson is critical to understanding the 
legacy of the late Chief Justice. 
The “Judicial Game” is a Game on a Graph 
The development of American law cannot be divorced from the social and 
professional relationships between its constitutive actors.  Recent scholarship has called 
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for a more holistic “social economics” approach to study judicial behavior.  For example, 
Professors Baum and Cameron cite a number of studies, which, taken together, “cast 
considerable doubt on what might be called the traditional political science approach to 
decision-making on collegial courts.”1  Indeed, the consideration of social factors is 
featured in a variety of related scholarship. For example, Judge Posner as well as other 
scholars2 argue a judge’s reputation among his or her fellow jurists is a core component 
of the judicial utility function and that reputational concerns among his or her fellow 
judges directly impact the set of judicial outputs he or she would be willing to support.3  
Of course, it is hardly new or novel to assert that, in general terms, maintaining 
high status among one’s peers as well as sustaining relationships with one’s close 
colleagues might, together with other factors, impact an individual’s behavioral calculus. 
Indeed, while other components certainly comprise the judicial utility function, the 
literature emphasizes that a jurist’s desire to be considered a “learned judge” is a source 
of motivation for his or her decision-making. The art of judging is marked by both 
general adherence to established legal principles as well as attempts to recombine 
existing approaches in novel ways. Of course, a priori it is not completely clear whether 
                                                
 
1 See Charles M. Cameron & Craig P. Cummings, Diversity and Judicial Decision-Making: Evidence from Affirmative 
Action in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 1971–1999 (Mar. 30, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).  
LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2006). 
2 RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995).   
3 See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995).  See also Jason Whitehead, Cynics and Rogues: 
How “Bad” Judges Can Help Us Better Understand the Rule of Law, Paper Presented at the 2008 Annual 
Meeting of the Law and Society Association (offering qualitative evidence that judges consider the views 
of other judges when rendering their decisions) (manuscript on file with author); LAWRENCE BAUM, 
JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2006). 
  
 5 
such attempt at recombination or mutation will be seen as “novel” or wholly 
inappropriate. In searching the “outcome space” in an effort to maximize their respective 
utility functions, is it is not always clear what class of decisions furthers a judge’s 
reputational interests.  However, judges do have the ability to obtain information 
regarding what would constitute a socially acceptable application of existing legal 
principles. Specifically, judges can take social cues and mimic the legal interpretations 
previously offered by their colleagues.  
Generalizing from this basic idea Chapter 2 argues, “social structure, and the 
formal and informal interactions between judicial actors, at least in part, charts the course 
of doctrinal development.” Specifically, if jurists formally or informally rely on the view 
of their colleagues with higher prestige then properly conceptualizing the nature and 
mapping the dynamics of such “peer effects” would appear to be a core component of 
positive legal theory. Thus, along with other important decisional factors previously 
identified in the judicial politics scholarship, this dissertation is dedicated to 
understanding the dynamics of judicial self-organization4 and its impact upon the 
development of the law.  
                                                
 
4 Self-organization is a term of art commonly used in to describe the collective behavior of a variety of 
social and physical systems. While there exists slightly varying definitions, the term is often used to 
describe a system whose behavior becomes increasingly organized without being explicitly managed by an 
outside source.  Examples of self-organization can been seen in physical science fields such as chemistry 
(molecular self-assembly), physics (spontaneous magnetization) and biology (homeostasis).  Such ideas 
have also been invoked in the social sciences to describe flocking behavior (sociology) and the behavior of 
markets (economics).  For example, the often-quoted Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek described 
capitalism as a "self-organizing system of voluntary cooperation." (Hayek 1945). 
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Of course, given there is no “pause button” in the external environment there is 
reason to believe reputation effects, esteem, prestige and influence are generated through 
dynamic processes that include negative and positive feedback. As such, they should be 
analyzed with not only traditional statistical methods but also the tools used to study in 
complex adaptive systems.   
The consistently changing composition of the overall federal judiciary implies 
that the relative social standing of judicial actors and, in turn, the legal doctrines they 
support are in a consistent state of flux. In this respect, the federal judiciary exhibits 
behavior that might be considered emergent.5  While a judge in a given case may rule in 
isolation of other judges, she does not exist in a state of complete social and professional 
isolation from their peers. Instead it is far more likely that judicial choice is, at least in 
part, impacted by a combination of jurists who are socially prominent and socially 
proximate.6  
                                                
 
5 There is not a uniform agreement regarding the appropriate definition of emergence.  See JOSHUA EPSTEIN 
& ROBERT AXTELL, GROWING ARTIFICAL SOCIETIES FROM THE BOTTOM UP (1996) (defining emergent 
phenomena to be “stable macroscopic patterns arising from the local interactions of agents.”). Outlining a 
variety of rationales including the anti-scientific history of British emergentism, Professor Epstein offers 
deep concerns regarding its continued use in the field of complex systems.  While we do not take a pass on 
its continued use, we recognize the merit of Professor Epstein’s argument.  See JOSHUA EPSTEIN, 
GENERATIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE 31-37 (2006).  
6 As noted earlier, recent work in the public law literature acknowledges a need for contextual 
understandings of judicial decision making. See, e.g., Charles M. Cameron & Craig P. Cummings, 
Diversity and Judicial Decision-Making: Evidence from Affirmative Action in the Federal Courts of 
Appeals, 1971–1999, Paper Presented at the 2003 Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 
(Apr. 3–6, 2003) (applying a “social economics approach” to the behavior of judges on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals). Cameron and Cummings cite a number of studies that “cast considerable doubt on what might be 
called the traditional political science approach to decision-making on collegial courts.” Id. See, e.g., Sean 
Farhang & Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority Representation 
Under Panel Decision Making, 20 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 299 (2004); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental 
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In the face of such dynamics, what is needed is a methodology that can capture 
the richness of the landscape. Among possible approaches, network analysis offers one 
manner of representing the interactions between various entities across a complex 
adaptive landscape.7 Specifically, as applied to the path of the common law as well as 
theories of judicial decision-making, the networks paradigm helps evaluate the manner in 
which individual level judge choice maps to the judiciary’s aggregate doctrinal outputs.8 
The analysis of the time evolving dynamics of prestige and influence are designed to 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997). Of course, other actors and 
institutions also impact a given jurist’s conception of what constitutes a sound legal rule.  
7 The analysis of social networks is long standing with notable early work conducted by scholars such as 
Jacob Moreno, Fritz Heider, and Kurt Lewin. See, e.g., JACOB MORENO, WHO SHALL SURVIVE? (1934) 
(developing the “sociogram,” an apparatus that allows social relationships to be drawn using analytic 
geometry); KURT LEWIN, FIELD THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1951) (extending Moreno’s work and 
applying a host of mathematical techniques including graph theory, topology, and set theory). Popular 
accounts of networks concepts can largely be attributed to the work of Stanley Milgram. See Stanley 
Milgram, The Small World Problem, 22 PSYCHOL. TODAY 61 (1967). Milgram is often credited with 
coining “six degrees of separation.” However, many attribute the term to Hungarian author, Frigyes 
Karinthy, whose volume of short stories invoked such concepts. See FRIGYES KARINTHY, MINDEN 
MÁSKÉPPEN VAN [EVERYTHING IS DIFFERENT] (1929). A host of recent popular literature continues the 
public’s widespread interest in network science. See generally FORBES, Networks, May 7, 2007 (devoting 
its Ninetieth Anniversary Issue to the “New” Age of Networks). For a non-exhaustive list of recent popular 
books in the subject, see also ALBERT-LASZLO BARABÁSI, LINKED: THE NEW SCIENCE OF NETWORKS 
(2002); MARK BUCHANAN, NEXUS: SMALL WORLDS AND THE GROUNDBREAKING SCIENCE OF NETWORKS 
(2002); and MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: HOW LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG 
DIFFERENCE (2000). Recent developments within the academy have also driven increased interest in 
network analysis. Among these developments the work of Watts and Strogatz is of utmost interest. See 
Duncan J. Watts & Stephen H. Strogatz, Collective Dynamics of ‘Small World’ Networks, 393 NATURE 440 
(1998).  See also Laszlo Barabási & Reka Albert, Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks, 286 SCIENCE 
509 (1999). For instructive texts on the subject see, e.g., THE STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF NETWORKS 
(Mark Newman, Albert-Laszlo Barabási, & Duncan J. Watts, eds., 2006); STANLEY WASSERMAN & 
KATHERINE FAUST, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS (1994).  
8 See generally THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MIRCOMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR (1978). 
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contribute to a broader literature arguing various domains of legal analysis would benefit 
from concepts and techniques typically reserved for the study of complex systems.9  
On the Path to a Legal Genome Project: The Early Jurisprudence of the United States 
Supreme Court (1791-1835) 
 
While Chapters 2 and 3 focuses upon the behavior of jurists, Chapter 4 provides 
an alternative perspective on the ‘evolution’ of the law.  Instead, of focusing upon the 
judges who decisions generate the common law, this Chapter considers the Court’s 
doctrinal outputs.  In particular, this Chapter reviews the early jurisprudence of the 
United States Supreme Court – a period where one observes the blending of foreign legal 
principles with legal rules of domestic origin. Relying upon the full corpus decisions of 
through the end of Chief Justice Marshall’s term (1791 - 1835), this study both identifies 
and classifies the more than 35,000 references contained therein. This analysis highlights 
                                                
 
9 See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of 
the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546 (1994) (discussing chaos theory in 
the context of capital market regulation); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 641 (1995) (discussing legal evolution and invoking both path dependence and complexity 
systems theory); Vincent Di Lorenzo, Complexity and Legislative Signatures: Lending Discrimination 
Laws as a Test Case, 12 J.L. & POL. 637 (1996) (employing chaos theory to review legislative responses to 
alleged lending discrimination); J. B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the 
Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996) 
(discussing both complexity and the general evolutionary model); David G. Post & Michael B. Eisen, How 
Long is the Coastline of the Law? Thoughts on the Fractal Nature of Legal Systems, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 545 
(2000) (uncovering the fractal structure of citations to precedent in judicial opinions); Thomas A. Smith, 
The Web of Law, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 309 (2007) (demonstrating the distribution of citations across the 
roughly four million cases in American law as consistent with the power law distribution); Elizabeth 
Leicht, Gavin Clarkson, Kerby Shedden & M. E. J. Newman, Large-Scale Structure of Time Evolving 
Citation Networks, 59 EUROPEAN J. OF PHYS. B 75 (2007) (mapping the structure of the United States 
Reports and detecting temporal communities in case to case citations); See also Daniel A. Farber, 
Earthquakes and Tremors in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Study of the Dynamics of 
Interpretation, 89 MINN. L. REV. 848 (2005); Bernard Trujillo, Patterns in a Complex System: An 
Empirical Study of Valuation in Business Bankruptcy Cases, 53 UCLA L. REV. 357 (2005); Daniel Katz, 
Derek Stafford, & Eric Provins, Social Architecture, Judicial Peer Effects and Law’s Evolution: Toward a 
Positive Theory of Judicial Social Structure, 23 Geo. State L. Rev. 975 (2008).  
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both the extent of reference to foreign legal sources and situates these references in the 
broader universe of cited sources. Justices on the early United States Supreme Court 
relied upon a variety of sources as evidence in support of their arguments. Rather than 
rely upon lower courts or the internal logic of its decisions, the early United States 
Supreme Court jumpstarted its jurisprudence with the substantial aid of foreign legal 
commentators and sources.     
Across sets of cases and even within individual decisions, the early Court either 
relied exclusively on foreign law or in many instances draws support for its position by 
legal principles developed by foreign legal actors.  This basic insight encourages one to 
more formally consider the dynamics present in the precedent based development of the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.  Namely, beyond its appeal as a historical investigation, 
this project has much broader aims. While this paper does not fully resolve all of the 
difficult theoretical and empirical questions, it provides a perspective informative to both 
positive legal theory and the long-standing literature on common law ‘evolution.’  
Indeed, in order to develop a positive model of legal doctrine and thereby “take law 
seriously” it is necessary to have a well-specified notion of the relevant doctrinal 
topology. To consider such questions requires a framework that can meet the 
methodological ante. Chapter 4 proposes a “legal genome project” – an informatics based 
project designed to trace our legal origins and better understand the “evolution” of the 
common law.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
INSTITUTIONAL RULES, STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR AND THE 
LEGACY OF CHIEF JUSTICE WILLIAM REHNQUIST: 
SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON DICKERSON V. 
UNITED STATES1 
 
 
Unchanged for more than a decade, the 2005-2006 term witnessed significant 
alteration to the composition of the United States Supreme Court.  In the span of several 
months, the High Court experienced substantial changes in its membership brought about 
in part by the death of its most prominent member, Chief Justice William Rehnquist.  In 
periods of transition, it is natural to speculate on the future course of this institution; but 
equally compelling, these changes elicit reflection as to the historical significance of the 
recently completed era.  In the most recent iteration, substantial attention centered upon 
the late Chief Justice, whose death focused interest not only on the institution that he 
guided for nearly two decades but also upon his personal jurisprudence.  Comments 
regarding his legacy were wide ranging and covered the gambit of cases that came before 
the High Court during his stewardship.2   
                                                
 
1 This chapter was previously published as Daniel Martin Katz, Institutional Rules, Strategic Behavior and 
the Legacy of Chief Justice William Rehnquist: Setting the Record Straight on Dickerson v. United States, 
22 J. L & POL. 303 (2006).  
2 See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, Rehnquist Scaled Back Rights of the Accused, 41 TRIAL, Dec. 2005, at 56, 56 
(“While Rehnquist failed in his effort to radically reconstruct criminal procedure law, he nevertheless 
enjoyed perhaps his greatest success in his 33 years on the Court by trimming back Warren Court initiatives 
in virtually every area of criminal procedure and habeas corpus.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Rehnquist’s Steady 
Conservatism Reshaped the Law, 41 TRIAL, Nov. 2005, at 70, 70 (“William Rehnquist will be remembered 
as one of the most important Supreme Court justices in American history, partly for his length of service . . 
. But more important, Rehnquist profoundly affected constitutional law by pushing it in a more 
conservative direction.”); R. Ted Cruz, In Memoriam: William H. Rehnquist, 119 HARV. L. REV. 10, 16 
(2005) (“His views did not always prevail, but his steady hand at the helm—his vision, leadership, and 
unwavering principles—made this in every respect the Rehnquist Court.”); Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, In 
  
 11 
One case, Dickerson v. United States,3 garnered particular attention from 
commentators.4  In fact, even before his passing some argued this decision was critical to 
understanding the Rehnquist legacy.5  In Dickerson, the Chief Justice authored a seven-
member majority opinion which sustained Miranda v. Arizona.6  The decision was a 
surprise.  Miranda had been a pillar of the Warren Court revolution, and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist previously varied from meek support to outright dissention for the 1966 
ruling.7  Thus, given his history, he seemed unlikely to author a supportive opinion in 
perhaps the key Miranda decision of the decade.   
                                                                                                                                            
 
Memoriam: William H. Rehnquist, 119 HARV. L. REV. 6,6 (2005) (“[O]f all the bosses I have had as a 
lawyer, law teacher, and judge, Chief Justice William Hobbs Rehnquist was hands down the fairest and 
most efficient.”); William N. La Forge, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist Remembered, 52 FED. LAW., 
Oct.2005, at 26, 28 (“Chief Justice Rehnquist was known as a pragmatist in many respects, and, through 
artful compromise and fair-minded debate intended to achieve the broadest majority possible, he strove to 
lead the Court with a show of judicial unity, while also preserving the integrity and credibility of the Court 
and the law.”); Tony Mauro, The Chief and Us: Chief Justice William Rehnquist, The News Media, and The 
Need For Dialog Between Judges and Journalists, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 407, 407 (2006) (“He was a 
brilliant and modest jurist who loved the Supreme Court and loved history but did not, I am fairly sure, love 
the news media. . . . [H]e viewed [the media] as something of a distraction.”).  
3 530 U. S. 428 (2000) (Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, O’Connor, 
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, 
J., joined.). 
4 See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 2; Cruz, supra note 2; Linda Greenhouse, The Last Days of the Rehnquist 
Court: The Rewards of Patience and Power, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 251 (2003); Yale Kamisar, Dickerson v. 
United States: The Case That Disappointed Miranda’s Critics—and Then Its Supporters, in THE 
REHNQUIST LEGACY 106 (Craig Bradley ed., 2006). 
5 Jeffrey Rosen, Rehnquist the Great, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 2005, available at 
www.theatlantic.com/doc/200504/rosen.  With respect to Dickerson, Professor Rosen notes: 
Rehnquist's evolution from Miranda's leading critic to its improbable savior infuriated 
conservatives and confused liberals; but in fact it was emblematic of his career. . . . 
[L]iberals have never understood how significantly and frequently Rehnquist departed 
from doctrinaire conservative ideology, and conservatives have failed to grasp that his 
tactical flexibility was more effective than the rigid purity of Scalia and Thomas. In truth, 
Rehnquist carefully staked out a limbo between the right and the left and showed that it 
was a very good place to be. . . . As for judicial temperament, he was far more devoted to 
preserving tradition and majority rule than the generation of fire-breathing conservatives 
who followed him. Id.   
6 384 U. S. 436 (1966). 
7 See infra notes 102, 108 and accompanying text. 
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In the wake of the Chief Justice’s ruling, legal scholars grappled to interpret this 
apparently anomalous decision.  This process produced a litany of explanations.8  Some 
commentators pursued a separation of powers theory, positing that the Chief sought to 
protect the Court from encroachment by Congress.9  Some focused upon exogenous 
factors, arguing that public opinion motivated the Chief.10  Still others argued that the 
decision was strong evidence of Rehnquist’s faithful adherence to the principle of stare 
                                                
 
8 See infra notes 9, 10, 12.  For a small sample of additional commentary, see also Paul G. Cassell, The 
Paths not Taken: The Supreme Court’s Failures in Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 898 (2001); Richard H. 
Fallon, Constitutional Law and the Supreme Court: Judicial Legitimacy and the Unwritten Constitution: A 
Comment on Miranda and Dickerson, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 119 (2001); The Supreme Court 1999 Term: 
The Leading Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV. 179, 199-209 (2000); Conor G. Bateman, Note, Dickerson v. 
United States: Dickerson is Deemed a Constitutional Rule, But Does it Really Matter?, 55 ARK. L. REV. 
177 (2002); Andrew W. Muller, Note, Congress’ Right to Remain Silent in Dickerson v. United States -or- 
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Learn to Love Miranda v. Arizona, 34 CREIGHTON L. REV. 801 
(2001). 
9 See George M. Drey, The “Illegitimate Exercise of Raw Judicial Power:” The Supreme Court’s Turf 
Battle in Dickerson v. United States, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 47, 80-81, 88 (2001) (“[T]he Court defended 
Miranda because, in attacking this decision, Congress was intruding upon the court’s turf. . . . In short, 18 
U.S.C. § 3501 struck a raw nerve; the Court felt the need to flex its judicial muscle in the face of what it 
perceived as a particularly well-targeted threat from a co-equal branch.”); Arthur H. Garrison, Rehnquist v. 
Scalia—The Dickerson and Miranda Cases: A Debate on What Makes a Decision Constitutional, 25 AM. J. 
TRIAL ADVOC. 91, 133 (2001); Craig M. Bradley, Behind the Dickerson Decision, 36 TRIAL 80 (Oct. 2000).  
Professor Bradley advances two explanatory theories, the second of which argues that the separation of 
powers motivated the Chief.  Specifically, he notes, “[T]his was likely because of the second reason 
Rehnquist’s vote did not surprise me: his concern with maintaining the balance of power between the Court 
and Congress.”  Id. at 80. 
10 Greenhouse, supra note 4, at 253 n.17 (citing KENNETH W. STARR, FIRST AMONG EQUALS: THE 
SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE 207 (2002) (arguing that the majority in Dickerson was unwilling to 
endure the public criticism which would follow from overruling Miranda)); Bradley, supra note 9, at 80 
(describing how William Rehnquist admired former Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes because “Hughes 
believed that unanimity of decision contributed to public confidence in the Court.” (citing William 
Rehnquist, Chief Justices I Never Knew, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 637 (1976))); Mitch Reid, Note, United 
States v. Dickerson: Uncovering Miranda’s Once Hidden and Esoteric Constitutionality, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 
1343, 1378-9 (2001) (“The simplest answer is that to hold otherwise the Court would have overturned a 
simple, yet comforting legal procedure embraced by most Americans. . . . Considering Miranda’s 
popularity, imagine the enormity of public backlash the Court would have received if it overturned such a 
distinguished decision.”)  All of these arguments are bolstered by language contained within the opinion 
specifically noting that public opinion at least partially motivated the court.  In particular, Justice Rehnquist 
wrote that public acceptance of Miranda has led it to become part of the “national culture.” Dickerson, 530 
U. S. 428, 443 (2000).  
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decisis.11  The Dickerson opinion itself particularly supports this latter account.  Chief 
Justice Rehnquist specifically noted, “[W]hether or not we would agree with Miranda’s 
reasoning and its resulting rule, were we addressing the issue in the first instance, the 
principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it now.”12 
As written, many accounts accept the opinion at face value, thereby disavowing 
the potential of a strategic explanation.  The difficulty with the non-strategic accounts is 
their failure to outline explicitly the evidence supporting the uniqueness of their theory.13   
Specifically, these explanations largely ignore the alternative set of preferences which 
could have produced the Chief’s decision.  This is troubling because prior scholarship 
demonstrates that a chief justice possesses a unique set of institutional powers which 
provides significant incentive for him to behave sophisticatedly.14  Many prevailing 
                                                
 
11 See Stephanos Bibas, The Rehnquist Court’s Fifth Amendment Incrementalism, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=830724 (December 
12, 2006) (“Out of respect for stare decisis, the Court left in place Miranda’s warnings but restricted its 
exclusionary rule and largely declined to extend Miranda.”); Rosen, supra note 5 and accompanying text; 
Bradley, supra note 2, at 56-57).  Contra William S. Consovoy, The Rehnquist Court and the End of 
Constitutional Stare Decisis: Casey, Dickerson and the Consequences of Pragmatic Adjudication, 2002 
UTAH L.J. 53, 93-95; Kevin McNamee, Comment, Do As I Say and Not As I Do: Dickerson, Constitutional 
Common Law and the Imperial Supreme Court, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1239, 1293 (2001).  
12 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443. 
13 However, there are a few works which reflect an exception to this trend.  See Cruz, supra note 2 at 13-15; 
see also Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional Theory for Criminal Procedure: Dickerson, Miranda, and the 
Continuing Quest for Broad-but-Shallow, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1(2001); Yale Kamisar, From Miranda 
to § 3501 to Dickerson to . . . , 99 MICH. L. REV. 879 (2001); Kamisar, supra note 4; Susan R. Klein, 
Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and Incidental Rights in Constitutional 
Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030, 1032-33 (2001); Jeffery Standen, Symposium: Policy at the 
Intersection of Law and Politics: Panel One: The Politics of Miranda, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 555, 
564 (2003). 
14 Many books and articles either explicitly or implicitly advance this argument.  See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK 
KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1997); WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 
(1964); SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES (Cornell W. Clayton & 
Howard Gillman eds., 1999); G. Edward White, The Internal Powers of the Chief Justice: The Nineteenth 
Century Legacy (Mar. 2006), University of Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, 
Working Paper 42, available at http://law.bepress.com/uvalwps/uva_publiclaw/art42/.  Unlike his 
predecessors, some have argued that Chief Justice Rehnquist did not use his administrative authority to 
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explanations for Dickerson at a minimum are incomplete because they fail to determine 
whether his vote and opinion were the result of moderation, fidelity to traditional legal 
principles, or, in fact, strategic behavior. 
This article pursues its own uniqueness claim, arguing the gravamen of available 
evidence supports a strategic explanation for Justice Rehnquist’s behavior in Dickerson.  
To do this, the article first reviews the methodological debate which exists within the 
social science scholarship, a debate relevant to the competing explanations for the 
Dickerson decision.  Next, the article explores the strategic or quasi-game theoretic 
approach by describing the multistage sophisticated process which produces all Supreme 
Court decisions.  It culminates in Figure 2.1, a general diagram that is carried forward 
into Part II of the article.   
Part II directly considers the Dickerson decision.  This section begins with a 
description of the Supreme Court’s Miranda jurisprudence before reviewing the specific 
facts and procedural history of the case.  Next, Part II reviews Justice Rehnquist’s 
Miranda-related decisions which, taken together, demonstrate the truly anomalous nature 
of the Dickerson opinion.  The article then outlines its strategic account, an approach 
rejecting many prevailing explanations of Rehnquist’s behavior.   
                                                                                                                                            
 
obtain strategic advantage.  This article argues against this view with respect to the discrete case of 
Dickerson v. United States.  For a greater discussion of potentially strategic behavior of the late Rehnquist 
Court, see Linda Greenhouse, Forward: The Third Rehnquist Court, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY, supra 
note 4, at xiii.  Greenhouse, a prominent reporter for The New York Times, notes that in several major 
cases of the late Rehnquist Court such as Nevada v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), and Locke v. Davey, 540 
U.S. 712 (2004), the Chief voted with large majorities and crafted opinions which were “cryptic” and “not 
long on legal analysis.”  Id. at xviii.  She argues that the Chief choose to engage a “sacrifice of cogency” to 
further greater institutional and societal interests. Yet, although Dickerson is “not long on legal analysis,” 
Greenhouse’s claim is inconsistent with the account provided herein as this article contends that 
institutional and societal interests did not animate Chief Justice Rehnquist’s decision in Dickerson.  
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Strategic and non-strategic behaviors are often observationally equivalent.  Thus, 
in order firmly to support its strategic theory, this article concludes with a discussion of 
several important post-Dickerson decisions including Chavez v. Martinez,15 Missouri v. 
Seibert,16 and United States v. Patane,17 where the Chief Justice to the surprise of some 
supports the preservation of certain exceptions to Miranda even after his Dickerson 
opinion supposedly afforded Miranda full constitutional status.  The cases are critical to 
the analysis because they help determine what end Chief Justice Rehnquist actually 
achieved in his Dickerson opinion.  He successfully froze a set of pre-Dickerson Miranda 
exceptions which he personally developed during his thirty-year tenure on the Court.  It is 
from this perspective that commentators in fact are correct to argue that Dickerson is 
critical to understanding the legacy of the late Chief Justice.18 
PART I: TOWARD A MODEL OF SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING 
ACROSS THE GREAT METHODOLOGICAL DIVIDE 
 
Like many other subfields in the social sciences, the public law scholarship 
divides scholars into several methodological camps.  Although theories of judicial 
decision-making have been the subject of numerous articles, edited volumes, and books, 
the methods employed to substantiate these theories are quite varied.  Generally the 
                                                
 
15 538 U. S. 760, 767 (2003) (explaining that until unwarned statements are introduced at trial, there is no 
constitutional violation). 
16 542 U. S. 600, 622 (2004) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that Elstad standard should control to 
analyze whether taint of initial unwarned statement is vitiated by second warned statement). 
17 542 U. S. 630, 637 (2004) (noting that physical evidence located based on unwarned statements is 
admissible unless statements actually coerced). 
18 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.  Professor Rosen, citing Dickerson, argues the Chief Justice is 
misunderstood by both liberal and conservative commentators.  Specifically, he notes how Rehnquist, 
unlike his more conservative counterparts on the Court, often departed from “doctrinaire conservative 
ideology.”  While Rosen’s thesis may or may not be true, this article will show why Justice Rehnquist’s 
behavior in Dickerson simply fails to substantiate his proposition that a reconsideration of Rehnquist 
jurisprudence is warranted.  See Rosen supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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scholarship finds individuals subscribing to one of three major approaches: the legal 
model,19 the behavioralist attitudinal model,20 or some variant of the strategic model.21 
The legal model is the traditional means to consider judicial outcomes.  Typically 
advanced by certain members of the legal academic community, it is a normative case-
based approach, which argues that judicial outputs should be the byproduct of a 
deliberate application of legal principles that are neutral as to the identity of the parties.22  
The model both argues that justices view themselves as significantly constrained by 
precedent and that political considerations are largely antithetical to the jurisprudential 
decision-making process.   
Proponents of Legal Realism,23 one of the historically important perspectives set 
forth by the legal academy, argue that in fact judicial decision-making is often animated 
                                                
 
19 JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993). 
20 Id. 
21 E.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 14; SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST 
APPROACHES, supra note 14.  
22 For one description of the legal model, see SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 19, at 33-64. The legal model as 
described by Segal & Spaeth is very much akin to formalist models of judicial decision-making offered by 
the legal process scholars. For prominent work from the Legal Process School, see generally ALEXANDER 
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); HENRY 
M. HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (William Eskridge, Jr. ed., 1994); Lon Fuller, The Forms 
and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978); Herbert Weschler, Toward a Neutral Principal 
of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).  For other non-formalist strands of the legal model, see 
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: 
TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999). 
23 Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL 
THEORY 50, 50-66 (W. Edmunson, et al. eds., 2003).  Legal realists responded to the formalism which once 
attached to the explanation of judicial decision-making.  Formalists posited “that judges decide cases on the 
basis of distinctively legal rules and reasons, which justify a unique result in most cases (perhaps every 
case).” Id. at 50.  Realists countered arguing that the law was indeterminate and thus other non-doctrinal 
considerations actually animated judicial decision-making.  There are several major sub-sets of realist 
scholars.  However, those most common identified with realism include Karl Llewellyn, Max Radin, 
Jerome Frank, Herman Oliphant and Joseph Hutcheson.  Some contend that legal realism is a discredited 
legal theory.  See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-54 (2d ed. 1994).  Others contend that realism 
  
 17 
by non-doctrinal considerations.  Realists do not deny the relevance of the legal model 
for many cases, but can be distinguished from other scholars in the extent to which they 
believe extra-legal considerations animate judicial behavior.24  Therefore, for many, the 
approaches favored by social scientists and those favored by legal academics have to 
some extent converged.  Therefore, the question is no longer whether “law matters” but 
rather the extent to which it matters.  It is a question of degree.  Those who subscribe to 
most current conceptions of the legal model view the law as important but also recognize 
the political outlook of the actors as an additional driving force. 
As their name implies, behavioralists focus upon the objective behavior that 
typically manifests itself in the votes taken by judicial actors.  In complete contrast to the 
legal model, Professors Segal and Spaeth, the primary proponents of the behavioral 
approach, posit judicial conduct can best be understood through their attitudinal model, 
an approach that argues justices cast votes to maximize their individual policy 
preferences.25  Therefore, “Rehnquist votes the way he does because he is conservative 
                                                                                                                                            
 
persists as a cogent theory of the law.  See Michael S. Green, Legal Realism as a Theory of Law, 46 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1917 (2005). 
24 Richard A. Brisben, Slaying the Dragon: Segal, Spaeth and the Function of the Law in Supreme Court 
Decision Making, 40 AM. J.  POL. SCI. 1004, 1007 (1996) (“[U]sing jurisprudential reasoning, much of the 
academic legal community has abandoned the political assumptions of Old Legal Process scholarship….”).   
25 In some sense, there is significant overlap between Segal and Spaeth, and Critical Legal Studies (CLS) 
theorists in so much as both view policy preferences or ideology as the exclusive motivation of judicial 
actors.  CLS theorists expand upon the work of legal realists arguing that realist scholars vastly understate 
the degree of indeterminacy in the law.  In other words, “[B]eneath the patina of legalistic jargon, law and 
judicial decision-making are neither separate nor separable from disputes about the kind of world we want 
to live in.”  Alan C. Hutchinson, Introduction to CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 4 (Alan C. Hutchinson ed., 
1989).  However, most directly, CLS emphasizes the connection between ideology and judicial outputs.  
CLS theorists believe that the logic of the law grows out of asymmetric power relationships.  Thus, legal 
decision-making biases already favored groups.  For a concise description of the argument of first order 
CLS scholars, see generally RICHARD W. BAUMAN, IDEOLOGY AND COMMUNITY IN THE FIRST WAVE OF 
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (2002).  For a discussion of the distinctions between realism and CLS, see Debra 
Livingston, Round and Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal Studies, 95 HARV. 
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while Marshall votes the way he does because he is extremely liberal.”26  Attitudinalists 
view justices as decision makers who always vote their unconstrained attitudes.27  Their 
outlook is methodologically attractive because it allows scholars to narrow their focus to 
the objective votes of the respective justices.  Therefore, attitudinalists are able 
empirically to test their behavioral theories by studying publicly available voting records.  
Attitudinalists have made significant contributions to the public law scholarship.  
In particular, they have succeeded in convincing many that policy preferences do indeed 
matter.  Despite its contribution to the debate, the attitudinal model suffers from 
significant criticism.28  While some of these demurrers lack an alternative hypothesis, the 
most sophisticated critique comes from those who seek to understand the strategic 
context through which justices maximize their individual policy preferences.  Namely, as 
a follow-on to the wave of neo-institutional theories which have come to pervade the 
social sciences,29 many judicial scholars recently have sought to better understand how 
                                                                                                                                            
 
L . REV. 1669 (1982); Jeffery Standen, Critical Legal Studies as an Anti-Positivist Phenomenon, 72 VA. L. 
REV. (1986).   
26 SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 19, at 65.  
27 Id. 
28 For a small sample of critiques of the attitudinal model, see e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF 
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1997); Howard Gillman & Cornell W. Clayton, Beyond Judicial Attitudes: 
Institutional Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW 
INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES, supra note 14; FORREST MALTZMAN, ET.AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE 
SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME; Brisben, supra note 24.  
29 The “New-Institutionalism” as contemplated within the rational choice wing of political science builds 
upon the institutional economic work of Nobelist Douglass North.  See, e.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH, 
INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE vii (1990); Douglass C. North, 
Institutions, 5 J.  ECON. PERSP. 97 (1991); Douglass C. North, A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics, 2  J. 
THEORETICAL POL. 355 (1990).  For examples of other prominent work, see Daniel Diermeier & Keith 
Krehbiel, Institutionalism as a Methodology , 15 J. THEORETICAL POL. 123 (2003); James March & Johan 
Olsen, Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions, 9 GOVERNANCE 247 (1996); James March & 
Johan Olsen, The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
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institutional rules and norms channel the decision-making process within the judicial 
branch.30   
Specifically, although a justice may desire to vote in a liberal or conservative 
manner, there may be legal or institutional restraints which incentivize a contrary vote.  
Institutionalist scholars do not reject a neo-classical maximization framework, but instead 
argue the notion of policy preference maximization cannot truly be understood without 
reference to the institutional context in which judicial actors find themselves. 
The foundation for the neo-institutionalist approach began with a focus upon the 
strategic stages of the jurisprudential decision-making process.  For while decisions on 
the merits may reflect the Court’s official outputs, these final votes derive from several 
earlier stages, each of which produces the possibility for strategic behavior.  Elements of 
Judicial Strategy, the classic book by Walter Murphy, was the first text to pursue a 
contextual approach, arguing that justices act within strategic settings where they must 
behave sophisticatedly if they wish to implement their specific policy preferences.31   
Epstein and Knight updated and expanded Murphy’s account by specifically 
considering each of the various stages of Supreme Court decision-making.32  They focus 
tremendous attention upon the institutional rules and norms which help inform decision-
making and argue that because each stage creates the potential for strategic behavior, 
                                                                                                                                            
 
734 (1984); Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: The Institutions of Governance, 88 
AM. ECON. REV. 75 (1998). 
30 See supra note 14. 
31 MURPHY, supra note 14, at 202. 
32 EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 14. 
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public law requires a methodological approach which shifts “the focus away from 
discrete acts of simple vote counting”33 toward a more fully informed account of the 
institutional incentives which ultimately produce The Choices Justices Make.34   
This article follows their approach as it attempts to explain Justice Rehnquist’s 
otherwise anomalous behavior in Dickerson.  However, before specifically turning to 
Dickerson, the article briefly outlines the strategic nature of various Supreme Court 
decision-making stages including certiorari, conference proceedings, opinion 
assignments, and post assignment coalition maintenance.  
Stage 1:  The Certiorari Decision 
The United States Supreme Court enjoys a unique position within the federal 
judicial system.  Not only does it sit atop a structural hierarchy, but it also enjoys almost 
complete control over its agenda.  While a limited number of cases reach this Court 
through either original35 or statutory jurisdiction,36 the vast majority of litigants must file 
                                                
 
33 Gillman & Clayton supra note 28. 
34 EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 14.  For other examples of work adopting some variant of the strategic 
approach see BAUM, supra note 28, at 123; MALTZMAN, supra note 28, at 4-5; and Paul Brace & Melinda 
Gann Hall, Neo-Institutionalism and Dissent in State Supreme Courts, 52 J. POL. 54, 66 (1990) (describing 
a strategic view of State Supreme Court decision-making). 
35 “In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall 
be a Party, the Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
36 E.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257, 2350 (2000); RUSSELL R. WHEELER & CYNTHIA HARRISON, CREATING 
THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 18 (3d ed. 2005). Wheeler and Harrison note that:  
[d]espite the relatively modest changes in circuit structure, the federal courts today differ 
strikingly from their forerunners in 1891, and even more from those of 1789. The 
Supreme Court’s limited certiorari jurisdiction in the 1891 Act has been broadened by 
successive legislation, the most noteworthy being the Judiciary Act of 1925, and the most 
recent being a 1988 act that eliminated most remaining categories of the Court’s 
mandatory appellate jurisdiction.  
Id. at 24.  The 1925 Judiciary Act, passed at the urging of Chief Justice and former President William 
Howard Taft, is often described as part of a larger movement towards judicial autonomy which occurred 
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a petition for a writ of certiorari to seek Supreme Court review.  The Court has complete 
authority to reject these petitions37 and does so in all but a small number of cases.38   
The specific mechanism which determines the status of a particular petition is a 
sub-majoritarian collective choice rule commonly referred to as “the rule of four.”39  The 
rule is not actually a rule.  Rather, it is an internal norm of the institution.40  This norm 
typically is observed by its members but not required by the United States Constitution, a 
federal statute, or the Supreme Court’s own published rules.41  Its historical origins are 
                                                                                                                                            
 
during the 1920s.  Taft’s entrepreneurialism was critical in the crafting of the modern judiciary as he is 
responsible not only for increasing the permissive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court but also for re-
organizing and bureaucratizing the federal judiciary.  For a detailed description, see Justin Crowe, The 
Forging of Judicial Autonomy: Political Entrepreneurship and the Reforms of William Howard Taft, 69 J. 
POL. __ (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript on file with author).   
37 SUP. CT. R. 10.  Supreme Court Rule 10 states a "petition for certiorari will be granted only for 
compelling reasons."  The stated reasons include but are in no way limited to a conflict among the United 
States Courts of Appeal, a conflict between a state court of last resort and another state or federal court or a 
state or Federal court decision which deviates from "relevant decisions" of the United States Supreme 
Court.  Id.   
38 "In the 1995 term, for example, the Court granted certiorari to 92 of 2456 paid certiorari petitions (4 
percent) and to 13 of 5,098 pauperis petitions (0.3 percent)."  Saul Brenner, Granting Certiorari by the 
United States Supreme Court: An Overview of the Social Science Studies, 92 LAW LIBR. J. 193,195 (2000) 
(citing LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS & DEVELOPMENTS, 83 
tbl. 2-6 (2d ed. 1996).  In sum, for the 1995 term, the Court granted certiorari in 105 of 7554 petitions (1.3 
percent).  In more recent years, the probabilities are even less favorable to a would-be litigant.  Id.  
39 While the "rule of four" dictates the decision with regard to certiorari, the justices, with the aid of their 
clerks use an additional gate keeping mechanism to ferret out meritorious petitions.  Initially, a case must 
reach the "discuss list," a tally of cases which are openly considered during the justices internal 
conference.  Each case not placed upon the discuss list is automatically denied certiorari.  See Gregory 
Caldeira & John Wright, The Discuss List: Agenda Building in the Supreme Court, 24 L. & SOC'Y REV. 
807, 808 (1990).  With the exception of Justice Stevens, each of the members of the court participates in 
the "cert pool" whereby the eight participating Justices pool their respective law clerks to produce 
recommendation memoranda regarding each petition for certiorari.  While the Justices are of course free to 
vote as they wish, they often follow their clerks' advice.  See Saul Brenner & Jan Palmer, The Law Clerk's 
Recommendations and Chief Justice Vinson's Vote on Certiorari, 18 AM. POL. Q. 68, 70-71 (1990). 
40 The origin of the rule of four is somewhat unclear.  “What evidence there is suggests strongly that the 
rule was developed by the Court itself, and that it probably came into existence about the time the Court 
first received discretionary authority, that is, shortly following the Court of Appeals Act of 1891.”  Joan 
Maisel Leiman, The Rule of Four, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 981 (1957). 
41 In fact, Justice Stevens discusses the interrelationship between the doctrine of stare decisis and the rule 
of four.  He suggests that various changes to the Court’s jurisdiction and practices make the rule of four 
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somewhat clouded, yet its existence was acknowledged by various Justices who testified 
before Congress in the early 1920s.42   
As the name implies, the rule requires the votes of at least four of the nine justices 
to grant a petition for certiorari.  The sub-majoritarian nature of the collective choice rule 
is juxtaposed against the final decision on the merits, where a majority of justices, 
typically five or greater, must lend support to a position before it can carry precedential 
value.  This discontinuity between the stage decision and the final decision helps define 
the strategic context that surrounds the certiorari vote.   
To be specific, a justice must cast a vote for or against certiorari without perfect 
knowledge of how others will vote once the case is actually decided on the merits.  
Because the exact positions of the fellow justices cannot be perfectly obtained, a justice 
seeking to maximize his or her policy preferences at the final stage cannot be assured at 
the certiorari stage that a favorable vote will produce a favorable outcome.  Therefore, the 
decision can be best described as a choice under uncertainty in which a justice, seeking to 
maximize his or her policy preferences, yet unsure of how colleagues ultimately might 
decide the case, could find it preferable to maintain the lower court decision rather than 
risk an adverse High Court, i.e., a ruling ideologically distant from that justice’s ideal 
point.43   
                                                                                                                                            
 
less necessary and or desirable than it once was, and, also,  more susceptible to change.  John Paul Stevens, 
The Life Span of a Judge Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 18-21 (1983). 
42 Id. at 10. 
43 H. W. PERRY, DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1991); 
GLENDON A. SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1959); Robert Boucher & 
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Underlying motivation is difficult to ascribe to the certiorari votes of individual 
justices in individual cases because the comparison between the final votes on the merits 
and votes on certiorari may not necessarily provide insight into individual motivation.44  
For example, one justice may vote to grant certiorari to reverse the decision of a lower 
court;45 another might vote to grant certiorari in order to nationalize the ruling below.46  
Also, since strategic interaction colors decisions at numerous stages, including the 
conference proceeding, opinion assignment, and post-assignment bargaining, each justice 
must consider how other justices are likely to behave, not only with respect to their final 
vote, but throughout the decision process.  This realization complicates analysis of voting 
patterns at each stage because justices must make discrete decisions at various stages 
which ultimately lead to a final outcome.  Nevertheless, it is not a world of complete 
indeterminacy because institutional rules and norms help to channel choices by providing 
certain justices with micro incentives at various stages of the judicial decision-making 
process.   
Stages 2, 3, and 4: Conference Proceedings, Tentative Votes, and Opinion Assignments 
 
The certiorari stage is only the threshold stage of Supreme Court litigation.  The 
next major stage is the conference which typically follows oral argument.  Justices gather 
privately to discuss the cases from the most recent court session.  Like other points in the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Jeffery Segal, Supreme Court Justices as Strategic Decision Makers: Offensive Grants and Defensive 
Denials on the Vinson Court, 57 J. POL. 824 (1995).  
44 However, some argue such comparisons are fruitful.  See, e.g., John F. Krol & Saul Brenner,  Strategies 
in Certiorari Voting on the United States Supreme Court: A Reevaluation, 43 W. POL. Q. 335 (1990); Jan 
Palmer, An Economic Analysis of the U. S. Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 39 PUB. CHOICE 387 
(1982).  
45 Brenner, supra note 38, at 195-197. 
46 Id. at 201. 
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process, there are a series of social norms which accompany this gathering.  One 
convention allows the chief justice to speak and vote first followed by each associate 
justice in order of seniority.47   In recent years, an additional norm allows each justice to 
speak once before acquiring a second opportunity to comment.  Prior to these opening 
statements, all face a degree of uncertainty regarding the preferences of their fellow 
justices.  The conference proceedings reduce this uncertainty.  In fact, as the initial 
discussions conclude with the opening statement of the most junior Associate Justice, the 
formerly uncertain landscape is far more certain. 
The potential for revealed preferences frame the strategic interaction at this stage. 
For example, some argue there are significant incentives for certain justices to deviate 
from the tentative voting norm.48  By strategically passing, a justice can maximize 
information prior to casting a tentative vote.  The actor with the greatest incentive to 
engage in this behavior is the chief justice because he can garner the potential power of 
opinion assignment if he finds himself in the majority.49  By voting last, the chief justice 
can ascertain the tentative ideological distribution of his fellow justices before casting his 
vote, thereby maximizing his probability of acting as an opinion assignor. 
There is some empirical evidence of such behavior in the historical records of 
conference proceedings.50  Chief Justice Burger, for example, is reputed to have 
strategically passed or changed his tentative vote in a number of politically salient 
                                                
 
47 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 254 (new ed. 2001). 
48 Timothy R. Johnson,  James F. Spriggs II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Passing and Strategic Voting on the U.S. 
Supreme Court,  39 LAW & SOC’Y  REV. 349 (2005). 
49 Id.; see also White, supra note 14.  
50 Johnson et al., supra note 48. 
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cases.51  In many instances, this behavior assured him a place with the majority, thereby 
securing to him the power of opinion assignment.   
Much like certiorari votes, it is difficult to ascribe specific motivation to this 
passing decision as there can be both non-strategic and strategic motives underlying the 
observed behavior.  However, with the referenced empirical support, the balance of the 
paper assumes a chief justice may always use his role as administrator of the conference 
either strategically to pass or change his vote to garner the power of opinion assignment.  
Figure 2.1, below, is a flowchart that captures the various stages of decision-
making which face the chief justice.  It is not a formal game theoretic model with a 
specific equilibrium prediction, but instead is simply a graphical representation of 
internal Supreme Court proceedings which define the path to a final decision on the 
merits.  For ease, the diagram excludes certain complications such as plurality groupings, 
i.e., instances where no coalition can secure a majority.  This simple figure demonstrates 
that there are a number of combinations of “states of the world” and sub-decisions which 
can produce a final observed vote by the chief justice.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
51 Id.    
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Conditioned on the notion that the Court has granted certiorari, the figure begins 
with two potential branches.  These branches capture two different states of the world in 
which, as assumed above,52 the chief can observe prior to making his tentative voting 
decision.  Together, Nodes 2A and 2B collapse the spectrum of potential vote 
distributions into two distinct branches.  Bracketing the more complicated case of 
plurality, the conference vote can either produce four or more votes for a policy position 
which is in line with the chief’s own preferred position, or it can yield five or more votes 
for a contrary position.  In the former instance, the strategic chief need not be strategic.  
Rather, he can simply vote his true, unbounded policy preference within the conference 
and still preserve for himself the power of opinion assignment.  In that vein, node 3D is 
included only for analytical clarity.53  It should never occur since a chief has no reason to 
vote against his policy preference when that preference has majority support.         
The more complex decision for a strategic chief justice is how best to maximize 
his given policy preferences in a context where his preferences are unaligned with the 
majority of the Court.54  The Figure’s upper branch reflects a state of the world where 
                                                
 
52 See Johnson et al., supra note 48.  At least in politically salient cases, the chief can ignore the norm 
which typically finds the chief casting the first tentative vote.  Alternatively, he could also strategically 
modify his vote following the tentative voting by his fellow justices.  
53 It is a typical convention in decision trees and game theoretic models to outline all theoretically possible 
outcomes.  This includes potential choices such as 3D, a choice which the actor has absolutely no incentive 
to adopt.  Specifically, a chief who possesses four or more votes for his preferred outcome has no incentive 
to vote against his true preferences.  Instead, he has every incentive to vote his true preferences as this will 
provide a majority for his preferred view and allow him to maintain agenda control over the matter.   
54 Theodore Arrington & Saul Brenner, Strategic Voting for Damage Control on the Supreme Court, 57 
POL. RES. Q. 565 (2004).  “At least nine different highly respected Supreme Court scholars assert that the 
Justices on the Court, whether they are likely opinion assigners or not, will sometimes vote insincerely at 
the conference vote and with the majority in order to pursue damage control.”  Id. at 565.  The authors cite 
a number of recent papers presented at major conferences, as well as some books.  For an example of such 
works, see DAVID O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS (5th ed. 2000).  
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five or more votes support a position disfavored by the chief justice.  If he maintains his 
genuine position, the chief will find himself in the minority, where his position has little 
chance of realization due to the loss of agenda control over the matter.55  Thus, a strategic 
chief justice must decide whether it would best serve his policy goals to vote faithfully or 
sophisticatedly.56 
As noted earlier, if the chief justice elects to vote with the majority, he has the 
power to select the author of the Court’s opinion.  Yet, this authority transfers to the most 
senior associate justice when the chief finds himself outside of the majority.  When 
voting in the shadow of the rule for opinion assignment, a voter must consider a variety 
of factors including the salience of the case at issue, the ideological distance between the 
chief justice and the court majority, and the ideological distance between the chief and 
the senior associate justice likely to be in the majority.57      
However, regardless of whether the chief initially finds himself on the strategic 
path at node 4A or the non-strategic path at 4B, he still faces a decision with respect to 
whom to assign the task of drafting the opinion of the Court.  The Court’s internal norm 
empowers him to assign the opinion to himself or to another justice within the winning 
coalition.  Principally, this decision could take a variety of forms. Yet, since writing an 
opinion is a timely enterprise, and each justice is resource-constrained, an assignor cannot 
                                                
 
55 See Arrington & Brenner, supra note 54. 
56 Id. 
57 For consideration of the calculus of opinion assignment, see Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, May 
It Please the Chief? Opinion Assignments in the Rehnquist Court, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 421, 425-26 (1996) 
(discussing some of the factors that affect case assignment). 
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elect to retain every opinion.  The assignor chief therefore must choose to assign some 
subset of the cases over which he initially has agenda control.    
The chief could employ either a strategic or non-strategic decision rule to guide 
this choice.  For example, the assignor chief could randomly assign the opinion to a 
member of the winning coalition.  Alternatively, the assignor could follow a parity rule, 
assigning the case to a coalition justice with the fewest number of outstanding 
assignments.  A knowledge rule could also guide the assignment decision whereby the 
drafting task is delegated to a justice with particular expertise within the relevant subject 
domain.  Such non-strategic notions almost certainly motivate some of the chief’s 
assignment decisions.58     
Yet this decision, like all others on the path to the final decision on the merits, 
contains the conditions for strategic behavior.  The scholarship argues that opinion 
assignment can follow a number of strategic paths.  For example, a strategic assignor 
might choose to assign cases to “an ideologically moderate justice” in the unstable 
coalition as part of a co-option strategy.59  Alternatively, the chief may choose to retain 
the case or assign the opinion to a justice closely aligned with his position in an effort to 
                                                
 
58 Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, A Conditional Model of Opinion Assignment on the Supreme 
Court, 57 POL. RES. Q. 551 (2004).  Maltzman and Wahlbeck find that “[f]ar from single mindedly seeking 
ideological gains, the chief justice pursues multiple goals through his power of opinion assignment.…”  Id. 
at 36.  Further, they find that “[a]s a Court term nears completion, the chief is less concerned with equity, 
expertise and ideology and more concerned with efficiency.” Id.  
59 Maltzman & Wahlbeck, supra note 57, at 426. 
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yield a final opinion close to his ideal point.60  The specific facts of the case as well as the 
nature of the coalition will ultimately frame the chief’s choice at the assignment stage. 
Stages 5&6: Post Opinion Assignment Bargaining and Final Observed Behavior 
 
If the chief chooses to bear the cost of opinion writing, the strategic setting does 
not abate.  Rather, either the chief or his assignee must focus attention upon maintaining 
agreement within the coalition. Thus, he or she must bargain with fellow coalition 
members regarding both the language and tone of the opinion.61  The need for relative 
consensus provides the drafter with only bounded authority over the substance of the 
majority opinion.  The ideological distance between the author and remaining coalition 
members greatly influences the probability of coalition maintenance.  Strife contains a 
downside risk for the opinion drafter because the quest to pull the decision toward his or 
her personal policy preference could result in the splinter of the coalition.  Figure 2.1 
contemplates a coalition splinter through Nodes 5A and 5B for the chief justice and 5E 
and 5F for the assignee.     
If the coalition dissolves and a new drafter arises, a chief must make a calculated 
response.  He may join the new opinion drafter at 6A or 6B, dissent from the new opinion 
at 6C and 6D, or file some sort of mixture of concurrence and dissent at 6E and 6F.  
Finally, because of incomplete information a chief may initially assign an opinion to a 
                                                
 
60 Id.  
61 See James Spriggs et al., Bargaining on the U.S. Supreme Court: Justices’ Responses to Majority 
Opinion Drafts, 61 J. POL. 485 (1999).  The authors write that “once the opinion draft is circulated, ‘the fur 
begins to fly.’” (quoting Tom Clark, Internal Operation of the United States Supreme Court, 43 
JUDICATURE 45, 51 (1959).  See also PHILLIP COOPER, BATTLES ON THE BENCH: CONFLICT INSIDE THE 
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 31 
fellow coalition member who ultimately drafts an opinion with which the chief disagrees.  
Thus, in response to arriving at either 5G or 5H, the chief may reply with terminal actions 
6O, 6Q or 6P, 6R respectively.    
This brief review of Figure 2.1 demonstrates that the chief is a unique player in 
the judicial decision-making process.  Although he has been called a “first among 
equals,” it is unclear whether this label is understated.62  Substantial institutional 
authority surrounds his position.  The chief is the only player on the Supreme Court for 
whom the strategic path, i.e., the ability to vote with the majority at 3A despite his 
underlying disagreement, is always available.   
The chief also possesses exclusive administrative authority over the proceedings 
as well as the conditional power of opinion assignment.  In a world of complete 
information without costs, these institutional powers might be of limited import.  
However, because Supreme Court decision-making is one where actors must cast votes 
with limited information and where significant costs attach to alternative coalition 
formation, institutional rules matter and those rules clearly favor the chief. 63   
                                                
 
62 See White, supra note 14. 
63 This agenda control account described herein is familiar to many political scientists.  Congressional 
scholars, in particular, have long argued how institutional rules and norms provide agenda control.  This 
agenda control favors certain actors and potentially distorts the outputs of the legislative branch.  For but a 
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PART II: THE EVIDENCE FROM DICKERSON V. UNITED STATES 
“You have the right to remain silent. If you give up that right, anything you say 
can and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to an attorney and 
to have an attorney present during questioning. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will 
be provided to you.”64 
Hardly an hour of a television police drama passes without the recital of these 
famous words, the warnings which have come to be identified with the Supreme Court’s 
1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizona.65  The Miranda decision remade the topography of 
confessional jurisprudence by requiring that all individuals subject to a custodial 
interrogation be apprised of both their Fifth Amendment protection against self-
incrimination as well as their Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  Chief Justice Earl 
Warren, speaking for the Court majority, crafted the relatively controversial bright-line 
rule requiring suppression of all custodial confessions obtained in the absence of the 
warnings—regardless of whether the confession was “coerced” or “involuntary” in the 
traditional pre-Miranda sense.   
The Miranda decision expanded upon an existing regime called the voluntariness 
test, a criterion which required that all statements be voluntarily provided.  The origins of 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Webb Yackee, Punctuating the Congressional Agenda: Strategic Scheduling by House and Senate Leaders, 
56 POL. RES. Q. 139 (2003). 
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that standard can be traced to English common law, as the courts of England typically 
rejected involuntary confessions on reliability grounds.  The United States Supreme 
Court imported the voluntariness standard through the 1897 decision in Bram v. United 
States.66  Bram and its progeny established that trial courts were charged with the 
responsibility of reviewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding a confession in 
order to ensure that the statement was voluntarily provided.  This totality approach is 
rather amorphous and arguably provided little guidance to authorities regarding the 
boundaries of acceptable conduct.  Therefore, even prior to the Court’s decision in 
Miranda, law enforcement organizations such as the FBI provided similar warnings to 
those mandated in Miranda to ensure that statements would survive a voluntariness 
hearing.67   
Even today, the mere provision of the warnings does not absolve the police from a 
voluntariness challenge because Miranda did not replace the voluntariness requirement; it 
only acted as an additional layer of protection.  Thus, voluntariness continues to be a 
required component of the constitutional analysis and a reviewing court still can deem a 
custodial environment excessively coercive even if the Miranda warnings preceded a 
custodial confession.68  
                                                
 
66 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).  
67 See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 552-58 (11th ed. 2005).  For a more general 
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The Miranda decision created substantial unrest and confusion which its 
opponents, most notably William Rehnquist, exploited.69  Chief Justice Warren’s opinion 
contained a series of seemingly contradictory statements, that when viewed in isolation, 
undercut the basis for the Court’s holding.70  Namely, it did not delineate whether the 
warnings were constitutionally mandated or instead were merely a sub-constitutional, 
common law requirement.  Chief Justice Warren noted that “[o]ur decision in no way 
creates a constitutional straitjacket” and “we cannot say that the Constitution necessarily 
requires adherence to any particular solution.”71  Furthermore, the Court appeared to 
invite Congress and the states to craft alternative mechanisms.72  Taken together, this 
language favored the notion that Miranda was a common law holding since Congress and 
state governments are not empowered to craft constitutional standards through statutes.  
Yet, the Court provided an important caveat which frustrated any common law 
interpretation.  Chief Justice Warren noted, “However, unless we are shown other 
procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of 
silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following safeguards 
must be observed.”73   
                                                                                                                                            
 
P.3d 552 (Ariz. 2004) (finding juvenile’s waiver of right to remain silent after Miranda warnings 
insufficient to overcome coercive atmosphere where mother was excluded from interrogation). 
69 See KAMISAR, supra note 4, at 114-19.   
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Congress purported to follow the Court’s invitation and a crafted a standard 
designed to quell the substantial public outcry which followed the Miranda decision.  
Through the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,74 Congress adopted a 
standard for evaluating custodial interrogations that was nearly identical to the prior 
voluntariness analysis.75  Such an obvious rebuke to the Miranda decision promised that 
final resolution of Miranda’s constitutional status would soon obtain.  However, its 
ultimate interpretation was stymied as every subsequent President and respective 
Attorney General refused to implement § 3501.76  For more than thirty years, the 
constitutionality of the statutory provision and thus Miranda remained in flux.   
Groundwork for the ultimate resolution of the question began in Davis v. United 
States,77 where Justice Scalia noted that the Court finally should visit the constitutionality 
                                                
 
74 Ominibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 701(a), 82 Stat. 197, 210 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000)). 
75 § 3501 provides, in part, as follows:  
(a) [A] confession . . . shall be admissible . . . if it is voluntarily given.  Before such 
confession is received in evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, 
determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that the confession 
was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit the 
jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to 
give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the 
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all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including (1) the time 
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was not required to make any statement and that any such statement could be used 
against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of 
his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was without 
the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession.  
Id. 
76 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 463-64 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[W]ith limited exceptions 
the provision has been studiously avoided by every Administration, not only in this Court but in the lower 
courts, since its enactment more than 25 years ago.”). 
77 Id. at 462-65. 
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of § 3501.78  Soon thereafter, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit followed Justice 
Scalia’s suggestion.79  The stage was ready for the ultimate review of the question by the 
nation’s highest court.  
The Facts and Procedural History of Dickerson v. United States 
January 24, 1997 began like any other day at the First Virginia Bank.  Tellers 
filled their drawers while the branch manager oversaw the start of business.  Customers 
entered the premises and conducted a variety of transactions including deposits, 
withdrawals, and check cashing.  The normality of the day, however, vanished when an 
individual brandishing a semi-automatic handgun entered the bank and demanded money.  
The tellers quickly complied while bank customers and other employees waited fearfully.  
The suspect collected the proceeds and quickly fled.80   
Officers arrived and diligently secured the scene.  Their investigation immediately 
produced a witness who saw the suspect leave the bank.  He described the suspect and 
provided police with a license plate number from the gateway car.81  The plate matched a 
white Oldsmobile registered to Charles Dickerson of Takoma Park, Maryland.82   
FBI agents visited Mr. Dickerson at his residence and asked him to accompany 
them voluntarily to the local field office for questioning.83  He was not arrested,84 
                                                
 
78 “As far as I am concerned, such a time will have arrived when a case that comes within the terms of this 
statute is next presented to us.” Id. at 464.  
79 United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
80 Id. at 673. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
  
 37 
although he later testified he felt he had no choice but to go to the FBI office.85  Initially, 
Mr. Dickerson denied participation in the bank robbery.86  A warrant was obtained to 
search his apartment.87  When told of the warrant and the imminent search, Dickerson 
admitted to being the getaway driver88 and was arrested.89  The search yielded 
incriminating evidence including the handgun, dye-stained money, masks, and a bait bill 
from a prior robbery.90 
Mr. Dickerson’s attorney sought to suppress the statement and the outcome of the 
search, arguing the confession was obtained in violation of Miranda.91  The trial court 
granted the defense motion.92  In response, the government first filed a motion to 
reconsider, providing additional information about the circumstances and arguing the 
statements were voluntary and, therefore, admissible under § 3501.93  When this motion 
was denied,94 the prosecutor filed an immediate interlocutory appeal asking the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals to reinstate Mr. Dickerson’s confession.95  While the 
government initially pursued a § 3501 claim in the motion to reconsider in the district 
court, on appeal it instead pursued its claim under the more difficult but less controversial 
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88 Id. at 674. 
89 Id.  
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91 Id. 
92 Id. at 675. 
93 Id. at 676. 
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traditional Miranda confessional jurisprudence.96  The Fourth Circuit reviewed the § 
3501 claim sua sponte.97  In so doing, the court followed Justice Scalia’s suggestion in 
Davis v. United States.98   
In order to properly consider § 3501, the Fourth Circuit invited prominent 
Miranda critic Paul Cassell to present the sua sponte argument.99  On the strength of his 
argument, the Fourth Circuit subsequently held § 3501 was an appropriate standard under 
which to consider Mr. Dickerson’s confession.100  Under that standard, it reversed the 
District Court and reinstated the defendant’s confession.101  Mr. Dickerson’s attorney 
challenged the Fourth Circuit’s ruling by appealing to the United States Supreme Court.  
The High Court granted the defendant’s petition and set the case for oral argument.102 
Keeping Your Enemies Closer: Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Decision in Dickerson  
As the Supreme Court’s 2000 term drew to a close, many significant issues 
remained.  From determining the constitutionality of restrictions on partial birth abortion 
to the permissibility of California’s blanket primary, weighty issues of social significance 
awaited resolution.  June 26, 2000 brought some answers.  The day began with the 
                                                
 
96 Brief for the United States at n.19, id. (No. 97-4750). 
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rendering of the Court’s opinion in California Democratic Party v. Jones 103 in which the 
Court invalidated the aforementioned blanket primary.  The second and final decision of 
the day, however, substantially overshadowed this first decision by providing some 
closure to a nearly thirty-five year debate regarding Miranda’s constitutionality.   
Prior to the Court’s decision in Dickerson v. United States,104 even Miranda’s 
strongest supporters had significant reason for concern.  A decision upholding its 
constitutionality required the Supreme Court not only to rebuke the Congressional effort 
to legislatively limit Miranda, but also to disagree with the Fourth Circuit, an appellate 
court with whom the Supreme Court often sided.  Yet, the most troubling hurdle that 
stood in front of Miranda’s continued viability was the prior voting records of the Court’s 
membership.  In particular, given his history there was substantial reason to believe Chief 
Justice Rehnquist would use Dickerson to finally purge the confessional jurisprudence of 
Chief Justice Warren’s controversial 1966 decision. 
Ultimately this concern was unrealized as Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a 7-2 
majority opinion, declared Miranda to be a constitutional rule, thereby invalidating 
Congress’s 1968 attempt to nullify it.105  To support this proposition, the Chief argued 
that the Miranda court majority believed it imposed a constitutional rule because it 
specifically stated that it had granted certiorari to “give concrete constitutional guidelines 
for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow.”106  Further evidence of its 
                                                
 
103 530 U.S. 567 (2000).  
104 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
105 Id. at 438.  
106 Id. at 439 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441-442) (emphasis added). 
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constitutionality was demonstrated through Miranda’s application against the states.107  
Specifically, because the Supreme Court typically refuses to apply non-constitutional 
mandates upon state authorities, and Miranda’s mandate upon state authorities was clear 
from its caption, Miranda had to be a constitutional decision.   
Beyond the doctrinal rationales, the Chief also relied upon several policy 
justifications.  First, he noted that in the years since its initial decision Miranda had 
become part of the “national culture.”108  Essentially, he argued that although there was 
initial opposition to Miranda, it had through subsequent modification become a rule 
which both law enforcement and the public had come to accept.  Of great significance, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that the doctrine of stare decisis also counseled against 
overruling Miranda.  As cited earlier, “Whether or not we would agree with Miranda’s 
reasoning and its resulting rule, were we addressing the issue in the first instance, the 
principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it now.”109 
The Chief recognized the confusion of the Court of Appeals.110  In particular, his 
opinion notes how the lower court focused upon language contained in a series of post-
Miranda decisions—opinions written by Justice Rehnquist himself.  Specifically, the 
Fourth Circuit “relied on the fact that we have, after our Miranda decision, made 
                                                
 
107 Id. at 438. 
108 Id. at 443. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 438.  The Chief’s recognition is only fair since it is Justice Rehnquist who created much of the 
confusion in the first place.  Professor Kamisar argues, “I doubt that any Justice in Supreme Court history 
has dismissed his own majority opinions more summarily or nonchalantly” than Chief Justice Rehnquist in 
Dickerson.  Kamisar, supra note 4 at 120. 
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exceptions from its rule.”111  For Rehnquist, “These decisions illustrate the principle—not 
that Miranda is not a constitutional rule—but that no constitutional rule is immutable.”112  
He further stated, “If anything, our subsequent cases have reduced the impact of the 
Miranda rule on legitimate law enforcement while reaffirming the decision’s core ruling . 
. . .”113 
Uniqueness Claims and The Problem of Observational Equivalence 
For many, the surprising part of Dickerson was not so much the underlying result 
but rather the Chief’s position as author for the Court’s majority.  The Chief’s opinion 
was such a vast departure from his prior reasoning that it left many scholars grappling for 
some sort of unifying doctrinal explanation.  As noted earlier, many candidate theories 
purport to advance the unique explanation for Justice Rehnquist’s observed behavior.114  
However, for a variety of reasons, these current explanations ultimately prove wanting. 
First, most observers focus their doctrinal theses upon the wrong justice, since 
despite his authorship, it is not the Chief so much as Justices Kennedy and O’Connor 
who were likely swayed by such prudential considerations.115  Yet, most importantly, 
much of the current scholarship is at best incomplete because it entertains only a non-
strategic view of Supreme Court decision-making. 
                                                
 
111 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 443. 
114 See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text. 
115 See Cruz, supra note 2, at 14.  (“As a practical matter, there was no way that Justice O’Connor or Justice 
Kennedy would possibly be willing to overrule Miranda.  It was too established, too much a part of the 
legal firmament, for either of them to hazard extinguishing it.”). 
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In Part I, the article argued that Supreme Court decision-making is more than the 
final observed decision.  The process contains a series of important procedural stages 
each of which produces the conditions for strategic behavior.  While not every judicial 
outcome is the byproduct of a sophisticated maneuver, the prospect looms in every 
discrete case.  Thus, any candidate explanation must successfully account for this 
possibility.  Simply put, no uniqueness claim is supportable without complete 
consideration and refutation of potential alternative explanations.  This point is 
demonstrated clearly through Figure 2.1.  Therein, symmetry exists between upper and 
lower branches as virtually every upper trunk branch has a corresponding lower trunk 
complement.  Although similar and in many ways observationally equivalent, the 
branches are not, in fact, identical.  For example, the path to terminal branches 6A and 
6B, i.e., where the Chief Justice joins the New Opinion Drafter, may appear similar.  
However, these two cases differ materially in stage 2.  
The observable facts of Dickerson as applied to Figure 2.1 demonstrate the 
difficulty with supporting a uniqueness claim.  In Dickerson, the Chief voted with the 
majority thereby garnering the power of opinion assignment.  After assigning the opinion 
to himself, he successfully bargained with his fellow justices thereby sustaining his 
coalition.  Each of these observable facts is consistent with terminal branches 6G and 6H, 
respectively.  Much like those branches discussed above, while branches 6G and 6H 
feature deceivingly similar final outcomes, they are not analogous; terminal branch 6G 
reflects strategic behavior while its counterpart, 6H, reflects a genuine, non-strategic path 
to the final outcome. 
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With two candidate explanations, only one of which can accurately reflect the true 
state of the world, query as to how to adjudicate between competing potential accounts?  
This article follows the available evidence reflected in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s pre- and 
post-Dickerson Miranda-related jurisprudence.116  This evidence overwhelmingly favors 
6G, the strategic explanation, as the unique explanation for the Chief’s otherwise 
anomalous behavior in Dickerson v. United States.    
Evaluating the Evidence: Justice Rehnquist’s Prior Miranda Jurisprudence 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s treatment of Miranda prior to Dickerson could hardly 
be deemed supportive of the rule.  At virtually every turn, he sided against the 1966 
ruling.  Rehnquist first encountered Miranda while working for the Department of 
Justice.  Through an April 1, 1969, memorandum, then Assistant Attorney General 
Rehnquist first disparaged Chief Justice Warren’s holding by suggesting that the 
President panel a Commission to consider a constitutional amendment to overturn 
Miranda.117  Two months later, another memorandum, one with which Rehnquist was 
likely familiar and perhaps even authored, circulated throughout the Nixon Justice 
Department.  This second memo outlined a set of litigation strategies designed to 
undercut the impact of the Miranda ruling.118  As Professor Kamisar has noted, the memo 
                                                
 
116 At this point, the available evidence is limited to publicly observable voting behavior.  Future research 
should review the internal conference notes and memoranda if and when such material becomes accessible.  
117 Kamisar supra note 4 at 109. 
118 Id. at 112-13.  Even though the exact authorship of the second memorandum is unclear, it follows that 
through his administrative role as the head of the Office of Legal Counsel, a division which often provides 
opinions regarding the constitutionality of federal legislation, Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist must 
have been aware of, if not explicitly approved of, its contents.  Id. at 113-14. 
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“foreshadowed the reasoning in later Supreme Court opinions disparaging Miranda.”119  
“Indeed, looking back on the memorandum more than three decades later, it seems to 
have provided a road map for those who wanted to read Miranda as narrowly as 
possible.”120  
Just over two years later, Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist was nominated 
and then confirmed to the United States Supreme Court.121  Despite his recent entry to the 
institution, the newly minted Justice Rehnquist authored one of the first major post-
Miranda rulings.  In Michigan v. Tucker,122 he began his more than a quarter century of 
Miranda decisions by substantially limiting the scope of the doctrine.  Rehnquist focused 
attention upon the specific text of Chief Justice Warren’s Miranda opinion, noting that 
the Constitution does not require “adherence to any particular solution.”123  To Justice 
Rehnquist, this implied the Miranda warnings were less than fully constitutional.  
Therefore, in the Tucker opinion, he referred to them as “protective guidelines”124 or 
“recommended procedural safeguards.”125   
Following Tucker, Justice Rehnquist’s continued his contribution to Miranda’s 
de-constitutionalization.  Whether in the majority or minority, Rehnquist cast consistent 
                                                
 
119 Id.  
120 Id. at 113.  
121 William H. Rehnquist was sworn in as an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court on 
January 7, 1972. 
122 417 U.S. 433 (1974). 
123 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).  
124 417 U.S. at 443. 
125 Id.; see also Kamisar supra note 4, at 116. 
  
 45 
votes to minimize the reach of the doctrine.  For example, in North Carolina v. Butler,126 
he agreed with the majority that, for Miranda purposes, an explicit waiver of an attorney 
is not required if the facts and circumstances support the notion that a waiver was 
executed.  In Rhode Island v. Innis,127 he voted to allow police to speak to an accused 
while transporting him even after the accused has invoked his right to counsel, as long as 
the conversation was not designed to produce incriminating statements.  In Jenkins v. 
Anderson,128 he joined a majority which permitted the State to impeach an accused who 
chooses to testify using his pre-arrest silence.  Later, in New York v. Quarles,129 Justice 
Rehnquist crafted a majority opinion creating a public safety exception to Miranda.  The 
opinion relies heavily upon the notion of sub-constitutionality which he originally 
advanced in Tucker.   
A year later, in Oregon v. Elstad,130 Justice Rehnquist joined an opinion authored 
by Justice O’Connor in which the Court substantially limited the reach of the “fruit of the 
poisonous tree” doctrine.131  Like Quarles, the Elstad opinion relied heavily on Tucker, a 
move which appeared to solidify the notion of Miranda’s sub-constitutionality into the 
landscape of confessional jurisprudence.  In sum, between his decision in Tucker and his 
                                                
 
126 441 U.S. 369 (1979). 
127 446 U.S. 291 (1980). 
128 447 U.S. 231 (1980). 
129 467 U.S. 649 (1984). 
130 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
131 The phrase “fruit of the poisonous tree” was first used by Justice Frankfurter in Nardone v. United 
States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).  It references the application of the exclusionary rule to secondary or 
derivative evidence obtained as a byproduct of an underlying illegal action by authorities.  The court is left 
to determine whether such evidence is “tainted” by the violative act.  For a discussion of the history and 
application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, see KAMISAR ET. AL., supra note 67, at 702-15, 906-
22.   
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elevation to Chief,132 in essentially all of the thirty-three Miranda-related cases he 
encountered, Justice Rehnquist voted to limit the scope of the Court’s original 1966 
ruling.133  
                                                
 
132 William H. Rehnquist was sworn in as Chief Justice of the United States on September 26, 1986. 
133 Arguably in all thirty-three major Miranda related cases within the time period, Justice Rehnquist either 
distinguished or otherwise voted to limit the core doctrine.  See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) 
(finding that a statement made after receiving Miranda warning admissible even though the same statement 
had been made before the warning); Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(concluding that the new Miranda standard decided while case was on appeal should not apply when police 
properly relied upon old rule); Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984) (per curiam) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(asserting that police should be allowed to inquire as to whether accused’s words actually invoked Miranda 
rights); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) (affirming that roadside questioning does not constitute 
“custodial interrogation” for purposes of Miranda); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (finding a 
public safety exception to Miranda exists when police ask for location of weapon hidden in public 
supermarket); Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638 (1984) (holding that Edwards was not retroactive as it does 
not enhance truth finding function of court, it was not foreshadowed, police relied upon prior standard, and 
retroactivity “would have a disruptive effect on administration of justice”); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 
420 (1984) (stating that no Miranda warning needed when accused made incriminating statements to 
probation officer during required meeting, even when the “probation officer consciously sought 
incriminating evidence”); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983) (per curium) (refusing to require 
Miranda rights to be read when the defendant voluntarily went to the police station); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 
462 U.S. 1039 (1983) (clarifying that after invoking Miranda rights, accused can initiate conversation that 
eventually leads to admissible incriminating statements); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983) 
(holding that “admission into evidence of defendant’s refusal to submit to blood-alcohol test does not 
offend his privilege against self-incrimination” and requires no warning at the time of refusal); Taylor v. 
Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 (1982) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing confession after illegal arrest should be 
admitted into evidence, given Miranda warning, lack of police intimidation, intervening events, and lack of 
continuous interrogation); Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (per curiam) (concluding that since 
defendant chose to testify, his post-arrest silence can be used for impeachment); California v. Prysock, 453 
U.S. 355 (1981) (per curiam) (deciding that “content of Miranda warnings need not be a virtual incantation 
of the precise language contained in the Miranda opinion”); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) 
(Powell, J., concurring) (refusing to create a new per se rule requiring defendant to initiate communication 
after invoking his Miranda rights); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) 
(noting that he does not find a right to counsel at a pre-trial medical examination, though notice needed to 
be given if the doctor was to testify); California v. Prysock, 451 U.S. 1301 (1981) (ordering stay on 
judgment reversing conviction due to inadequate warning under Miranda); United States v. Henry, 447 
U.S. 264 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that post-arrest conversation between defendant and a 
government informant should not require Miranda warning to be admissible); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 
U.S. 231 (1980) (holding that prearrest silence can be used to impeach a testifying defendant); Rhode 
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (finding statement by defendant to police after invocation of Miranda 
rights admissible so long as police did not expressly question the defendant or know that their comments 
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This article contends that institutional rules matter and thus, following his 
elevation to Chief, the strategic environment arguably changed for Chief Justice 
Rehnquist.  As a result, one might expect to observe unusual and potentially strategic 
voting patterns by the now Chief Justice.  In reality, for many Miranda-related cases 
following his elevation, strategic behavior was simply unnecessary.  Specifically, with 
                                                                                                                                            
 
were “reasonably likely” to provoke incriminating response); Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552 (1980) 
(permitting defendant’s failure to cooperate with  police to be used as aggravating factor to secure 
consecutive sentences); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 7071(1978) (distinguishing that request to speak to 
probation officer is not per se invocation of Miranda rights); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that even after an illegal arrest, “voluntary” incriminating statements 
given in police custody after a Miranda warning should be admissible); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 
369 (1979) (requiring no explicit waiver of right to an attorney as long as facts and circumstances support 
such a conclusion); Fare v. Michael C., 439 U.S. 1310 (1978) (granting state request for stay of California 
Supreme Court ruling that juvenile request for probation officer constitutes invocation of Miranda rights); 
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that, after a defendant has 
asserted his right to counsel, police comments on desire to find and preserve body of victim were not 
“interrogation” and defendant’s responses should be admissible if voluntary, even without an express 
waiver of Miranda rights); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam) (concluding that 
interrogation of suspect at police station who came voluntarily and was allowed to leave without hindrance 
was not “custodial” for purposes of Miranda rule, even if police informed man he was a suspect and lied 
about evidence they had against him); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that prosecutors should be allowed to use post-arrest silence to impeach defendants who choose to testify); 
United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976) (finding that “putative” defendant need not be given 
Miranda warnings when called to testify to a grand jury and false statements can be used to bring perjury 
charges); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976) (holding that non-custodial interview by Internal 
Revenue agents about tax liability of defendant does not require Miranda warnings); Garner v. United 
States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976) (holding that incriminatory disclosure on tax return not protected under Fifth 
Amendment, as defendant could have claimed privilege against self-incrimination on return); Michigan v. 
Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (finding no Miranda violation if accused invoked right to silence before one 
detective and hours later is interviewed by a different one on a different matter, so long as first request 
“was scrupulously honored” as to the first case); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (concluding that 
evidence gained as a result of interrogation prior to Miranda decision upon warning of right to counsel but 
no warning of state’s willingness to provide one at no cost if needed need not be excluded, given adherence 
of police to the law of the time and reliability of the evidence).  In the only Miranda-related Supreme Court 
decision considered by Justice Rehnquist prior to Tucker, Justice Rehnquist again voted to limit the core 
holding of Miranda.  See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(agreeing with the Court’s holding that police need not inform a person of the right to refuse for a consent 
search to be voluntary). 
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respect to limiting the Miranda doctrine, Justice Rehnquist had willing partners in 
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy.134  Their support allowed the Chief to vote his 
“genuine” preferences without concern.135     
                                                
 
134 The Chief Justice must have known that Justices O’Connor and Kennedy had a substantial history 
supporting his position on Miranda.  Of the most significant Miranda opinions decided since she joined the 
Court in September, 1981, Justice O’Connor supported Chief Justice Rehnquist twenty-five times.  See 
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994); Winthrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 697 (1993) (O’Connor, 
J. concurring in part, dissenting in part); Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 
501 U.S. 171 (1991); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) (Parts I, II, IIIA, IV); Illinois v. Perkins, 
496 U.S. 292 (1990); New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990); Michigan v. Harvey,  494 U.S. 344 (1990); 
Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988): Greer v. Miller, 483 
U.S. 756 (1987); Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987); Colorado v. Spring,  479 U. S. 564 (1987); 
Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987);  Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986);  Michigan v. 
Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 637 (1986) (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986); 
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985); Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 61, 65 (1985) (White, J., dissenting 
and, also separately, Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984); Solem v. 
Stumes, 465 U.S. 638 (1984); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 
1039 (1983); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983); Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 (1982).  
Justice Kennedy commenced his service in February, 1988.  Although his mutual association was shorter 
than Justice O’Connor, out of fourteen opportunities, he voted ten times exactly with the position of the 
Chief Justice.  See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 
(1993); Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991); Illinois v. 
Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990); New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990); Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 
(1990); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1990); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988); Arizona v. 
Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  To be considered a common vote, the positions 
must be exact.  For example, the Chief Justice might join with a Concurring Opinion of the Associate 
Justice.  This would be an exact match.  If the Chief and Associate Justice wrote separate concurring 
Opinions, this would not be an exact match, even though the two opinions might take similar positions.  Per 
Curiam decisions also were excluded as these tend to be rather routine matters.  The decisions of Justices 
O’Connor and Kennedy to vote in favor of the constitutionality of Miranda must have conveyed a powerful 
message to the Chief Justice.  
135 In the time between his elevation and his opinion in Dickerson, the Rehnquist Court considered an 
additional twenty-four Miranda related cases.  In each of these cases, just as before his elevation, Justice 
Rehnquist took every possible opportunity to undercut, distinguish or otherwise limit the initial Miranda 
decision.  See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the trial 
court was best suited to determine if the accused was in custody and in so doing it held no Miranda 
violation); Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (concluding that when a request for a lawyer is 
ambiguous, the questioning can continue without a Miranda violation); Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 
318 (1994) (per curiam) (finding that custody is an objective, not subjective, standard); Withrow v. 
Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that there is 
no federal habeas relief for a Miranda violation); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (finding that 
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For example, consider New York v. Harris,136 where the now Chief Justice voted 
that even after a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the 
exclusionary rule did not apply to a subsequent incriminating statement made after 
Miranda warnings were given.  In Illinois v. Perkins,137 he joined a court majority that 
declared Miranda was not violated when an undercover inmate elicited a statement from 
                                                                                                                                            
 
a Miranda violation occurred but it was harmless error based on facts of case); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 
292 (1992) (holding that Miranda is not violated if the accused elects to speak to a fellow inmate placed 
undercover in his cell); Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991) (holding that there is no federal indirect 
attack for Miranda violations); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991) (deciding that an accused who 
had counsel for one crime can be questioned for another crime after Miranda warnings); Minnick v. 
Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that an accused who had counsel, and 
consulted with counsel, could waive his Miranda rights and be questioned further by police); Pennsylvania 
v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in part, concurring in result in part and 
dissenting in part) (stating that questioning for driving under the influence of alcohol, in the absence of 
Miranda, is non-testimonial because it shows the impact on the speech); New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 
(1990) (holding that no exclusionary rule applies when, after Miranda warnings, an accused made 
incriminating statement after an illegal search of the home); Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (1990) 
(asserting that statements acquired in violation of Miranda can be used to impeach the accused); 
Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989) (concluding that a Miranda form which states that a lawyer 
would be appointed only “if and when” he goes to court does not violate Miranda); Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 
488 U.S. 9 (1988) (per curiam) (deciding that ordinary traffic stops do not amount to custody requiring 
Miranda warnings);  Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988) (finding that Miranda warnings effectively 
waived counsel despite the fact the accused had already been indicted); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 
(1988) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that even though the accused had invoked his rights, this was a 
separate investigation involving a separate crime so no Miranda violation occurred); Greer v. Miller, 483 
U.S. 756 (1987) (finding that a comment at trial on the defendant’s right to silence was error, but it was 
harmless here since the Court made two curative instructions); Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987) 
(holding that statements made by the accused to his wife in the presence of the police are not suppressible); 
Colorado v. Spring, 497 U.S. 564 (1987) (finding no Miranda violation if, after Miranda rights were read, 
the accused believed the interview involved one crime but really was designed for another); Connecticut v. 
Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987) (determining that after Miranda warning there was no violation if the accused 
refused a written statement but agreed to an oral one); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (finding 
no Miranda violation when a mentally ill person waives his rights and holding that the state must prove a 
waiver of rights only by preponderance of evidence); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986) 
(Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting) (concluding that there is no Sixth Amendment violation where the accused 
requested an attorney at an arraignment and later waived an attorney after administration of Miranda 
rights); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (finding no Miranda violation when an accused waived his 
rights although he was unaware that an attorney already had been appointed for him); Wainwright v. 
Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1986) (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring) (holding that a request for a lawyer does not 
imply guilt so comments before the jury possibly could have been harmless). 
136 495 U.S. 14. 
137 496 U.S. 292. 
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a fellow inmate.  In Withrow v. Williams,138 Justice Rehnquist joined a dissent that voted 
to exclude Miranda violations from federal habeas review.  Finally, in Davis v. United 
States,139 he supported an opinion that held that so long as the request for a lawyer was 
ambiguous, questioning could continue without a Miranda violation.        
Taken together, from Tucker to Dickerson, the Chief participated in a total of 
fifty-seven major Miranda-related cases.140  Arguably in all of these cases, the Chief 
                                                
 
138 507 U.S. 680. 
139 512 U.S. 452. 
140 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 (1995) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994); Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 
318 (1994); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 700 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993); Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991); 
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 156 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 603 (1990) (Rehnquist, C.J.,  concurring in part, 
concurring in the result in part, and dissenting in part); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990); New York 
v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990); Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (1990); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 
195 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9 (1988); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988); Arizona 
v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 690 (1988) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987); 
Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987); Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987); Connecticut v. Barrett, 
479 U.S. 523 (1987); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 638 
(1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986); Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 
U.S. 284, 296 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985); Shea v. 
Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 61, 67 (1985) (White, J. and Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 
91, 100-01 (1984) (per curiam) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984); 
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638 (1984); Minnesota v. Murphy, 
465 U.S. 420 (1984); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 
(1983); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983); Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 697-98 (1982) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting); Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982); California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 
(1981); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 491-92 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring); Estelle v. Smith, 451 
U.S. 454, 475 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); California v. Prysock, 451 U.S. 1301 (1981); United 
States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 293-94 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 
231 (1980); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980); Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552 (1980); 
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 226 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979); Fare v. Michael C., 439 U.S. 1310 (1978); 
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 435-36 (1977) (White, J. and Blackmun, J., dissenting); Oregon v. 
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 620-21 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976); Garner 
v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 
U.S. 433 (1974).  
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either voted to distinguish or limit the scope of the 1966 ruling.141  In case after case, the 
Miranda doctrine found no friend in William Rehnquist. 
Yet, when it came to Dickerson, the trend abruptly ended.  Admittedly, it is 
possible that despite nearly thirty years of behaving otherwise, Justice Rehnquist 
genuinely believed in Miranda’s constitutionality.  Alternatively, perhaps the truth is 
precisely as the Chief described it in his opinion.  Specifically, stare decisis is such an 
important value that it induced his capitulation.  Yet, because in Dickerson the Chief 
could no longer count upon his long-standing alliance with Justices O’Connor and 
Kennedy,142 his true policy preferences cannot be derived from within the Dickerson 
decision.  Simply put, regardless of the Chief’s vote in Dickerson, it appears the majority 
of the Court—including some of Miranda’s critics—was going to support the centerpiece 
of the Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution.143   
As noted before, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, along with the Chief, had 
similar histories of voting to limit Miranda.144  Had they voted with Justices Scalia and 
Thomas in the conference, the Chief Justice would only need to join them to make a five-
member majority.  Given his grudging interpretation of the Miranda doctrine,145 it is 
difficult to believe that if given the opportunity to cast a deciding vote, he would have 
                                                
 
141 See supra notes 120-131 and accompanying text. 
142 Cruz, supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
143 Id.  Those arguing that the Chief Justice’s decision was the product of a sensitivity to public opinion, 
respect for the principle of stare decisis, or separation of powers might better apply those theories to 
explain the behavior of Justices O’Connor and Kennedy in Dickerson.   
144 See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
145 For a description of Justice Rehnquist’s Miranda related voting record see supra notes 120-131 and 
accompanying text.     
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come to Miranda’s rescue.  However, by all indications, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy 
were initially in the pro-Miranda majority.146  This reduced the Chief’s feasible set 
leaving him with one remaining question: whether to vote with the majority and thereby 
secure for himself the assignment decision or allow that authority to be exercised by 
Justice Stevens.   
The Chief chose the former.  His choice does not itself completely elucidate the 
true nature of the Chief’s policy preferences.  Again, it is possible that, in his later years, 
the Chief moderated his views.147  In order to evaluate this contingency, as well as to 
fully understand the nature of the strategic maneuver, a review of Justice Rehnquist’s 
post-Dickerson behavior is warranted.       
Evaluating the Evidence: Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Post-Dickerson Miranda 
Jurisprudence 
 
Between his decision in Dickerson and his death, the Rehnquist-led Court 
considered five major Miranda-related cases.148  In each of these cases, the Chief 
resumed exactly where he left off prior to Dickerson.  Consider Chavez v. Martinez,149 
where Justice Rehnquist voted to prevent a § 1983 claim against police officers, holding 
that until unwarned statements are used at trial, there is no violation.150  This vote is 
                                                
 
146 Cruz, supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
147 See Rosen, supra notes 5, 18 and accompanying text.  Contra Cruz, supra note 2 and accompanying 
text. 
148 See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004); Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004); Yarborough 
v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004); Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519 (2004); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 
U.S. 760 (2003). 
149 538 U.S. 760 (2003). 
150 Rehnquist explained:  
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curious because it is inconsistent with the position he purported to announce in 
Dickerson.  Specifically, Chavez implies that a failure to comply with Miranda is 
somehow different from other violations of the Constitution where § 1983 permits 
recovery.151      
His behavior in Chavez was soon followed by the 2004 companion “fruit of the 
poisonous tree” cases, Missouri v. Seibert152 and United States v. Patane.153  In Seibert, 
although a combined majority of the Court condemned the intentional use of a two-stage 
interrogation process designed to frustrate Miranda, the Chief joined the dissenting 
justices.154  In Patane, Justice Rehnquist again joined an opinion which furthered the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 We have likewise established the Miranda exclusionary rule as a prophylactic measure to 
prevent violations of the right protected by the text of the Self-Incrimination Clause—the 
admission into evidence in a criminal case of confessions obtained through coercive 
custodial questioning. Accordingly, Chavez’s failure to read Miranda warnings to 
Martinez did not violate Martinez’s constitutional rights and cannot be grounds for a § 
1983 action. And the absence of a “criminal case” in which Martinez was compelled to 
be a “witness” against himself defeats his core Fifth Amendment claim. 
Id. at 772-73 (citations omitted).   
151 Apparently, for the Chief, a Miranda violation held a lower constitutional status than, for example, a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.  It has long been held that an illegal search in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment can be authority for § 1983 action.  See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled 
on unrelated grounds; Monnell v. Dep’t of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (finding that unreasonable 
search and seizure by police officers supports a claim under § 1983); Finsel v. Cruppenik, 326 F.3d 903 
(7th Cir. 2003) (holding that unlawful searches, excessive use of force and false imprisonment are 
actionable under § 1983 where deputy could not reasonably believe he could kick in a motel door and 
forcibly enter a room simply to effectuate motel clerk’s desire to have a patron’s truck moved); Bolden v. 
Village of Monticello, 344 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding that because no reasonable officer could 
believe a no-knock warrant authorizing search of a location and all persons located inside without naming 
specific individuals authorized invasive strip and body cavity searches, a § 1983 claim may be pursued); 
Terrell v. Petrie, 763 F. Supp. 1342 (E.D. Va. 1991) (concluding that a search incident to a pretext arrest is 
unreasonable and violates Fourth Amendment, for which a claim under § 1983 is available). 
152 542 U.S. 600 (2004). 
153 542 U.S. 630 (2004).  For a discussion of Siebert, Patane and Chavez, see Yale Kamisar, PostScript: 
Another Look at Patane and Siebert, the 2004 Miranda “Poisoned Fruit” Cases, 2 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 
97 (2004). 
154 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Justice O’Connor relied heavily on the analysis in 
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), stating, “Elstad commands that if Siebert’s first statement is shown 
to have been involuntary, the court must examine whether the taint dissipated through the passing of time 
or a change of circumstances.”  Id. at 628. 
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notion that a Miranda violation is different from and less important than violations of 
other portions of the Constitution,155 as evidenced by descriptions of non-Miranda 
constitutional rights as “core protection,”156 “core privilege,”157 “actual right,”158 “actual 
protections,”159 and “actual violations,”160 thus distinguishing Miranda issues from “true” 
constitutional doctrines.161  Patane, much like its pre-Dickerson counterpart Elstad,162 
operates to preclude the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to Miranda 
violations.163  This differential treatment in Elstad was based upon the notion of 
Miranda’s sub-constitutionality.164  Following Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in 
Dickerson declaring Miranda a constitutional rule, the notion of sub-constitutionality no 
longer seemed sustainable.  Yet, Justice Thomas’s opinion in Patane follows this sub-
constitutional approach anyway by using the “prophylactic” language—terminology 
                                                
 
155 542 U.S. at 633. 
156 Id. at 637. 
157 Id. at 638. 
158 Id. at 639. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 642. 
161 This point is appropriately raised by Professor Kamisar: 
At no time in Dickerson did Chief Justice Rehnquist contrast the prophylactic rules of 
Miranda with the ‘actual Self-Incrimination Clause.’  Nor, in Dickerson, did he ever 
contrast Miranda violations with a ‘core’ violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause itself. 
Indeed at no time in Dickerson did Rehnquist call the Miranda rules ‘prophylactic.’  
However, in his Patane plurality opinion, Justice Thomas repeatedly characterized the 
Miranda rules as ‘prophylactic’ and repeatedly refers to ‘the core protection afforded by 
the Self-Incrimination Clause,’ ‘the core privilege against self-incrimination’ protected 
by prophylactic rules, ‘the actual right against compelled self-incrimination’ and ‘actual 
violations of the Due Process Clause or the Self -Incrimination Clause.   
Kamisar, supra note 4, at 125-26. 
162 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985). 
163 “Thus, unlike unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment or actual violations of the Due 
Process Clause or the Self-Incrimination Clause, there is, with respect to mere failures to warn, nothing to 
deter. There is therefore no reason to apply the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine of Wong Sun.”  Patane, 
542 U.S. at 642 (emphasis added).  See Kamisar, supra note 4, at 124-26.    
164 470 U.S. at 305. 
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associated with Miranda’s sub-constitutionality—which does not appear anywhere in the 
Chief Justice’s opinion in Dickerson.165  
Despite his opinion in Dickerson supporting Miranda’s constitutionality, Justice 
Rehnquist supported positions in Seibert, Patane, Chavez, and other cases that described 
a Miranda violation as somehow different from other constitutional violations.  For Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, that difference operated to preclude the application of traditional 
constitutional remedies such as § 1983166 as well as the suppression mechanism available 
through the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.167  Simply put, the Chief’s post-
Dickerson behavior, taken together with his pre-Dickerson voting, makes it almost 
impossible to avoid the conclusion—despite what he seemed to say in Dickerson—that 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist did not really believe that Miranda was a 
constitutionally based decision. 
Setting the Record Straight on Dickerson v. United States 
From these post-Dickerson cases, it is clear that the Chief’s 2000 decision did not 
reflect a new found respect for Miranda.  Instead, with the direct question of Miranda’s 
constitutionality already decided by a majority of the Dickerson Court, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist did the best he could given the reduced choices in his feasible set.168  Rather 
than allow Justice Stevens the power of opinion assignment, he voted with the majority 
                                                
 
165 Kamisar, supra note 4, at 125-26. 
166 Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 776 (2003). 
167 Patane, 542 U.S. at 642. 
168 See Cruz, supra note 2, at 15.  (“Although not what one would describe as the tightest of logical 
syllogisms, it was the best that could be gotten from the current members of the Court.”). 
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and assigned himself the opinion.169  Given his decision to craft a majority opinion, the 
Chief needed a rationale sufficient to garner a court majority.  Thus, he cited stare decisis 
and the Warren Court’s own view of what it was doing as justification for his support of 
Miranda.170 
With the apparent elevation of Miranda to a fully constitutional status, the 
exceptions that had been built upon Miranda’s sub-constitutional foundation stood in 
peril.  Justice Stevens, the alternative opinion assignor, had a long history of resisting the 
Miranda exceptions.171  After spending nearly thirty years crafting limitations to 
Miranda, it is hard to believe the Chief would allow Justice Stevens the opportunity to 
undo his legacy.  Chief Justice Rehnquist thus took control of the future of the doctrine 
and crafted an opinion that both studiously avoided discussion of the continued viability 
                                                
 
169 “Had the Chief voted with the dissenters, the majority opinion would have been assigned by the senior 
Justice in the majority, in this case Justice Stevens. . . . [I]n my judgment, the Chief acted decisively to 
avoid that consequence.  He voted with the majority and assigned the opinion to himself.”  Id. at 14-15.  
170 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442-43 (2000).  Cruz, the former Rehnquist clerk implies that 
the stare decisis rationale is a subterfuge.  In responding to questions regarding Dickerson’s logical 
underpinning Cruz responds, “do not ask why, and please, never, ever, ever cite this opinion for any 
reason.”  Cruz, supra note 2, at 15.   
171 A cursory review of the voting records demonstrates that most of the Miranda exceptions supported by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist were opposed by Justice Stevens.  See, e.g., New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 
(1990); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980); North 
Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979).  Additionally, in some cases with Miranda issues, Justice Stevens 
prevailed while Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented.  See, e.g., Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995); 
Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988); Michigan v. 
Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986); Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U. S. 51(1985); Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984); 
Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 (1982); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980); Dunaway v. New 
York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).  Evidence of Justice Stevens’ view is also prominently demonstrated in Oregon 
v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), where the oral argument displayed an exchange between Justices Stevens 
and O’Connor regarding the constitutional underpinning of the Miranda decision.  “I must confess that if 
it’s not a constitutional violation, I don’t know where this Court ever had the power to set aside any state 
conviction. . . . It seems to me analytically it must be a constitutional violation or else we have no business 
in this area at all.”  Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, id. (No. 83-773). 
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of the Miranda exceptions and included language designed to aid in his final stand.  
Although dicta in Dickerson, he argued that Miranda’s newly discovered 
constitutionality was premised on its current form, a form which included all of its 
exceptions.  Specifically, he stated, “our subsequent cases have reduced the impact of the 
Miranda rule on legitimate law enforcement while re-affirming the decision’s core ruling 
. . . .”172   
This sentence later became a centerpiece of the Patane opinion.173  Justice 
Thomas, with the support of the Chief, argued that both this language as well as the 
Dickerson Court’s reliance upon cases such as Tucker and Elstad “demonstrate[d] the 
continuing validity of those decisions” following Dickerson.174  Although dicta, 
Rehnquist’s wording that “subsequent cases [had] reduced the impact on law 
enforcement” somehow passed without public objection, as Dickerson features the 
complete absence of any concurring opinion.  Yet, it is this sentence which is the Trojan 
horse of the Dickerson decision.  To be precise, the genius of the stare decisis rationale as 
applied by the Chief Justice in Dickerson is that he applied it to all aspects of the 
Miranda doctrine, exceptions included.   
Thus, once again, when the Chief Justice elected to join the majority and assigned 
the opinion to himself, he both denied Justice Stevens control over the matter and crafted 
the very language that would later be used to argue that all of the exceptions are part of 
                                                
 
172 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443. 
173 United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004). 
174 Id. at 640. 
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his constitutional decision.  Many of those exceptions, of course, are based upon the sub-
constitutional treatment for this “constitutional” rule.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
HUSTLE AND FLOW: A SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS  
OF THE AMERICAN FEDERAL JUDICIARY1 
 
Scholars have long asserted that social structure is an important feature of a variety of 
societal institutions.
2
 Whether analyzing private or public, non-professional or 
professional organizations, the existing literature consistently asserts how social factors 
and not necessarily expertise dictate both directives and an organization’s substantive 
institutional practices.
3
 Extrapolating to law-giving institutions—most notably the 
aggregate outputs of the federal judiciary—we believe social structure, and the formal 
and informal interactions between judicial actors, at least in part, charts the course of 
doctrinal development. Specifically, if when considering a given legal decision jurists 
                                                
 
1 This chapter was previously published as Daniel Martin Katz & Derek K Stafford, Hustle and Flow: A 
Social Network Analysis of the American Federal Judiciary, 71 OHIO ST. L. J. 457 (2010).  
2 
See, e.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (W.D. Halls trans., The Free Press 1984) 
(1893); REID HASTIE, STEVEN D. PENROD & NANCY PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY (1983) (providing 
insight into the role of social influence in jury decision making); DAVID KNOKE, POLITICAL NETWORKS: 
THE STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE (1990); ARTHUR L. STINCHCOMBE, SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND 
ORGANIZATIONS (1965); Brian Colwell, Deference or Respect? Status Management Practices Among 
Prison Inmates, 70 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 442 (2007) (analyzing the social structure of a California prison and 
determining that social standing among the prisoners derives from interpersonal dynamics); Kenneth A. 
Frank & Jeffrey Y. Yasumoto, Linking Action to Social Structure Within a System: Social Capital Within 
and Between Subgroups, 104 AM. J. SOC. 642 (1998); David Knoke, Networks as Political Glue: 
Explaining Public Policy-Making, in SOCIOLOGY AND THE PUBLIC AGENDA 164–184 (William Julius 
Wilson ed., 1993); Edward O. Laumann, Peter V. Marsden & Joseph Galaskiewicz, Community-Elite 
Influence Structures: Extension of a Network Approach, 83 AM. J. SOC. 594 (1977); Michael Lounsbury & 
Marc J. Ventresca, Social Structure and Organizations Revisited, in SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND 
ORGANIZATIONS REVISITED 3–38 (Michael Lounsbury & Marc J. Ventresca eds., 2002); Barry Markovsky, 
David Willer & Travis Patton, Power Relations in Exchange Networks, 53 AM. SOC. REV. 220 (1988).  
3 
Of great interest to the study of legal institutions are the early network-based studies of the medical 
profession and their subsequent extensions. See generally JAMES S. COLEMAN, ELIHU KATZ & HERBERT 
MENZEL, MEDICAL INNOVATION: A DIFFUSION STUDY (1966) (finding the implementation of new medical 
technology more closely tracks a network-based upon the social connections between doctors than a 
network based upon expertise); James Coleman, Elihu Katz & Herbert Menzel, The Diffusion of an 
Innovation Among Physicians, 20 SOCIOMETRY 253 (1957). 
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either formally or informally consider the views of their colleagues, then properly, 
conceptualizing the nature and mapping the dynamics of such “peer effects” would 
appear to be a critical task for public law scholarship.
4
 In other words, if legal outcomes 
are at least in part socially constituted, then an effort to characterize the relevant social 
architecture should complement the existing public law literature, perhaps helping to 
bridge divides among the behavioral, strategic, and historical institutionalist decision 
making theories.
5
  
Of course, acknowledging a role for “judicial peer effects” does not itself produce a 
social-scientific approach designed to isolate the social linkages between jurists. Prior 
studies relying upon academic ratings
6
 or citation counts find institutional authority alone 
does not explain the prestige and influence across judges.
7
 Instead, this literature 
                                                
 
4 
From a game theoretic perspective, this is akin to arguing that the ‘judicial game’ is a game on a graph. 
While there has been little formal work applying a game or games on graphs approach, a small but growing 
segment of the public law literature is devoted to devoted to more contextual understandings of judicial 
decision making. See LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL 
BEHAVIOR (2006); Charles M. Cameron & Craig P. Cummings, Diversity and Judicial Decision-Making: 
Evidence from Affirmative Action in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 1971–1999 (Mar. 30, 2003) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (applying a “social economics approach” to the behavior of 
judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals). Cameron and Cummings cite a number of studies which taken 
together “cast considerable doubt on what might be called the traditional political science approach to 
decision-making on collegial courts.” Id.; see, e.g., Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro, Institutional 
Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority Representation Under Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 299 (2004); Gerald S. Gryski, Eleanor C. Main & William J. Dixon, Models of State High 
Court Decision Making in Sex Discrimination Cases, 48 J. POL. 143 (1986); Richard L. Revesz, 
Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997); see also Christina 
L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging (July 19, 
2007) (on file with author), available at http:ssrn.com/abstract=1001748. 
5 
For a very brief introduction to some of these approaches, see generally infra Part II.A. 
6 
See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira, In the Mirror of the Justices: Sources of Greatness on the Supreme Court, 
10 POL. BEHAV. 247 (1988) (describing the literature using subjective evaluations); see also Rodney L. 
Mott, Judicial Influence, 30 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 295 (1936).  
7 
See, e.g., David Klein & Darby Morrisroe, The Prestige and Influence of Individual Judges on the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 371 (1999); William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig & Michael E. 
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documents great variance in judicial esteem even across judges with equal formal 
authority. Building on the themes of this largely non-Supreme Court centric scholarship, 
this study uses network analysis to visualize the social topology of the overall federal 
judicial branch.  
Although network analysts often rely upon survey data to build the connections 
between actors,
8
 in the context of the federal judiciary, there is significant reason to 
believe that survey-based network data collected from federal judges would suffer from 
rampant non-response or other systematic biases. Thus, in order to develop a picture of 
the social landscape, it is necessary to rely upon a proxy measure for social connectivity. 
We believe the revealed preferences displayed in the aggregate flow of law clerks 
between judges reflect a proxy for social and professional esteem.
9
 While not conclusive, 
the use of this proxy in a network analysis provides an approximate snapshot of the social 
structure of the federal judiciary.  
This study visualizes the traffic of law clerks over the decade-long period of the 
“natural” Rehnquist Court (1995–2004).
10
 As operationalized herein, judges who share 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Solimine, Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 
271 (1998); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else 
Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993); William G. Ross, The Ratings Game: Factors That Influence 
Judicial Reputation, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 401 (1996). 
8 
See STANLEY WASSERMAN & KATHERINE FAUST, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS: METHODS AND 
APPLICATIONS 45–48 (1994) (noting that the questionnaire is the data collection method “most commonly 
used (especially when actors are people)”). 
9 
For the argument supporting the use of this proxy, see infra Parts II.B, II.C.  
10 
The “natural Rehnquist Court” is typically defined as the period from 1994–2005 where the composition 
of judges remained unchanged. To synergize this period with the clerk hiring calendar, our data is restricted 
to the 1995–2004 time period. For use of the term in another empirical context see, for example, Lori A. 
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clerks may be both socially connected and highly regarded within the relevant 
community. Thus, the structural prestige derived from our analysis is not separable into 
its social and professional components. Of course, it is likely that jurists who are best 
able to persuade the aggregate institution to support their specific doctrinal vision are 
those who jointly maximize across the social and professional dimensions.  
The precursor to evaluating the policy consequences that a given social structure 
imposes is an effort to characterize its nature. While we do not directly map doctrinal 
outputs and only generate a static picture of the landscape, we recognize there is no 
“pause button” in the external environment. Therefore, reputation effects, esteem, 
prestige, and influence are undoubtedly generated through dynamic processes that 
include negative and positive feedback.
11
 What is needed is a methodology that can 
capture the richness of this adaptive landscape. Complexity generally, and network 
analysis more specifically, may help harness this dynamism, thereby allowing for unique 
insight into the mechanics of social persuasion within the aggregate federal judiciary.  
                                                                                                                                            
 
Ringhand, Judicial Activism: An Empirical Examination of Voting Behavior on the Rehnquist Natural 
Court, 24 CONST. COMM. 43 (2007).  
11 
It is worth emphasizing the consistently changing composition of the aggregate institution. Namely, 
actors enter and exit the network; thus within the newly constituted social world, their doctrinal legacy may 
or may not sustain. Although our current effort is not suited to capture notions of legacy, even a casual 
observer would recognize that although many jurists’ views are quickly forgotten, the views of a selected 
few persist. Federal judges such as Learned Hand, Jerome Frank, Henry Friendly, and J. Skelly Wright, as 
well as state supreme court justices such as Cornelius Moynihan, Hans Linde, Roger Traynor, and Stanley 
Mosk, impose distinctive legacies.  
  
 63 
To motivate the use of network analytics, the article begins in Part I with a 
description of the science of networks as a subset of the larger field of complexity.
12
 With 
homage to Moreno, Milgram, Grannovetter, Watts, and Strogatz as well as others, it 
describes how network analysis,
13
 the long-standing but recently popularized 
methodology, allows for the insightful study of a variety of social systems.  
                                                
 
12 
While not yet part of the mainstream legal literature, complexity theory has made important contributions 
to legal scholarship. See, e.g., Barbara A. Cherry, The Telecommunications Economy and Regulation as 
Coevolving Complex Adaptive Systems: Implications for Federalism, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 369 (2007); 
Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of the 
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546 (1994); Vincent Di Lorenzo, Complexity 
and Legislative Signatures: Lending Discrimination Laws as a Test Case, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 637 (1996); 
Daniel A. Farber, Earthquakes and Tremors in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Study of the 
Dynamics of Interpretation, 89 MINN. L. REV. 848 (2005); Greg Todd Jones, Dynamical Jurisprudence: 
Law as a Complex System, 24 GA. ST. L. REV. 873 (2008); David G. Post & Michael B. Eisen, How Long is 
the Coastline of the Law? Thoughts on the Fractal Nature of Legal Systems, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 545 (2000); 
Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641 (1996); J.B. Ruhl, The 
Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical 
Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996); J.B. Ruhl, Law’s Complexity: A Primer, 24 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 885 (2008); J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management —Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J. L. 
SCI. & TECH. 21 (2005); Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, On the Regulation of Networks as 
Complex Systems: A Graph Theory Approach, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1687 (2005); Bernard Trujillo, Patterns 
in a Complex System: An Empirical Study of Valuation in Business Bankruptcy Cases, 53 UCLA L. REV. 
357 (2005); For an extensive list of scholarship, see J.B. Ruhl, Complex Adaptive Systems Literature for 
Law and Social Sciences, http://law.vanderbilt.edu/seal/ resources/readingscomplex.htm (last visited Jan. 
11, 2010).  
13 
Formal network analysis—or invocation of its core concepts—has recently been witnessed within legal, 
social science, and physics literatures. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Thomas A. Smith & Antonio 
Tomarchio, The Reagan Revolution in the Network of Law, 57 EMORY L. J. 1227 (2008); James H. Fowler 
& Sangick Jeon, The Authority of Supreme Court Precedent, 30 SOC. NETWORKS 16 (2008); James H. 
Fowler et al., Network Analysis and the Law: Measuring the Legal Importance of Precedents at the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 324 (2007); Daniel M. Katz, Derek K. Stafford & Eric Provins, Social 
Architecture, Judicial Peer Effects and the “Evolution” of the Law: Toward a Positive Theory of Judicial 
Social Structure, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 977 (2008); E. A. Leicht et al., Large-Scale Structure of Time 
Evolving Citation Networks, 59 EUR. PHYSICAL J. B 75 (2007); Anthony Paik, Ann Southworth & John P. 
Heinz, Lawyers of the Right: Networks and Organization, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 883 (2007); Thomas A. 
Smith, The Web of Law, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 309 (2007); Katherine J. Strandburg et al., Law and the 
Science of Networks: An Overview and an Application to the “Patent Explosion,” 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1293 (2006); David J. Walsh, On the Meaning and Pattern of Legal Citations: Evidence from State 
Wrongful Discharge Precedent Cases, 31 L. & SOC’Y REV. 337 (1997); Frank B. Cross, Thomas A. Smith 
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In an effort to justify the use of law clerk traffic as a proxy for social connectivity, 
Part II of this Article reviews two major strains of the extant legal literature. After briefly 
introducing the larger field of public law, it demonstrates how the behavior of actors 
within the law clerk market might, in part, help reveal the social structure of the federal 
judiciary. Concepts such as social influence are fairly difficult to operationalize and, in 
response, scholars have developed an array of diverse approaches to consider such 
questions.
14
 We believe that a promising addition to the literature would be a graph 
theoretic approach. Specifically, notwithstanding any allocative inefficiencies present in 
the judicial law clerk market, it is highly probable that, in the aggregate, judicial 
reputation significantly affects the matching of law clerks with their employers. Thus, as 
applied to the marriage of these two literatures, the network analysis advanced here relies 
upon the displayed preferences of both judges and clerks, embedded within law clerk 
traffic, to provide a partial picture of the institution’s aggregate topology.  
 Part III represents this Article’s core contribution. It begins with a description of the 
significant data collection effort undertaken to support our findings. Our research team 
collected available information for every federal judicial law clerk employed by an 
Article III judge
15
 during the full term of the “natural” Rehnquist Court (1995–2004). 
Holding the United States Supreme Court constant and drawing from a base of nearly 
                                                                                                                                            
 
& Antonio Tomarchio, Determinants of Cohesion in the Supreme Court’s Network of Precedents (Aug. 14, 
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=924110. 
14 
For a discussion of these approaches, see infra Part II.A. 
15 
As available clerk information for Senior Status Judges is far less extensive, we choose to omit Senior 
Status Judges from this study. 
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19,000 clerk events,
16
 Part III provides a series of visualizations and corresponding 
network statistics. Such statistics are critical because they help identify critical actors and 
illuminate the class of generating processes that are likely responsible for the observed 
network. For example, we hypothesize that a process of preferential attachment, similar 
to that described by physicists Barabási and Albert, likely generates the federal judicial 
social network.
17
  
Part IV provides some concluding thoughts about emergence, convergence, peer 
effects, and legal change in the federal judicial hierarchy. Although our effort is first-
order, the structure of the network visualized herein provides significant insight into how 
the local actions of a series of micro-motivated judicial actors maps to the judiciary’s 
macro-jurisprudential outputs.
18
   
PART I. THE SCIENCE OF NETWORKS: FROM MORENO TO MILGRAM TO 
WATTS AND STROGATZ AND BEYOND 
 
Built upon the combination of linear algebra, graph theory, and traditional statistical 
approaches, network analysis should help illuminate the social structure of the federal 
judiciary. Using nodes to represent actors and ties to represent relations between actors, 
network analysis differs from traditional statistical models as it attempts to determine not 
only properties of an individual’s relationships to his or her peers, but also the larger 
                                                
 
16 
Hereinafter, a “clerk event” is defined as a given clerk employed by an individual judge for a given year. 
For example, a clerk hired for a two-year interval constitutes two clerk events. A permanent clerk 
employed for k years would have k law clerk events.  
17 
As described infra Part III, we lack the necessary evidence to definitively characterize the generative 
process. Based upon the currently available quantitative and qualitative evidence, we believe a process akin 
to Barabási and Albert’s preferential attachment represents a good working hypothesis.  
18 
See generally THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR (1978).  
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social structure in which that individual operates.
19
 As the techniques of network science 
and complex systems are often unfamiliar, we proceed with a broad introduction to both 
fields. Such an introduction should motivate our larger project of building a picture of the 
social landscape using the information embedded in the law clerk labor market. 
A. Emergence in a Broad Class of Complex Systems Models 
Network analysis is a disciplined scientific approach used to understand the 
interactions between agents in a complex system.
20
 Although the definition of a “complex 
system” is awkward and can seem nebulous, nearly all definitions would specify that the 
system must exhibit emergent behavior.
21
 Traditionally, systems display emergence when 
the micro-study of individual actors in a given system yields incomplete information 
about the entirety of the organization.
22
 Instead, interactions between the components, at 
                                                
 
19 
See WASSERMAN & FAUST, supra note 7, at 17–21. 
20 
Drawn from core concepts developed within the academy, a host of recent literature has popularized the 
study of network analysis. The devotion of the ninetieth anniversary of Forbes magazine to network 
analysis is one of many indications that this is a renaissance period for the science of networks. See Tom 
Post, The Power of Networks, FORBES, May 7, 2007, at 49 (devoting its ninetieth anniversary issue to the 
“new” age of networks). For a non-exhaustive list of recent popular books in the subject, see ALBERT-
LÁSZLÓ BARABÁSI, LINKED: THE NEW SCIENCE OF NETWORKS (2002); MARK BUCHANAN, NEXUS: SMALL 
WORLDS AND THE GROUNDBREAKING SCIENCE OF NETWORKS (2002); MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING 
POINT: HOW LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE (2000); DUNCAN J. WATTS, SIX DEGREES: THE 
SCIENCE OF A CONNECTED AGE (2003). 
21 
For more detailed discussion of emergence including applications to a variety of disciplines, see 
generally JOHN H. HOLLAND, EMERGENCE: FROM CHAOS TO ORDER (1998); STEPHEN WOLFRAM, A NEW 
KIND OF SCIENCE (2002); David J. Chalmers, Strong and Weak Emergence, in THE RE-EMERGENCE OF 
EMERGENCE: THE EMERGENTIST HYPOTHESIS FROM SCIENCE TO RELIGION 245 (Philip Clayton & Paul 
Davies eds., 2006); Tom De Wolf & Tom Holvoet, Emergence Versus Self-Organisation: Different 
Concepts but Promising When Combined, in ENGINEERING SELF-ORGANISING SYSTEMS: METHODOLOGIES 
AND APPLICATIONS 1 (Sven A. Brueckner et al. eds., 2005). 
22 
See generally HOLLAND, supra note 20. De Wolf and Holvoet provide a more detailed working definition 
of emergence. They argue that “[a] system exhibits emergence when there are coherent emergents at the 
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least in part, structure the outputs of the system.
23
 As Peter Corning describes, “[a]mong 
other things, complexity theory gave mathematical legitimacy to the idea that processes 
involving the interactions among many parts may be at once deterministic yet for various 
reasons unpredictable.”
24
  
Common examples of emergence include the study of ecosystems where order 
emerges from the interspecies interactions. Emergent systems do not necessarily have 
logical or deterministic properties. Thus, their outputs cannot always be deduced or 
predicted. Consider H2O phase transitions. Water boils and freezes at very specific 
temperatures under controlled conditions, but nothing about the change in temperatures 
affects the actual water molecules.
25
 At precisely 100°C and 0°C the molecules begin to 
interact differently; and thus, from liquid, new macro-worlds of solid ice and water vapor 
                                                                                                                                            
 
macro-level that dynamically arise from the interactions between the parts at the micro-level. Such 
emergents are novel w.r.t. the individual parts of the system.” See De Wolf & Holvoet, supra note 20, at 3. 
23 
For an illuminating discussion of emergence and its historical origin, see Peter A. Corning, The Re-
Emergence of “Emergence”: A Venerable Concept in Search of a Theory, 7 COMPLEXITY 18–19 (2002); 
see also BRIAN GOODWIN, HOW THE LEOPARD CHANGED ITS SPOTS: THE EVOLUTION OF COMPLEXITY 
(1994); STEVEN JOHNSON, EMERGENCE: THE CONNECTED LIVES OF ANTS, BRAINS, CITIES, AND SOFTWARE 
(2001). The last decade witnessed the creation of an academic journal devoted to exploring the concepts of 
emergence. See generally EMERGENCE, http://emergence.org/index.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2010). 
24 
See Corning, supra note 22, at 21. There is not a uniform agreement regarding the appropriate definition 
of emergence. See JOSHUA M. EPSTEIN & ROBERT AXTELL, GROWING ARTIFICAL SOCIETIES: SOCIAL 
SCIENCE FROM THE BOTTOM UP 35 (1996) (defining emergent phenomena to be “stable macroscopic 
patterns arising from the local interactions of agents.”) (emphasis omitted). Outlining a variety of rationales 
including the anti-scientific history of British emergentism, Professor Epstein offers deep concerns 
regarding its continued use in the field of complex systems. See Joshua M. Epstein, Agent-Based 
Computational Models and Generative Social Science, in GENERATIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE 31–37 (2006). 
While we do not take a pass on its continued use, we recognize the merit of Professor Epstein’s argument.  
25 
See, e.g., PIERRE PAPON, JACQUES LEBLOND & PAUL H. E. MEIJER, THE PHYSICS OF PHASE TRANSITIONS: 
CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS 1 (S.L. Schnur trans., Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2d ed. 2006). 
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emerge.
26
 An extensive study of the chemical characteristics between these moments of 
transition would not predict the discontinuity that occurs at these threshold points. 
Automobile traffic is another example of a complex system.
27
 To characterize the 
global properties of a traffic system, one could code a set of individual-level variables, 
including the horsepower of the respective vehicles, the disposition of the drivers, and a 
host of decisional rules employed by the driver, including the leave space and a driver’s 
ideal speed and lane. Even with an understanding of all of these properties, it is 
ultimately the interactions between actors that structure outputs for the overall system. 
Whether flow or bottleneck will emerge is a function of the intermingling of individuals, 
each of whom possesses a host of these attributes and decisional rules. Thus, it depends 
upon the precise spatial distribution of agents and the nature of their local interactions. 
Returning to the matter of inquiry, the federal judiciary exhibits behavior that might 
be considered emergent. While a judge in a given case may rule in isolation of other 
judges, jurists generally do not exist in a state of complete social and professional 
isolation from their peers. The socialization and training of the legal community occurs 
through various repeated interactions with one’s current or future peers at moments and 
                                                
 
26 
See Corning, supra note 22, at 24.  
27 
There exists a broad host of scholarship modeling the dynamics of traffic. For a cursory sample, see Ofer 
Biham, A. Alan Middleton & Dov Levine, Self-Organization and a Dynamical Transition in Traffic-Flow 
Models, 46 PHYSICAL REV. A 6124 (1992); Debashish Chowdhury, Ludger Santen & Andreas 
Schadschneider, Statistical Physics of Vehicular Traffic and Some Related Systems, 329 PHYSICS REP. 199 
(2000); Henryk Fukś & Nino Boccara, Generalized Deterministic Traffic Rules, 9 INT’L J. MODERN 
PHYSICS C 1 (1998); Kai Nagel & Michael Schreckenberg, A Cellular Automaton Model for Freeway 
Traffic, 2 J. DE PHYSIQUE 2221 (1992); Shin-ichi Tadaki & Macoto Kikuchi, Jam Phases in a Two-
Dimensional Cellular-Automaton Model of Traffic Flow, 50 PHYSICAL REV. E 4564 (1994). 
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places throughout the hierarchy.
28
 In some cases, social interactions begin in law school
29
 
and in others they begin even sooner. Accordingly, if judicial perceptions and outcomes 
are at least, in part, the by-product of these interactions, then larger interpretative frames, 
themselves the aggregation of various individual decisions, assuredly are emergent. As 
such, the federal judiciary is a “complex system” and would benefit from methodologies 
reserved for the study of complexity.  
B. A Brief Introduction to Social Network Analysis 
One method of studying a complex system is network analysis, an approach which 
maps the aggregate topology by quantifying the local interactions between agents.
30
 In 
the early twentieth century, researchers such as Jacob Moreno used network analysis to 
compile sociograms that diagramed social relationships and identified individuals who 
held structural positions that were indicative of leadership.
31
 Following this early work, 
Stanley Milgram did much to advance the popularity of network analysis. Through his 
study of communal relationships in society in the 1960s, the “small worlds” or “six 
degrees of separation” conception entered the popular lexicon.
32
 In his experiment, 
Milgram sent letters to a sample of people in Kansas and Nebraska and asked the subjects 
if they would attempt to send these letters to a stockbroker in Boston, Massachusetts.
33
 
On average, the letters who reached the target only passed through the hands of 6.5 
                                                
 
28 
See, e.g., DUNCAN E. KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC 
AGAINST THE SYSTEM (1983).  
29 
See ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A LAWYER” 210 
(2007) (citing Christa McGill, Producing Lawyers: Institutional Hierarchy and the Social Structure of Law 
Schools (2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University)).  
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people, and thus Milgram argued that the social world was quite small, with only six 
degrees of separation between a random selection of people.
34
  
The logic supporting the original Milgram experiment was fairly straightforward. If 
every individual each knows 150 people and each of those 150 people know 150 others, 
the size of the network exceeds the total world population before the sixth order of 
magnitude. Such a hypothesized network, however, was a random network where the 
interrelations between an individual’s second-degree friends were not explicitly modeled. 
In subsequent work, Mark Granovetter argued that world social connections do not 
                                                                                                                                            
 
30 
The origins of network science are closely linked to the development of graph theory. Leonhard Euler, 
whose major contributions include the first theorem in graph theory, developed his work in an effort to 
solve the Konisberg Bridge Problem. In reduced form, the Konigsberg Bridge Problem asks whether it is 
possible to traverse the town of Konigsberg, while both crossing each of its seven bridges only once and 
closing the circuit by returning to one’s point of origin. Euler demonstrated this was not possible. With 
reference to the Konisberg Bridge Problem, mathematicians ask whether “there exists any Eulerian path on 
the network.” See THE STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF NETWORKS 2 (Mark Newman, Albert-László 
Barabási & Duncan J. Watts eds., 2006). For more on the life and work of Leonhard Euler, see C. EDWARD 
SANDIFER, THE EARLY MATHEMATICS OF LEONHARD EULER (2007). For more information on graph theory, 
see, for example, GARY CHARTRAND, INTRODUCTORY GRAPH THEORY (1977) and FRANK HARARY, GRAPH 
THEORY (1969).  
31 
It is hard to understate the contribution of Jacob Moreno to the development of social network analysis. 
Along with Kurt Lewin and Fritz Heider, the first half of the twentieth century witnessed dramatic 
developments in the science of networks. For example, Moreno developed the “sociogram,” an apparatus 
that allows social relationships to be drawn using analytic geometry. See J. L. MORENO, WHO SHALL 
SURVIVE? A NEW APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN INTERRELATIONS 86, 153 (1934). Kurt Lewin 
extended Moreno’s work, arguing that the structural properties of social space could be uncovered using a 
host of mathematical techniques including graph theory, topology, and set theory. See, e.g., KURT LEWIN, 
FIELD THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE: SELECTED THEORETICAL PAPERS 64, 92 (Dorwin Cartwright ed., 1951).  
32 
See Stanley Milgram, The Small-World Problem, 1 PSYCHOL. TODAY 61 (1967). Milgram is often 
credited with coining “six degrees of separation.” However, many attribute the term to a Hungarian author, 
Frigyes Karinthy, whose volume of short stories, Everything Is Different, invoked such concepts.  
33 
Milgram, however, did not provide the subjects with the address of the stockbroker; he instead insisted 
individuals send the letter to someone they thought would be socially closer to the man in Boston. See 
Milgram, supra note 31, at 64. 
34 
See id. at 65; see also Charles Korte & Stanley Milgram, Acquaintance Networks Between Racial 
Groups: Application of the Small World Method, 15 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 101 (1970) 
(replicating the small world experiment between different racial groups); Jeffrey Travers & Stanley 
Milgram, An Experimental Study of the Small World Problem, 32 SOCIOMETRY 425, 428 (1969) (varying 
the starting populations and providing “a first technical report on the small world method”). 
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emerge randomly.
35
 People cluster and organize in cliques; thus, if two people are strong 
friends the likelihood that they have shared friends is fairly high.
36
 This commonality 
between connections of people in similar groupings would not allow the macro-network 
to exhibit the exponential growth suggested by Milgram’s theory. Since Milgram’s 
experiment and subsequent replications
37
 still demonstrated a “small world,” Granovetter 
worked to develop an alternative causal account that would sustain the empirical 
phenomena. He noticed the weaker the ties between individuals the more likely those 
connections would not coincide. Hence, these weak ties maintained the small-world 
characteristics observed by Milgram. Accordingly, Granovetter supplemented Milgram’s 
work by categorizing the connections between individuals by the strength of those bonds, 
while also placing more realistic restraints on Milgram’s random networks.  
Following on these themes of prior scholars, the latest wave of network science is 
attributable to a host of scholars in the physical sciences including Watts and Strogatz
38
 
                                                
 
35 
Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC. 1360 (1973). 
36 
Id. at 1362. Granovetter did not argue that this empirical fact completely undercut widespread 
connectivity; rather, he argued only that widespread societal links are an artifact of one’s weak connections. 
Id. at 1378. In his seminal article The Strength of Weak Ties, Granovetter provided an addendum to 
Milgram’s theory. See generally id. See also Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network 
Theory Revisited, 1 SOC. THEORY 201 (1983). Granovetter understood that if Person A was close friends 
with Persons B and C, then Persons B and C were also likely friends with one another. See Granovetter, 
supra note 34, at 1362. Accordingly, the stronger the bonds between individuals, the more likely their first 
degree nodes are also connected. In network analysis, this is known as balance theory. See Fritz Heider, 
Attitudes and Cognitive Organization, 21 J. PSYCHOL. 107, 107 (1946) (asserting in part the idea of 
balance); see also WASSERMAN & FAUST, supra note 7, at 220–32.  
37 
See Korte & Milgram, supra note 33; Travers & Milgram, supra note 33. 
38 
See Duncan J. Watts & Steven H. Strogatz, Collective Dynamics of ‘Small-World’ Networks, 393 
NATURE 440 (1998). 
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as well as Barabási and Albert.
39
 Motivated by the organizational behavior of a certain 
species of fireflies in Southeast Asia, Watts and Strogatz demonstrated how a relatively 
small amount of random wiring can allow a network simultaneously to hold the small 
world properties hypothesized by Milgram and the high clustering described by 
Granovetter.
40
 Apparently, fireflies in this region have the rather unusual habit of flashing 
in unison.
41
 However, neurological analysis of the fireflies indicated that they should not 
have the mental faculty necessary to coordinate this effort. Although the fireflies may 
take cues from their neighbors, this alone was not enough to generate the witnessed 
behavior. Namely, in the early evening, witnesses commonly observe one firefly light 
and then another. Suddenly, groups of fireflies flash. Finally, concentrations of hundreds 
of fireflies on the same tree synchronize their flashes in unison.  
In the initial moments at dusk when the fireflies are randomly flashing, these 
uncoordinated flashes could be considered possible offerings of timing. Think of 
applause in an auditorium.
42
 Since only one sequence ultimately emerges, it is important 
                                                
 
39 
See Albert-László Barabási & Réka Albert, Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks, 286 SCIENCE 
509 (1999); see also Réka Albert & Albert-László Barabási, Statistical Mechanics of Complex Networks, 
74 REVS. OF MODERN PHYSICS 47 (2002). Although outside the scope of this article, it is worth noting that 
network science has also developed a variety of models of network evolution. For example, Professor 
Smith introduces legal scholars to the Bose-Einstein condensation (BEC) approach to studying the 
evolution of networks where nodes are permitted to possess differential levels of fitness. See Smith, supra 
note 12, at 322–23 (citing Ginestra Bianconi & Albert-László Barabási, Bose-Einstein Condensation in 
Complex Networks, 86 PHYSICAL REV. LETTERS 5632 (2001)); see also Alain Barrat, Marc Barthélemy & 
Alessandro Vespignani, Weighted Evolving Networks: Coupling Topology and Weight Dynamics, 92 
PHYSICAL REV. LETTERS 228701-1 (2004). 
40 
See Watts & Strogatz, supra note 37, at 440. 
41 
See, e.g., STEVEN STROGATZ, SYNC: THE EMERGING SCIENCE OF SPONTANEOUS ORDER 11 (2003).  
42 
See, e.g., John H. Miller & Scott E. Page, The Standing Ovation Problem, 9 COMPLEXITY 8 (2004).  
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to understand how the landscape moves from divergence to convergence, from 
randomness to some sense of relative order.
43
  
Watts and Strogatz used computational models to simulate the fireflies’ flashing 
based upon different rules about how the insects could react to cues from their neighbors. 
However, the initial simulations failed to reproduce the simultaneous flashing. Even with 
near immediate reaction time to the fireflies in close proximity, the overall pattern was 
still too protracted. Thus, Watts and Strogatz added one more component to their model: 
they gave a small proportion of fireflies the ability to see and thus react to a random 
firefly. This simulation worked in an egalitarian network because each of the dyads
44
 is 
relatively equal in its number of connections but with a select few connections across 
great distances. This approach reflected a successful replication and provided an 
explanation for the observed empirical phenomena.  
Extrapolating from the fireflies and returning to the social world, there are many 
phenomena that display similar properties. In reduced form, a cascade is essentially 
emergent behavior upon which there is enough initial convergence by certain actors to 
see it take hold. Depending upon the orientation of the relevant landscape, it is possible to 
generate a cascade using a small number of structurally important or prestigious actors. 
Existing network statistics are designed to identify such critical actors. Ultimately, these 
network statistics are only as reliable as the interactions they attempt to represent. 
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Id. 
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While mathematicians might provide a more formal definition of the dyad, involving vectors, tensors and 
vector space, it can loosely be considered as two individuals or units considered as a pair.  
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Developing appropriate connections between nodes is the critical step in the analysis. 
Thus, in Part II we devote significant attention to describing our measure of connectivity. 
II. DEVELOPING A PROXY FOR THE SOCIAL LANDSCAPE: THE PUBLIC 
LAW AND CLERKS MARKET LITERATURES 
 
Among the immense public law literature analyzing the operation of the American 
Federal Judiciary are two important strands that together with the greater body of 
available work advance our understanding of the operation of this important political 
institution. The first line of scholarship considers the relative prestige and influence of 
various judges and Justices.
45
 Specifically, as a variety of commentators note, the views 
of some courts and some jurists seem to be uniquely privileged while others are not 
nearly as well-regarded.
46
 In order to understand the impact this empirical fact imposes 
upon the legal landscape, the literature has been consumed with innovative methods to 
help adjudicate questions of relative esteem.
47
 However, regardless of the approach 
employed and any methodological disagreements, virtually all scholarship finds 
significant variance in prestige across jurists. 
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See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 74–91 (1990); Klein & Morrisroe, 
supra note 6; Montgomery Kosma, Measuring the Influence of Supreme Court Justices, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 
333 (1998); Landes, Lessig & Solimine, supra note 6. 
46 
See sources cited supra note 44. For a study using an entire court as the unit of analysis, see Michael E. 
Solimine, Judicial Stratification and the Reputations of the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 1331 (2005).  
47 
Solimine, supra note 45, at 1343–50. Professor Solimine provides a very detailed description of the 
various approaches used to consider the question. Discussing the existing studies, he notes “[r]eputation is a 
difficult subject to objectively study. Couple that with the snapshot quality of most of the studies; they 
usually cover a relatively short period of time or only samples of the judges who constitute a circuit.” Id. at 
1350. 
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Also under the large umbrella of the public law literature is a largely different group 
of individuals who devote attention to the study of federal law clerks.
48
 This “clerks” 
scholarship includes analysis of the process governing their selection as well as their 
impact upon judicial outputs. At first glance, this strain of scholarship might appear 
wholly unrelated to the question of relative prestige and influence. However, a careful 
review counsels otherwise. There is important information regarding judicial reputation 
embedded within the market for judicial law clerks. Namely, despite any existing 
allocative inefficiencies in the clerk market, clerks more or less seek to work for the most 
prestigious judges and judges seek the “best” clerks. While not conclusive, we believe the 
movement of law clerks provides a significant observable measure of the social and 
professional linkages between jurists. Later, we will explicitly develop this link—but 
first, we provide introduction to both literatures.  
From Qualitative Supreme Court Studies to Decision Making in a Hierarchal Federal 
Judiciary  
 
 
Throughout its long history, the judicial politics subfield has embraced a variety of 
substantive questions and methodological approaches. Early work in the subfield 
emphasized the decision making of the United States Supreme Court and privileged the 
use of qualitative methods. However, these approaches were largely jettisoned as the rise 
of behavioralism ushered in the use of quantitative models across a variety of intellectual 
domains. Following their prior embrace by allied disciplines, large N empirical 
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See infra Part II.B. 
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approaches were initially adopted in neighboring political science subfields such as 
legislative politics
49
 and political participation.
50
  
Public law behavioralism is epitomized by The Attitudinal Model, in which Professors 
Segal and Spaeth derive judicial preferences through attention to the objective voting 
behavior of members of the United States Supreme Court.
51
 Analyzing aggregate voting 
data, attitudinalists argue Justices vote in a manner to maximize their individual partisan 
policy preferences. Thus, in broad stroke their model asserts “Rehnquist votes the way he 
does because he is extremely conservative; Marshall voted the way he did because he is 
extremely liberal.”
52
 While a significant amount of the current scholarship still embraces 
behavioral studies of the High Court, recent years witnessed the increasing use of 
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In legislative politics, for example, many studies embracing the behavioralist paradigm use outputs, in 
this case roll call votes of members of Congress to characterize and predict legislative behavior. Suffice to 
say, the literature is vast. See, e.g., RICHARD L. HALL, PARTICIPATION IN CONGRESS (1996); Christopher 
Achen, Measuring Representation, 22 AM. J. POL. SCI. 475 (1978); John E. Jackson & John W. Kingdon, 
Ideology, Interest Group Scores, and Legislative Votes, 80 AM. J. POL. SCI. 805 (1992); Keith Krehbiel, 
Where’s the Party?, 23 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 235 (1993); Keith T. Poole & R. Steven Daniels, Ideology, Party, 
and Voting in the U.S. Congress, 1959–1980, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 373 (1985). 
50 
See, e.g., ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER (1960); SIDNEY VERBA & NORMAN H. NIE, 
PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA: POLITICAL DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL EQUALITY (1972); RAYMOND E. 
WOLFINGER & STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES? (1980); Paul R. Abramson & John H. Aldrich, The 
Decline of Electoral Participation in America, 76 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 502 (1982).  
51 
See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 
(1993). For a discussion of early behavioral work in the judicial politics subfield, see generally NANCY 
MAVEETY, THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2003). Behavioralism generally and attitudinalism more 
specifically have been criticized by other scholars. For a sample of critiques of the attitudinal model, see, 
for example, LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1997); FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES 
F. SPRIGGS & PAUL J. WAHLBECK, CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME 
(2000); Richard A. Brisbin, Jr., Slaying the Dragon: Segal, Spaeth and the Function of the Law in Supreme 
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Law to the Empirical Analysis of the Supreme Court, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 477 (2009). 
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alternative methods as well as the study of other judicial actors. For example, the past 
two decades saw the rise of a variety of neo-institutional decision making theories,
53
 as 
well as extensive study of the decision making of the state supreme courts
54
 and the lower 
federal courts.
55
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This recent work is important as both the industrial organization of the Judicial 
Branch and its norms and variant institutional rules undoubtedly exert influence upon its 
final outcomes. With the wide variety of actors and institutions, the precise trajectory of 
American common law is difficult, if not impossible, to predict, as a host of interactive 
parameters, including legal doctrine and partisanship, work to shape the path of American 
jurisprudence. Yet, the increasing nuance and diversity
56
 of the judicial politics literature 
certainly brings scholars closer to understanding the complicated landscape in which 
judicial decision making is undertaken.  
In addition to all of the aforementioned decisional factors, judicial “peer effects” are 
one additional element that received recent study.
57
 Of course, it is hardly new or novel to 
assert that, in general terms, maintaining high status among one’s peers as well as 
sustaining relationships with one’s close colleagues might, together with other factors, 
impact an individual’s decision calculus. Legal formalists, however, long denied such 
influence, instead arguing judicial decision making was the by-product of the 
technocratic application of neutral legal principles. With respect to crafting law, a number 
of important scholars assert a strong role for social factors. Consider Judge Posner’s book 
Overcoming Law, where he identifies a host of variables that together define the judicial 
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utility function.
58
 Among these core parameters, Judge Posner argues that a judge’s 
reputation among his or her fellow judges affects the types of judicial outputs he or she 
would be willing to support.
59
  
Reputational effects are difficult to operationalize. However, this has not prevented 
scholars from developing methodological approaches to measure the relative prestige and 
influence of federal judicial actors.
60
 While early work on prestige relied upon ratings by 
academics and other court observers,
61
 recent efforts use more objective measures to gain 
leverage on such questions. For example, Landes, Lessig, and Solimine operationalize 
prestige using the total citations to opinions produced by a given judge.
62
 These scholars 
support the use of this proxy for prestige and influence by arguing that judges who garner 
high citation counts do so because their brethren either hold them in high regard or 
otherwise feel some social obligation to cite the opinion of their close colleague.
63
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Klein and Morrisroe resist this assertion, arguing that the raw citations, relied upon by 
Landes, Lessig, and Solimine, do not adequately capture the question at issue.
64
 Namely, 
“it is not at all clear what citations measure.”
65
 For example, raw citations might capture 
an entire host of factors unrelated to prestige and influence including panel assignment, 
case effects, as well as other stochastic elements. To combat these concerns, Klein and 
Morrisroe offered a modified citation analysis—limited to instances where individual 
judges are cited by name. They assert “more prestigious judges should more often be 
cited by name and, therefore, citations by name should be a valid indicator of a judge’s 
prestige.”
66
 The Klein and Morrisroe approach provides a list of ultra-prestigious jurists 
whose views might be more likely to be followed than less socially prominent 
colleagues.
67
  
These lists are important as socially elite opinion regarding what constitutes a sound 
legal rule is not static. At the same time, given that the judicial social world displays 
significant adherence to particular interpretative approaches, a robust theory of change 
should describe which actors, if any, are disproportionately likely to garner acceptance 
from their colleagues. Specifically, at first pass, it would appear no individual jurist 
could, through his or her mere pronouncement, induce acceptance of a given legal rule by 
his or her colleagues. Yet this may depend upon the social position of the actor making 
the pronouncement. If certain jurists in the judicial hierarchy possess a greater level of 
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prestige and influence than their surrounding peers, then only a small number of diffuse 
but socially important agents might actually be necessary to induce widespread 
convergence from their less prominent colleagues. The popular literature calls this 
threshold a “tipping point.”
68
 In more formal terms, it is the relative measures of social 
structure developed within the networks literature that may yield information about the 
conditions under which one might observe a doctrinal phase transition.
69
 
The growing work employing the citation methodology offers significant insight into 
questions of judicial esteem.
70
 Building upon the themes of this scholarship, we believe a 
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mapping of the judicial social landscape, using a measure other than citations, should 
supplement this literature by visualizing the relative position of both individuals and 
communities of judicial actors. Additionally, such an analysis should uncover the 
structural properties of interactions across the aggregate federal judiciary. While our 
measures are admittedly partial and do not completely adjudicate all questions, we hope 
this article, taken together with the scholarship will motivate a wide host of additional 
“network analysis and law” scholarship. 
The Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks 
Federal judicial clerkships are desirable employment opportunities to which many 
individuals aspire. For the successful applicant, an elite clerkship provides personal 
prestige as well as a series of tangible dividends.
71
 In addition to the immediate financial 
rewards, such positions are linked to advancement in a variety of hierarchies—including 
advancement within the legal profession, the legal academy and in some instances future 
elevation to the bench. The financial and professional rewards are not the only attractive 
elements. Commentators assert that law clerks exert an increasing influence over both the 
agenda
72
 and the substantive content of judicial outcomes.
73
 For a law student or freshly 
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minted lawyer, the opportunity to participate in the shaping of the law, taken together 
with the social prestige and labor market dividends, incentivize a qualified individual to 
seek such employment.  
Following an initial sorting process, including in most cases a personal interview, a 
judge may tender an offer to a selected applicant.
74
 Such an offer could be extended 
immediately following the interview or could come at a future moment. The content of 
the offer is exceedingly similar across judges at a given level of the judicial hierarchy.
75
 
The salary is determined exogenously and “fixed.”
76
 As Professor Priest notes, “even 
where there are differences across clerkships, their expected value is low because of the 
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Judicial Law Clerks, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 793, 799 n.14 (2001); Priest, supra note 74, at 154 (“Salaries are 
fixed, set by Congress.”). 
  
 84 
short tenure of the job.”
77
 There is very little range for negotiation over the terms of the 
position. Essentially, the offer is dichotomous.
78
 
While this description of the clerk selection process might appear innocuous, a 
substantial amount of recent scholarship argues otherwise. The past two decades 
witnessed a burgeoning literature devoted to analyzing both the role of as well as the 
labor market for federal judicial law clerks.
79
 It is this latter commentary regarding clerk 
hiring that is most germane to this article. Although not completely attributable to any 
single source, Judge Wald’s 1990 essay is the probable origin of recent commentary 
discussing the selection mechanism for federal law clerks.
80
 The former Chief Judge of 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals describes the clerk hiring process as undignified and 
cites others who characterize it as “frenzied,”
81
 “ludicrous,”
82
 and “madcap decision 
making.”
83
 While her essay is a call for reform, she offers some keen observations about 
the conditions underlying the nature of the law clerk market. 
She observes that an “excellent versus a mediocre team of clerks makes a huge 
difference in the judge’s daily life and in her work product.”
84
 Thus, judges, in part, seek 
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strong clerks as it lightens their workload or allows them more effectively to advance 
their substantive agenda. As Judge Wald notes, “a judge sometimes decides whether to 
file a separate opinion or to dissent in a case based—at least in part—upon the support 
she can anticipate from her clerks.”
85
 In addition to internal administrative motivations, 
external reputational considerations also encourage artful hiring practices. In a commonly 
quoted sentence, Judge Wald asserts, “A judge’s reputation among his own colleagues 
may in part reflect his ability to garner the most highly-credentialed clerks under his 
banner so that he can maintain a reputation as a ‘feeder’ of clerks to the Supreme 
Court.”
86
 
It is the strong demand for stellar clerks that in large part fueled the “frenzied mating 
ritual.”
87
 The process, as described by Wald, includes “short fuse” offers and “[e]arly–
bird judges skim[ming] off those applicants with the brightest credentials.”
88
 Despite 
various efforts to cajole their colleagues to adhere to a consistent hiring date, reform 
efforts consistently unraveled. While unraveling is a source of distress for Judge Wald, it 
is the behavior produced by the market for clerks and its reflection upon the judicial 
branch that is her greatest concern.
89
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While Judge Wald’s position is certainly shared by some of her colleagues, her 
position has not received uniform support. For example, the following year witnessed a 
rejoinder offered by Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski.
90
 Through his 1991 article, 
Judge Kozinski acknowledges that in reaction to “complaints about ‘badmouthing, spying 
and even poaching among judges’. . . we should all try to do better.”
91
 Despite this 
concession, Judge Kozinski otherwise states that “there is nothing at all wrong with the 
current law clerk selection process; everything is hunky dory.”
92
 Instead of reform, he 
passionately argues, “federal judges should get off their pedestals and compete . . . .”
93
 
For Judge Kozinski, reform proposals simply stymie upstarts by advantaging judges with 
geography, seniority and existing high levels of prestige.
94
  
This first round of commentary, including efforts by the aforementioned jurists as 
well as others,
95
 brought a variety of unique reform proposals and provided a wealth of 
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qualitative insight into the state of the law clerk hiring process. The second strand of 
“clerk market” scholarship advanced an economic solution to the discontents of the clerk 
market. Most notably, Professors Avery, Jolls, Roth and Judge Posner produced what has 
been called the Harvard-Chicago analysis of the law clerk market.
96
 Using detailed 
survey data, the Harvard-Chicago study provided extensive, empirical insight into the 
experience of judges and clerks in the hiring process.
97
 Their data, taken together with 
subsequent economic analysis, argued the clerk selection process failed to maximize “the 
sum of satisfaction” of judge and clerk matches. Namely the clerk market, like other 
markets with timing problems, is plagued with unraveling. Individual judges have 
substantial incentive to deviate from agreed hiring dates as the existing regulatory 
mechanisms did not impose enforceable timing regulations.
98
 Judges who might 
otherwise be inclined to abide with a given hiring date are forced to defect from that date 
to avoid the “sucker payoff.”
99
 Therefore, in only a few iterations such conditions 
invariably produce widespread non-compliance.  
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98 
Id.  
99 
The Harvard-Chicago study offers a partial solution to the problem of enforceability. It argues that “the 
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 88 
Although disagreeing with a number of conclusions of the Harvard-Chicago study, 
Professor Priest, as quoted earlier, observes that “job conditions themselves are fungible 
over a large range . . . . [e]ven where there are differences across clerkships, their 
expected value is low because of the short tenure of the job.”
100
 Since less prestigious 
judges cannot offer a compensating wage differential “[t]he timing of the offer, thus, 
becomes a term of trade in the clerkship market transaction.”
101
 Thus, “first movers” such 
as Judge Kozinski are able to increase their relative standing through strategic behavior 
early in their career. 
Of course, if timing of offer was the sole sorting mechanism in the clerk market, the 
traffic of law clerks might be a poor proxy from which to operationalize the aggregate 
social structure. Some portions of the literature, if reviewed in isolation, imply that the 
strategic behavior of judges simply overwhelms law clerks and precludes them from 
obtaining their optimal match. For example, the Harvard-Chicago data indicates a 
majority of respondents who received an offer did so either during or within two days of 
their interview.
102
 At the same time, judges often expected quick or even immediate 
responses to such offers.
103
  
Given these conditions, clerks face significant pressure to avoid an “exploding” offer 
from a less preferred judge. Yet, a number of clerks, often with guidance from their 
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professors and law school career services offices, use compensating techniques to resist a 
sub-optimal match. For example, Judge Wald notes “[s]avvy clerk applicants . . . called 
chambers in advance to announce that that particular judge was the first choice.”
104
 In 
addition, strategic scheduling is another important compensating technique. Strategic 
schedulers organize their interviews in relationship to their choices over judges. 
Specifically, if clerks schedule interviews in strict association to their preference 
ordering, then an exploding offer, of course, would not be problematic but rather a 
welcome event.
105
  
A Marriage of Convenience? 
The purpose of this article is not to engage the debate over the proper regulatory 
mechanism, if any, which should govern the clerk market. The recent hiring moratorium, 
for example, may limit some of the discontentment experienced under the prior regime.
106
 
We will leave the evaluation of such questions to more qualified scholars.
107
 Our interest 
in law clerks and the respective labor market is simply to study and visualize their traffic 
to gain insight into questions of inter-judge connectivity. The hiring of clerks is an 
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intimate act,
108
 one where deliberation or forethought should attach. While it is a choice 
under uncertainty, a significant number of signals are available. Some signals, such as 
grade point average, law review membership, or personal background, are intrinsic to the 
individual clerk. Other cues come from third parties. As the foregoing analysis is limited 
to law clerks flowing between various judicial actors, judges who previously employed 
the given clerk provide either an explicit or implicit signal to the subsequent hiring jurist. 
In general, judges and communities of jurists who consistently share clerks probably do 
so because the receiver either respects the judgment of his or her colleagues or otherwise 
shares a social connection with the senders.  
Thus, embedded in the immensely interesting literature analyzing the market for 
federal law clerks is language and commentary that should be of particular interest to the 
larger public law scholarship. Notwithstanding their critiques of the efficiency of a 
number of allocative elements of the clerk market, many authors observe it is prestige 
that in large part motivates both the judges and their would-be apprentices.
109
 Consider 
Judge Wald as quoted earlier
110
 and Professor Priest who notes “other things equal, 
prominent judges are able to secure the most qualified clerks.”
111
 Of course, the Harvard-
Chicago findings counsel some degree of caution from reliance upon clerk traffic as the 
perfect measure for the relative social position of federal judges. However, even their 
                                                
 
108 
See Wald, supra note 79, at 153 (arguing “[t]he judge-clerk relationship is the most intense and mutually 
dependant one I know of outside of marriage, parenthood, or a love affair.”). 
109 
The term “sorcerers’ apprentice” is borrowed from a well-received recent book on Supreme Court Law 
Clerks. See WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 71. 
110 
See Wald, supra note 79, at 153. 
111 
Priest, supra note 74, at 162. 
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proposal for reform, centered upon restricting feeding to the United States Supreme 
Court, acknowledges that social prestige and influence is attached to the ability to attract 
and feed “star” clerks.
112
  
In all, despite the caveats the literature on the clerk market might impose, there 
remains significant information embedded in the market for judicial clerks that should 
help inform the greater public law literature. While a simple descriptive account or 
tabulation of so called “feeder” judges would certainly demonstrate which individuals 
consistently sent their law clerks to the levels above, such analysis fails to characterize 
communities and capture concepts such as social position and attraction. While some of 
the clerk moves may be wholly unrelated to our question of inquiry, we believe in the 
aggregate, the majority of such moves are related to social advancement. In general, 
clerks move from judges with a lower social position to those with a higher social 
standing. Given the clear labor market payoffs available in the private market, many 
clerks who remain in the network in order to flow between judges often do so in order to 
increase their personal position.
113
 In the face of significant opportunity costs for 
remaining a public employee, clerks are voting with their feet, and their traffic—
particularly in the aggregate—says something important. 
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See Avery et al., supra note 75. 
113 
At least some number of clerks who remain and move from the Federal Circuit Court to the Federal 
District Court may do so in order to offer potential employers a better portfolio of experience. In fact, it is 
also possible that clerks who move downward in the hierarchy may do so in order to work in geographic 
locations that they consider more attractive. Recognizing this caveat we still believe, all things being equal, 
as a clerk searches for an additional clerkship, imposing whatever limiting parameters he or she chooses, to 
the extent the individual selects among judges, prestige is an important part of the decisional calculus.  
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PART III. THE VISUALIZATION AND CHARACTERIZATION OF THE 
JUDICIAL SOCIAL NETWORK 
 
 
Inspired by our desire to better understand its social topography, we used the tools of 
network analysis to visualize the structure of the federal judiciary. To build the 
connections between actors, we collected a decade’s worth of federal law clerk 
information and used this data to visualize the flow of clerks between judges. Bolstered 
by subsequent analytics, our visualizations yield some interesting findings. First, while 
the notion of a “feeder judge” is commonly invoked, this study visualizes the concept. 
Visualization displays a host of secondary movers who “feed” the feeders thereby 
increasing their centrality within the network. The overall structure of the network, 
visualized in Figures 1–4 infra, is also intriguing. Despite the presence of clear cliques or 
communities, the center of the network is dense and clustered enough to keep 
interconnected most of the members of the federal judiciary.
114
 
Data Collection: Sources and Approach 
With the assistance of our research team,
115
 we collected available information for 
every federal law clerk employed by an Article III judge during the “natural” Rehnquist 
Court (1995–2004). This process proved challenging as no particular data source 
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Figures 1–4 infra do not contain every member of the federal judiciary. Although nearly six hundred 
members are present, the visualizations omit judges who over the decade-long period failed to send a single 
clerk to another federal judge.  
115 
We would be remiss if we did not take the opportunity to thank Eric Provins, Steven Schwartz, Courtney 
O’Brien, Pamela Kiel, Stephen Janos, Eitan Ingall, Daniel Schwartz, Art Reyes, Jon Tshiamala, Alex 
Hughes, Noah Korn, Neil Tambe, Nicole Tyrna, Erin Copland, Matthew Smith, Darin Goldstein, Alex 
Satanovsky, Benjamin Ruano, and Alex Karpowitz for their assistance with data coding. 
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contained a complete listing of such information. However, our data set combines a 
diverse set of sources and reflects nearly all law clerks at all levels for the relevant 
years.
116
  
Given its extensive treatment, we began our effort by consulting The Judicial Yellow 
Book published by Leadership Directories, Inc.
117
 This tri-annual serial publication 
contains extensive biographic information on virtually every state and federal judge in the 
United States. Included within this broad range of information are the names, and in most 
cases, educational history of various members of the judges’ chambers. Using the fall 
edition in each year, our team collected all available identifying information including the 
clerk’s full name, educational background, and year of service. Across the decade-long 
period, this process yielded a significant amount of the desired data. 
Despite the extensive amount of information contained in The Judicial Yellow Book, 
our primary data collection effort left a non-trivial number of “missing” clerk values. In 
order to bolster the comprehensiveness of our dataset, we searched and filled missing 
values using The Judicial Staff Directory
118
 produced by CQ Press as well as selected 
years of the National Association for Law Placement (NALP) Judicial Clerkship 
                                                
 
116 
By our estimate, the data collection effort yielded approximately 95.2% of all law clerk events during 
the decade-long period. 
117 
The volumes of the Judicial Yellow Book that we consulted were Fall 1995–Fall 2004. 
118 
Specifically, we collected available copies the Judicial Staff Directory that covered the 1995–2004 
window.  
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directory.
119
 This second level was largely successful and moved the dataset near 
completion. Yet, as we reviewed the totality of the dataset, it was clear that the set still 
contained some systematic bias with a large number of the missing values drawn from a 
discrete number of judges. In order to obtain these public but otherwise unavailable 
“clerk values,” our team searched for missing clerk values using Martindale-Hubbell
120
 as 
well as the websites of various prominent law firms. To the extent the sum of these 
combined efforts also proved unavailing, we contacted both the judge’s former law clerks 
as well as the career services offices at a number of law schools located near the 
particular judge’s chambers.  
In sum, while the dataset does not contain every discrete clerk value, the dataset 
reflects all reasonably available law clerk information for a decade long period. Appendix 
3.1 displays some sample lines of code drawn from the dataset. As displayed infra, a 
given line of code contains not only the clerk’s full name, but also the clerk’s educational 
background, year of service, and the judge’s name.
121
 Furthermore, in order to link our 
set to existing data sources and to aid in future research, each “clerk event” reflected as 
an individual line of code contains judge identification and seat numbers drawn from the 
                                                
 
119 
While full coverage was not available, we collected available copies of the National Association for Law 
Placement (NALP) Judicial Clerkship Directory that covered the 1995–2004 window.  
120 
Missing values were filled either using both the current as well as older version of the Martindale-
Hubbell Directory.  
121 
For an example of the information contained in this dataset, see infra Appendix 3.1. 
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Gary Zuk, Deborah J. Barrow, and Gerard S. Gryski Attributes of Federal Court Judges 
dataset.
122
  
A complete version of the dataset contains in excess of 25,000 law clerk events drawn 
from not only Article III judges but also Article I Bankruptcy Court Judges. As the 
available data sources maintain the greatest degree of accuracy for the law clerks of non-
senior status Article III judges,
123
 we restricted our analysis to these jurists. Even with the 
clerks of Bankruptcy and Senior Status Judges removed, the dataset does not suffer from 
a want of information. Namely, the remaining dataset, as restricted, still contains nearly 
19,000 total law clerk events for the decade-long period. These events are distributed 
across the federal judicial hierarchy with the majority of clerk events attributed to federal 
district courts. 
Many of the clerks who appear in our dataset occupy exactly one line of code. 
Typically, such singletons are employed by a judge immediately following law school 
and exit the data-set at the completion of their discrete term. So called “permanent” law 
clerks reflect another subset of individuals in the dataset. Such individuals reflect 
multiple lines of code because a given individual judge employs them over a number of 
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The dataset is housed at Judicial Research Initiative at the University of South Carolina. The page 
contains both the district and circuit court datasets. See http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/index.php (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2009). 
123 
For a detailed discussion of senior judges including a claim that Senior Judges are unconstitutional, see 
generally David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional?, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 453 
(2007). “Senior judges are the product of a patchwork of several statutes governing judicial retirement, the 
most significant of which is 28 U.S.C § 371. Federal judges become eligible for retirement benefits upon 
satisfying the “Rule of Eighty”—when the sum of their age and years of service on the federal bench 
reaches eighty. At that point, the judge has two retirement options: outright retirement, which for the sake 
of clarity we will call ‘resignation,’ and the form of semiretirement known as ‘senior status.’” Id. at 460. 
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years. Our analysis is not directly focused upon either of these subgroups. Instead, it is 
directed at clerks who flow between judges.  
To find clerk “movers,” we sorted the dataset by clerk name and then by year. This 
displayed clusters of individual clerk names. Using limiting properties such as middle 
initial, law school, and undergraduate institution,
124
 we differentiated cases involving 
similar names. To qualify as a clerk move, an individual employed in a given period must 
have been hired by a different judge in a subsequent period. As such, it requires two lines 
of code to qualify as a clerk move. While we placed no precise limitation upon the timing 
of the subsequent interval, the vast majority of the clerk moves involved transfers in the 
year immediately following the first clerkship. 
From our nearly 19,000 clerk events, we detected nearly 950 movements. As our 
analysis is exceedingly conservative in its willingness to validate a “mover,” the number 
of connections present in the true population likely exceeds the connections in our 
visualization of the social landscape. To execute the visualizations and craft the 
corresponding network statistics, we converted the lines of code representing “movers” 
into connections between judges. For example, if law clerk Doe_John moved between 
Judge A and Judge B, then we tallied a connection between those two jurists. Of the close 
to 950 total connections, nearly 500 represented discrete paths. In other words, the 
repeated connections concentrated on a very limited number of judicial actors. We 
                                                
 
124 
We relied upon the values in this cell to the extent available. Often a clerk’s J.D.-granting institution was 
available to aid in the delimiting process while much of the undergraduate institutional information was 
unavailable.  
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entered this final dataset of clerk connections into Pajek.
125
 Using Pajek, we produced the 
visualizations and generated the analysis contained infra. 
The Visualization of the Judicial Social Network 
The nodes are the individual judges and, as operationalized, the edges reflect a 
weighted measure of shared clerks between the jurists. Although the traffic is directed, 
we explicitly choose to model the network as undirected because we believe the influence 
is bidirectional.
126
 Manually generating consistent and unbiased visualizations of a 
network of this size is a nearly impossible task. Automated drawing procedures 
developed in computer science, however, can be used to generate clear and transparent 
depictions of networks such as the federal judicial network. The two automated drawing 
procedures used in this article, Kamada-Kawai
127
 and Fruchterman-Reingold,
128
 are 
spring-embedded, force-directed placement algorithms. Although the technical 
characterization is discussed further in Appendix 3.2, an analogy may help characterize 
the drawing process.  
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Pajek is one of the competing network software packages used by network scholars to generate 
visualizations. More information is available at http://pajek.imfm.si/doku.php (last visited Jan. 2, 2009). 
126 
Our judicial social network based upon clerk traffic, displayed infra Figures 1–4, is thorny as the traffic 
is clearly directed, but we believe the social importance associated with the linkage travel in both 
directions. All modeling choices explicitly imply a weighting scheme. Our decision to assign equal 
directional weights seemed to be the most sensible approach. Possible extensions of this article might 
consider alternative theoretically motivated weighting schemes. 
127 
See generally Tomihisa Kamada & Satoru Kawai, An Algorithm for Drawing General Undirected 
Graphs, 31 INFORMATION PROCESSING LETTERS, 7 (Apr. 12, 1989); see also Tomihisa Kamada & Satoru 
Kawai, Automatic Display of Network Structures for Human Understanding, University of Tokyo 
Department of Information Science, Technical Report No. 88-7 (1988).  
128 
See generally Thomas M.J. Fruchterman & Edward M. Reingold, Graph Drawing by Force-Directed 
Placement, 21 SOFTWARE: PRACTICE AND EXPERIENCE 1129 (1991).  
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Imagine that the judge nodes are steel rings with opposing magnetic charges working 
to repel one another. Now visualize springs connecting the steel rings as the edges in the 
network. The longer a spring must stretch to connect the steel rings, the more energy is 
required to stretch the spring. The closer the positions of rings without connections are to 
one another, the greater is the energy required to hold those positions.
129
 The 
aforementioned algorithms seek to minimize the energy required to balance these 
attracting and repelling forces.
130
 After applying either Kamada-Kawai or Fruchterman-
Reingold, the result is a graph that generally distributes vertices evenly, minimizes edge 
crossings, uses the planar area, reflects inherent symmetry, and minimizes differences in 
edge lengths.
131
  
In terms of visualization, Fruchterman-Reingold tends to increase the difficulty of 
remaining in the center, pushing less connected nodes to an orbit with a larger 
circumference. Nevertheless, in overall structure and clustering, no substantive difference 
exists. Some network scholars believe the choice of algorithms should be determined by 
the size and density of the graph with 500 nodes as the recommended cut-point.
132
 Since 
the federal judicial network contains roughly 600 nodes, we included visualizations of 
both types of automated drawing. While the Kamada-Kawai energizing algorithm 
provides a nice visual of the overall structure of the network, the Fruchterman-Reingold 
                                                
 
129 
Peter Eades, A Heuristic for Graph Drawing, 42 CONGRESSUS NUMERANTIUM 149–50 (1984). 
130 
Id. at 149. 
131 
See Fruchterman & Reingold, supra note 127, at 1129.  
132 
See WOUTER DE NOOY, ANDREJ MRVAR & VLADIMIR BATAGELJ, EXPLORATORY SOCIAL NETWORK 
ANALYSIS WITH PAJEK 17 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005).  
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automated drawing provides greater clarity of the interconnectedness of the network’s 
core. 
With this introduction, consider the foregoing series of networks visualizations. 
Figures 3.1 and 3.3 use the Kamada-Kawai algorithms, while Figures 3.2 and 3.4 employ 
Fruchterman-Reingold. Figures 3.1 and 3.3 provide a wide view of the energized network 
while Figures 3.2 and 3.4 provide a close-up view including the network’s core. A careful 
review of the Supreme Court Justices displays a familiar ideological distribution. As this 
effort is primarily directed at classifying social structure and differentiating among lower 
court judges, what is of greater interest are the communities of both circuit and district 
court judges who cluster around and feed these Justices. For ease, we rotated the 
foregoing figures so as to hold the traditional left to right ideological distribution.
133
 
  
                                                
 
133 
Rotation imposes no substantive consequences. If the graphics were rotated 90°, the relative positions of 
the nodes would remain unchanged. Rather, the Supreme Court Justices would simply be distributed North 
to South rather than East to West. 
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Figure 3.1: Wide View of the Kamada-Kawai Energized Judicial Social Network 
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Figure 3.2: Wide View of the Fruchterman-Reingold Energized Judicial Social Network 
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Figure 3.3: A Close View of the Kamada-Kawai Judicial Social Network 
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Figure 3.4: A Close View of the Fruchterman-Reingold Judicial Social Network 
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The judicial social network displays a densely connected center with clusters 
around the Supreme Court Justices. Each visual includes a partition for the formal 
distinctions between members of the Supreme Court (white); circuit court (gray); and 
district court (black). Although the formal institutional authority of each federal judge is 
essentially identical across actors holding the respective circuit/district distinction, our 
visuals support the finding of previous scholars who assert that the informal prestige and 
influence of various jurists is far from equal.
317  
With respect to broad structure and consistent with their relative institutional 
position, district court judges are primarily located at the periphery of the network. 
However, a few selected judges sitting on the district court do persist and are located in 
close proximity to or the center of the network.
318
 Although a non-trivial subset of the 
circuit court population finds itself at the boundary of the network, in general, a greater 
population of circuit court judges find themselves concentrated at the network’s core. 
Thus, while institutional authority is certainly important, our analysis indicates that a 
mixture of formal and informal authority determines the placement of each judicial actor.  
While the visualizations help display the social standing of various jurists as well 
as the broad structure of the network, it is ultimately the network statistics that offer 
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It is likely of little surprise to observe prolific judges such as the Honorable Richard Posner, Harry T. 
Edwards, Samuel Alito, Merrick Garland, J. Harvie Wilkinson, Michael Luttig, and Guido Calabresi 
located in the core of the network. 
318 
Included among these district court judges located close to the core of the network is Judge Michael 
Mukasey of the Southern District of New York. In late 2007, Judge Mukasey was confirmed as the eighty-
first Attorney General of the United States.  
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clean, replicable depictions of the network and its various components. A wide variety of 
statistical approaches have been developed in the network science literature to consider 
such questions. Thus, in the proceeding sections we offer such analysis.  
Identifying Central Actors in the Judicial Social Network 
The extant social networks literature contains a wide number of statistical 
approaches designed to identify such prominent actors. Networks scholars place many 
concepts under the broad umbrella of centrality. The simplest form of centrality is a tally 
of the “degree” of each vertex, which refers to the number of connections to and from a 
given vertex. Although degree can be a useful measure of centrality, this simple 
aggregation of an actor’s connections does not take into account the differences in the 
prominence of a given actor’s connections. For example, a simple degree score implies 
that a social connection to Merrick Garland will increase that judge’s centrality score by 
the same increment as a connection to some less socially important jurist. Thus, while the 
definition of centrality is often elusive and different measures trade upon different 
analytics, we avoid much of the centrality debate by presenting herein three well-
established centrality rankings—hubs and authority scores, closeness, and betweenness.  
Originally derived for navigating the internet with text-based queries, the Hubs 
and Authorities (HITS) algorithm created by computer scientist Jon Kleinberg offers one 
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manner of identifying important nodes in a network.
319 The HITS algorithm assumes that 
in a large network there are two important types of nodes that serve different functions in 
the network based on their structural positions. The key distinction is the direction of 
their relation to other central nodes. A vertex with strong hub score displays connections 
towards important authorities, while a vertex with a strong authority score features 
connections from important hubs. As applied to the judicial network, a hub is a jurist who 
sends his/her clerks to prominent judges, while an authority would be a judge who 
accepts clerks from prominent judges.
320  We exclude hub scores from the analysis 
because many of the most prominent district and circuit court judges rarely select clerks 
with prior clerkship experience. For this reason, otherwise highly prominent jurists such 
as Alex Kozinski and Richard Posner have authority scores that are low. Furthermore, 
given the specific proxy measure employed herein, we remove the nine Supreme Court 
Justices from the authority scores in Table 1 because their prestige is institutionally 
determined. Accordingly, our authority scores are exclusively limited to the lower court 
jurists.  
                                                
 
319 
See Jon M. Kleinberg, Authoritative Sources in a Hyperlinked Environment, 46 J. ACM 604 (1998).  
320 
Prominent networks scholar James Fowler and his co-authors offer a very useful description of the 
Kleinberg algorithm. Applying their description to the judicial social network, let each judge’s hiring 
capacity scores be xi = a1iy1 + a2iy2 + … + aniyn and let each jurist’s sending capacity be yi = a1ix1 + a2ix2 + 
… + anixn. These equations produce x = ATy and y=Ax in matrix format. These equations converge to the 
fixed points λx* = ATAx* and λy* = AATy* where λ is the principle eigenvector. See James Fowler et al., 
Social Networks in Political Science: Hiring and Placement of Ph.D.s, 1960–2002, 40 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 
729, 730 (2007). 
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Closeness centrality measures the normalized shortest distance from a given node 
to all other nodes.
321  More simply stated, consider the node with the highest closeness 
score as the median of a network, because if the graph were represented as a number line 
like a chain, then the median would have the highest closeness centrality score. In the 
context of the federal judiciary network, this statistic will be highest when a judge is on 
average nearer to the rest of the jurists than any other judge.  
Finally, betweenness centrality is often used to identify the bridges between 
different communities and clusters. To identify these gatekeepers, betweenness calculates 
the shortest paths (known as geodesics) between all pairs of vertices, identifies the 
frequency of each node appearing on those paths, then normalizes the statistic.
322
 Jurists 
that exhibit high betweenness scores are not necessarily likely to be individuals that 
connect ideologically different groups together. These judges may act as gatekeepers that 
connect communities in a bowtie-like fashion. These jurists are, however, important in 
maintaining the connectivity of the network. 
                                                
 
321 
See Dirk Koschützki et al., Centrality Indices, in NETWORK ANALYSIS: METHODOLOGICAL 
FOUNDATIONS 16 (Ulrik Brandes & Thomas Erlebach eds., 1998). If one denotes the sum of the distances 
from “a vertex u to any other vertex in a graph G = (V, E) as the squared total distance: 
! 
cc (u) = d(u,v)v"V# .” Id. at 22. The most commonly employed definition of closeness is a “vertex 
centrality” built upon the reciprocal of the total distance: 
! 
cc (u) = d(u,v)v"V#[ ]
$1. Id. at 23.  
322 
If one denotes the “fraction of shortest paths between s and t that contain vertex v” as δst (v) = [σst(v)]/( 
σst), then betweenness centrality of a given vertex is given by: )()( vvc
Vvs Vvt
stb ∑ ∑
∈≠ ∈≠
= δ . Id. at 29–30. 
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Centrality measures must be interpreted contextually as their meaning can vary 
across bipartite networks, directed networks, and negative affective networks. Table 1 
presents the jurists ranked in terms of authority scores, closeness, and betweenness. The 
judges are presented in order of their scores. The first ranking is given to the jurist with 
the most prominent structural position based on the respective statistic. We exclude 
Supreme Court Justices from Table 1, given their institutionally imposed structural 
position within the judicial social network.  
Table 3.1: Ranking Jurists Using Various Measures of Centrality 
 
Rank Authority Closeness Betweenness 
1 Luttig, 
J. Michael 
Ginsburg, 
Douglas H. 
Sotomayor, 
Sonia 
2 Wilkinson, 
J. Harvie 
Wilkinson, 
J. Harvie 
Brunetti, 
Melvin T. 
3 Kozinski, 
Alex 
Silberman, 
Laurence H. 
Gillmor, 
Helen W. 
4 Silberman, 
Laurence H. 
Randolph, 
A. Raymond 
Straub, 
Chester J. 
5 O’Scannlain, 
Diarmuid 
Tatel, 
David S. 
Henderson, 
Karen LeCraft 
6 Calabresi, Guido Jacobs, Dennis G. Gilman, Ronald Lee 
7 Tatel, David S. Luttig, J. Michael Tjoflat, Gerald B. 
8 Posner, Richard Calabresi, Guido Gibbons, Julia Smith 
9 Ginsburg, 
Douglas H. 
Williams, 
Stephen F. 
Randolph, 
A. Raymond 
10 Sentelle, David B. Kozinski, Alex Tatel, David S. 
11 Boudin, Michael Winter, Ralph K. Gleeson, John 
12 Edwards, Harry T. Gleeson, John Black, Susan Harrell 
13 Williams, Stephen F. Cabranes, José A. Arnold, Morris S. 
14 Garland, 
Merrick B. 
O’Scannlain, 
Diarmuid 
Walker Jr., 
John M. 
15 Jones, 
Edith Hollan 
Garland, 
Merrick B. 
Sentelle, 
David B. 
16 Leval, Pierre N. Leval, Pierre N. Ross, Allyne R. 
17 Niemeyer, Paul V. Edwards, Harry T. Timlin, Robert James 
18 Winter, 
Ralph K. 
Henderson, 
Karen LeCraft 
Bybee, 
Jay S. 
19 Randolph, 
A. Raymond 
Boudin, 
Michael 
Jacobs, 
Dennis G. 
20 Reinhardt, Niemeyer, Brody, 
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Stephen R. Paul V. Anita B. 
21 Cabranes, José A. Sotomayor, Sonia White, Jeffrey S. 
22 Higginbotham, 
Patrick E. 
Posner, 
Richard 
Ginsburg, 
Douglas H. 
23 Wallace, 
J. Clifford 
Fletcher, 
William A. 
Benavides, 
Fortunato P. 
24 Rymer, Pamela A. Wald, Patricia M. Robertson, James 
25 Fletcher, 
William A. 
Higginbotham, 
Patrick E. 
Hornby, 
David Brock 
 
 
Classifying the Physical Properties of the Judicial Social Network 
 
In addition to identifying central nodes, network scientists are often interested in 
classifying the structural properties of a given network. Namely, with a conception of the 
network’s physical characteristics, it is possible to consider the class of micro-level 
generative processes plausibly responsible for the observed macro-structure. One manner 
to classify the aggregate structure of a network is to tally the number of degrees between 
the actors and determine the distribution of such connections. There exist many potential 
forms this distribution of authority could assume.
323
 For example, the distribution could 
be relatively uniform—with a wide number of actors possessing a moderate level of 
connections. The distribution could be distributed normally or alternatively could be 
centered upon a small number of socially prominent actors.  
In a large number of social and physical networks, including the judicial social 
network, the degree distribution follows this latter orientation. The concentration of 
degrees over a small subset of actors yields a heavy-tailed distribution. While the “fat-
                                                
 
323 
For an extended discussion of these various “states of the world” as applied to the federal judiciary, see 
Katz, Stafford & Provins, supra note 12. 
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tailed” distribution of degrees is most commonly associated with the power law 
distribution, a wide array of other closely linked distributions including the exponential, 
the power law with cutoff and log-linear distribution are also possible.
324  
Figure 3.5 is a frequency distribution plot of the number of judges by the degree of 
each judge (the degree is simply the measure of how many edges are incident with each 
node), the L-shaped curve consistent with extreme skewing emerges. The log/log graph 
offers a cleaner view of the tail of the degree distribution. As before, the Supreme Court 
Justices are excluded from this analysis because their structural position relative to degree 
distribution is a construct of their institutional position. Namely, each year, each Justice 
accepts a defined number of clerks, virtually all of whom have served as a clerk for one 
of their lower court colleagues.
325
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See Aaron Clauset, Cosma Rohilla Shalizi, & M. E. J. Newman, Power-Law Distributions in Empirical 
Data, 51 SIAM REV. 661 (2009), available at http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/0706/0706.1062v1.pdf. 
The authors define the Power Law, Exponential, and Log-Normal Distributions as generated by the 
following equations respectively
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In the period 1995–2004, we find that nearly 99% of the Supreme Court law clerks were drawn from 
lower courts. Professor W. William Hodes, law clerk to Justice Ginsburg during the 1996 term, represents a 
rare exception to this global trend. A former student of Justice Ginsburg from her tenure as a law professor 
at Rutgers, Mr. Hodes served as her law clerk without first serving for a lower court judge. Other 
exceptions include individuals such as Rachael L. Brand, who clerked for the Honorable Charles Fried of 
the Massachusetts Supreme Court prior to her service to Justice Kennedy, and Adam M. Samaha, who 
clerked for the Honorable Alexander Keith of the Minnesota Supreme Court prior to clerking for Justice 
Stevens.  
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Figure 3.5: The Highly Skewed Degree Distribution of the Judicial Social Network 
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Table 3.2 provides an alternative presentation of the degree skewing in the judicial 
social network.
326 We excluded the Supreme Court Justices from the analysis for 
previously stated reasons. Although the district and circuit partitions may be of individual 
interest, the aggregate frequency distribution provides the most useful information about 
the entirety of the interactions. For instance, the “aggregate” column exhibits a rapid 
decline of degree frequency over the first five classifications. 
Table 3.2: Degree Distribution 
% of Judges District Judges Circuit Judges Aggregate 
    
with Degree 0 57.43% 23.20% 50.04% 
 (522) (58) (580) 
    
with Degree 1 25.85% 21.60% 24.16% 
 (235) (54) (280) 
    
with Degree 2 9.90% 18.40% 11.73% 
 (90) (46) (136) 
    
with Degree 3 3.96% 11.60% 5.61% 
 (36) (29) (65) 
    
with Degree 4 1.87% 8.40% 3.28% 
 (17) (21) (38) 
    
with Degree 5 0.33% 6.00% 1.56% 
 (3) (15) (18) 
    
with Degree 6–
10 inclusively 
0.55% 6.80% 1.90% 
 (5) (17) (22) 
                                                
 
326 
See Clauset et al, supra note 140, at 661. These scholars observe that “the best we can typically do is to 
say that our observations are consistent with a model of the world in which x is drawn from a distribution 
of the form p(x) = αx−α.” Rather than definitively conclude the degree distribution mimics the power law 
distribution, we adopt a grounded approach, arguing the judicial social network is highly skewed. 
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with Degree 
greater than 10 
0.11% 7.6% 1.73% 
 (1) (19) (20) 
Total 909 250 1159 
 
 
While both Figure 3.5 and Table 3.1 offer an initial indication of the properties of the 
degree distribution, the use of maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) allows for 
differentiation between possible distributions.
327
 Using MLE approach, the alpha for the 
judicial social network is {-2.38}, placing it in the traditional 2< α <3 interval for a 
power law. However, given the relatively small size of the network, it is not possible to 
conclusively assert that the distribution follows a power law as we cannot reject the 
possibility that it mimics an alternative type of highly skewed distribution.
328
 Despite this 
shortcoming, the empirical evidence presented herein is consistent with prior scholarship 
describing and documenting the fractal nature of the American common law and its 
constitutive institutions.
329 Thus, we believe the extreme skewing of the judicial social 
network motivates the consideration of a generative process responsible for producing 
such inequality in social authority.  
                                                
 
327 
See Clauset et al., supra note 140.  
328 
For a history and description of a subset of possible distributions, see Michael Mitzenmacher, A Brief 
History of Generative Models for Power Law and Lognormal Distributions, 1 INTERNET MATHEMATICS 
226 (2004).  
329 
For the original invocation of the concepts of fractal geometry, see J. M. Balkin, The Promise of Legal 
Semiotics, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1831, 1835–36 (1991); J. M. Balkin, The Crystalline Structure of Legal 
Thought, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1986). While Professor Balkin limits his analysis to the structure of legal 
argumentation, a growing set of empirical scholarship documents this fractal or crystalline nature of self-
organization within legal systems. See, e.g.,  Leicht et al., supra note 12; Post & Eisen, supra note 11l; 
Smith, supra note 12.  
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Preferential Attachment as a Possible Generative Process? 
Most networks form, grow and change in relationship with their respective 
environments. Network creation is commonly referred to as a generative process. Given 
the dynamic nature of network formation and information flow, static network 
visualizations such as those offered herein represent a mere snapshot of a more dynamic 
landscape.
330
 Although this dynamism complicates the identification of the process 
responsible for producing particular networks, there exist several common generative 
processes, each of which have characteristics that are observable in the snapshots of the 
network structures.
331 Namely, there are distinct micro-mechanisms that produce classic 
structures such as Erdos-Renyi random graphs, small-world networks, highly clustered 
graphs, and scale-free networks grown through processes of preferential attachment.
332
  
If our micro-level clerk movements reasonably operationalize social prestige, then the 
highly skewed degree distribution is substantively interesting because it helps identify the 
probable generating process responsible for producing the judicial social network. Given 
the skewing of the degree distribution and the aforementioned alpha level, we believe a 
process of preferential attachment analogous to the model outlined by physicists Barabási 
and Albert (BA) is a possible mechanism responsible for generating the judicial social 
                                                
 
330 
For more of an applied description of how those dynamics could influence common law development, 
see generally Katz, Stafford & Provins, supra note 12. 
331 
Id.  
332 
Id. 
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network. Namely, graphs generated using the BA model display a particular type of 
extreme skewing similar to Figure 5.
333
 The specific process described by Barabási and 
Albert yields a “scale-free” network whose degree distribution is power law 
distributed.
334
 
In the BA model, the number of connections a node displays at a given moment is a 
function of the number the node possessed in earlier time periods.
335
 Thus, the 
distribution of connections in a system organized under such conditions is highly 
                                                
 
333 
For a simulation of a preferential attachment process written in Net Logo, see 
http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/models/PreferentialAttachment.  
334 
Preferential attachment is exceedingly similar to a Yule-Simon process. For primary materials on Yule-
Simon processes, see, for example, Herbert A. Simon, On a Class of Skew Distribution Functions, 42 
BIOMETRIKA 425 (1955); George Udny Yule, A Mathematical Theory of Evolution, Based on the 
Conclusions of Dr. J. C. Willis, F.R.S., 213 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOC’Y OF LONDON 21 
(1925). In a “rich get richer” Yule process the percentage of return an individual receives is positively 
related the quantity of money that person is able to invest. Thus, a system organized under such conditions 
is often described as extremely sensitive to its initial starting conditions as those with large initial 
endowments are able to extend their relative advantage over those at a lower initial starting investment. 
With respect to the federal judicial actors, it appears that social or professional influence may in part grow 
in this manner. Namely, individual agents who stochastically or strategically garner initial advantage in 
social standing appear able to extend that advantage in subsequent periods. In a manner similar to that 
depicted herein, a Yule process generates a relatively small number of agents occupying vastly 
disproportionate influence to their colleagues. As described in the literature, there are slight differences 
between the original Yule process and the BA preferential attachment model. However, as physicist Mark 
Newman explains, “the important point is that the Yule process is a plausible and general mechanism that 
can explain a number of the power-law distributions observed in nature and can produce a wide range of 
exponents to match the observations by suitable adjustments of the parameters. For . . . citations, city 
populations and personal income, it is now the most widely accepted theory.” See M. E. J. Newman, Power 
Laws, Pareto Distributions and Zipf’s Law, 46 CONTEMP. PHYSICS 323, 343 (2005). 
335 
Consider the approach offered by Nadine Baumann and Sebastian Stiller, Network Models, in NETWORK 
ANALYSIS: METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS 341 (Ulrik Brandes & Thomas Erlebach eds., 2005). Namely, 
if  represents the history of some graph, whereby G is the structure of that graph at every point in time (t) 
when some vertex (v) is added to the graph with a given number of connections (m) to a vertex (i) in the set 
of all vertices (V) driven by a probability distribution based on the degree distribution of the graph at the 
previous point in time (t-1).  offers a state to state framework which can recursively define the sets and 
distributions of moments in time of a dynamic network. Following Baumann and Stiller,  we can use to 
probabilistically classify the generative processes of network snapshots. Id. at 349. 
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susceptible to its initial starting conditions. For example, consider a network that has only 
four nodes: A & B and C & D, where A is connected to B and C is connected to D. Next, 
assume node E enters the network and its probability of attachment to the AB community 
is equal to that of the CD community. The key to the model is the role of subsequent 
entrants such as node F, G, H, and beyond. As these later nodes enter the network, their 
probability of attachment is directly impacted by the community initially selected by 
node E.
336  
The precise conditions contained in the Barabási & Albert model are, of course, 
highly stylized.
337
 One of the points of departure between the BA model and an empirical 
network, such as the judicial social network, is the interaction between motivations of 
actors and the institutions that govern the entrances and exits. Additionally, most social 
                                                
 
336 
For further information on this generative process and the ubiquity of highly skewed networks see 
Albert-László Barabási & Eric Bonabeau, Scale-Free Networks, 288 SCI. AM. 60 (2003); Chavdar 
Dangalchev, Generation Models for Scale-Free Networks, 338 PHYSICA A 659 (2004); S. N. Dorogovtsev, 
J. F. F. Mendes, & A. N. Samukhin, Structure of Growing Networks with Preferential Linking, 85 
PHYSICAL REV. LETTERS 4633 (2000); M. E. J. Newman, The Structure and Function of Complex 
Networks, 45 SOC’Y INDUS. & APPLIED MATHEMATICS REV. 167 (2003). 
337 
Following its publication, several interesting extensions of the initial preferential attachment model have 
been offered. With respect to initial attractiveness, Buckley and Osthus assigned measures of attractiveness 
that increase or decrease the likelihood of a new connection. Initial attractiveness is a useful manner to 
operationalize the additional characteristics that may affect the likelihood of gathering connections. See 
Pierce G. Buckley & Deryk Osthus, Popularity Based Random Graph Models Leading to a Scale-Free 
Degree Sequence, 282 DISCRETE MATHEMATICS 53 (2004). Consider also the copying model where vertex 
(v) is selected and a clone of that vertex, (v’), is made. While v’ initially possesses all of the connections 
held by vertex v, the model probabilistically rewires v’. The copying model and its extensions implement a 
rich-get-richer processes where explicit knowledge of degree is not required. See, e.g., Jon M. Kleinberg et 
al., The Web as a Graph: Measurements, Models, and Methods, in 1627 LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER 
SCIENCE 1 (G. Goos et al. eds., 1999).  
  
117 
 
 
networks do not grow from initially random conditions. For instance, over the time 
period in question, the number of federal judges is roughly static and entry and exit from 
the network is fairly rare. As the network changes over time, agents enter and exit the 
network and connections form and dissolve. Additionally, when new jurists enter the 
network, it is unlikely they can directly connect to socially prominent actors. Thus, while 
it is rare to observe empirically a social system that meets the strict BA criteria, the 
model still offers insights that are useful for considering processes that generate highly 
skewed degree distributions.  
On the key dimensions, there are significant similarities between the micro-level 
mechanism outlined in the BA model and the process that appears to generate the 
distribution of authority within judicial social network. Namely, the driving force 
generating the observed structure is the micro-motivations of the actors. In general, all 
else equal, both jurists and clerks are upwardly mobile and direct their efforts toward 
connections with socially prominent agents. The skewed degree distribution is an artifact 
of this effort. In sum, if social connections among federal judicial agents are generated 
through preferential attachment or some allied process, this implies social prestige is 
sensitive to initial conditions where jurists will tend to connect to the set of jurists who 
are already socially prominent. If those empirically modeled connections are professional 
relationships that connote substantive influence, this will produce a small number of 
jurists with substantive authority that dramatically exceeds their institutional position.  
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Doctrinal Phase Transition . . . Is the Common Law a System Self-Organized at a 
Position of Criticality? 
 
While the use of our proxy measure and our static representation of the judicial social 
network limits our ability to formally adjudicate questions of growth and influence, the 
findings offered herein should motivate further empirical investigation—particularly 
analysis incorporating jurist citations and decisions. Among possible research questions, 
one worthy of detailed investigation is whether the American common law is a system 
self-organized at a position of criticality.  
Self-organized criticality (SOC) has been linked to earthquake magnitude, the size of 
forest fires, turbulence in financial markets, and biological evolution. SOC describes a 
process whereby social and physical systems organize on the precipice of great change.
338 
Such self-organization does not require an exogenous authority to structure the system. 
Instead, the structure that manifests is the emergent property of the local interactions 
between individual agents.  
The sand pile model described in the work of the late physicist Per Bak offers one 
classic illustration of the phenomena.
339 Imagine randomly dropping grains of sand onto a 
                                                
 
338 
See PER BAK, HOW NATURE WORKS: THE SCIENCE OF SELF-ORGANIZED CRITICALITY (1996); Per Bak et 
al., Self-Organized Criticality: An Explanation of 1/f Noise, 59 PHYSICAL REV. LETTERS, 381–84 (1987).  
339 
PER BAK, supra note 154, at 52. 
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flat surface.
340 Eventually, a pile will form which will start flat, but with time will grow 
steeper. At irregular intervals, avalanches of sand will flatten the base allowing the pile to 
grow again. In their work, Bak and colleagues kept track of the size of such avalanches 
and determined there was no typical or average size of an avalanche because the 
avalanche sizes followed a power law distribution.
341
 Although the most frequent 
avalanches involved a single grain or two, the avalanche could also encompass thousands 
or tens of thousands of grains. Given such large avalanches were rare, significant 
numbers of computational trials were necessary in order to properly specify the 
underlying probability distribution.  
Through these trials, certain informative trends became evident. The steeper the angle 
of the sand pile and the greater the amount of sand, the more likely a catastrophic 
avalanche would occur. To better illustrate the model, Bak and colleagues offered a 
contour plot where the pile was shaded according to steepness. As the angle increased the 
computer shaded the hill red to indicate a critical state. When the pile stood in some sort 
of equilibrium and thus was less likely to be subject to greater avalanches, the computer 
shaded the pile green. In general, the piles would begin green and then gradually shade 
red in advance of an avalanche. As the number of grains increased, so too would the 
                                                
 
340 
For a computational simulation see http://vlab.infotech.monash.edu.au/ simulations/non-linear/dendritic-
growth/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2009). 
341 
It is worth noting that subsequent scholarship has challenged the sand pile model, arguing only rice piles 
where rice demonstrates a large aspect ratio actually display SOC. See Vidar Frette et al., Avalanche 
Dynamics in a Pile of Rice, 379 NATURE 49, 49 (1996). 
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number of red spots. If a grain were to fall on the green plateaus, the likelihood of a 
cataclysmic avalanche was small, but if that same grain were to fall near the bright red 
peak, an avalanche could spread to other peaks, flattening the entire pile.  
The sand pile example is illuminating as the static, instantaneous representation of the 
model might indicate a system in equilibrium. However, time revealed a dynamic non-
linear landscape—one that would eventually jettison anything that might be characterized 
as equilibrium—and exposed a system on the precipice of great change. Given that highly 
skewed system level characteristics tend to emerge in systems self-organized criticality, 
we pose the question of whether SOC represents a possible evolutionary model for the 
American common law and its constitutive institutions. 
PART IV. FROM MICRO TO MACRO AND BACK AGAIN: PEER EFFECTS, 
EMERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE IN A FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
HIERARCHY 
 
 
Whether the actors in the federal judiciary self-organize at positions of criticality or 
whether preferential attachment or some allied process is responsible for generating the 
distribution of social authority, the evidence of extreme skewing presented herein is 
consistent with a system in which “peer effects” are likely to influence substantive 
outcomes. Whether invoking illusions to fireflies, sand piles, or automobile traffic, the 
overall goal of this endeavor is to enrich existing theories of judicial decision making 
through a formal discussion of judicial “peer effects.” While there are important 
properties drawn from each major judicial decision making theory, better understanding 
of the manner in which social factors structure the global outputs for the federal judicial 
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hierarchy is arguably needed. As discussed in allied work, we believe “the manner which 
doctrine changes cannot be divorced from the manner of self-organization that judicial 
actors embrace. The micro-motives of federal jurists and the professional and social 
interactions between jurists, at least in part, help generate systemic changes in the 
common law.”
342
 
Judicial decision-making is decision-making in a hierarchy. Across all the actors and 
opinions, particularly those produced by lower courts, understanding why certain 
individuals and cases come to be privileged is a non-trivial enterprise. An important 
precursor to gaining leverage on “peer effects” is characterizing the social structure in 
which actors operate. Following on Judge Posner’s discussion of “reputation,” as well as 
other literature discussing prestige and influence, it is difficult to deny a role for social 
factors. Simply put, social factors “matter” and as such the federal judiciary is 
simultaneously marked by both emergence and convergence. Despite the widespread 
agreement, within the bounded range of legal discourse, there are still periods of non-
linear change where the rise of new interpretative approaches is almost certainly 
supported by structurally important actors who champion a particular legal rule.
343 Table 
1 infra offers a list of such structurally important actors as measured through different 
network statistics.  
                                                
 
342 
See Katz, Stafford & Provins, supra note 12, at 979. 
343 
See Leicht, supra note 12.  
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In all, despite the sorting issues associated with the law clerk market, we believe the 
traffic of law clerks provides significant insight into the relative clout of actors in the 
judicial hierarchy. While existing methods relying exclusively upon citation counts or 
subjective evaluations certainly furthered collective understanding about questions of 
social stature, these approaches did not bring complete closure to the debate. We 
recognize that this article also fails to completely adjudicate all open questions. However, 
it advances the literature by offering a graph-theoretic approach to formalize discussion 
of concepts such as social position and social structure. 
A significant number of individual-level theories of judicial decision-making—
including behavioral and strategic theories—purport to provide a complete view of 
judicial decision-making. Other scholarship, such as those offered by the historical 
institutionalists, emphasizes the Court’s constitutive features and challenges strategic 
theories arguing that macro patterns of judicial decisions are inconsistent with observed 
macro-level judicial outputs. Our emphasis on judicial “peer effects” is an attempt to fill 
the void in these respective theories, arguing the existing social structure of the 
hierarchical federal judiciary in part explains how an existing set of individual micro-
motives map to the aggregate macro-behavioral judicial outcomes.344 Namely, while 
partisan policy preferences, strategic and other considerations are certainly important, so 
too are social factors. If judicial decision-making is in part socially constituted, then 
                                                
 
344 
See Schelling, supra note 17. 
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consider this an investigation of the relevant architecture. Scaffolding comes in a variety 
of flavors and different structures consequence outcomes in different manners. As such, 
we believe the public law literature should embrace a variety of complex systems based 
approaches including, but not limited to, network analysis. 
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APPENDIX 3.1: SAMPLE OF THE KATZ, STAFFORD & PROVINS DATASET 
 
Year Clerk Name Under-
graduate 
Law School Judge Name Judge 
ID 
1995 Yoo,  
Christopher S. 
Harvard Northwestern Randolph,  
A. Raymond 
12109 
1995 Metzger, 
Gillian E. 
Yale Columbia Wald,  
Patricia M. 
18260 
2000 Van Houwelling,  
Molly S. 
Michigan Harvard Boudin, 
Michael 
22750 
2000 Seinfeld, Gil Harvard Harvard Calabresi,  
Guido 
23155 
2000 Stras, David Kansas Kansas Luttig,  
J. Michael 
22225 
2002 Prescott, J. J. Stanford Harvard Garland,  
Merrick B. 
30168 
1998 Tushnet,  
Rebecca L. 
Harvard Yale Becker, 
Edward R. 
590 
1996 Gulati, Mitu Chicago Harvard Alito,  
Samuel A. 
127 
1998 Zearfoss, Sarah Bryn Mawr Michigan Ryan,  
James L. 
13110 
2000 Milani, Anup Georgetown Chicago Williams, 
Stephen F. 
20460 
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APPENDIX 3.2: FROM A RING LATTICE TO AN ENERGIZED NETWORK 
 
Given the number of nodes in the judicial social network, the applied graph theory 
literature is somewhat indifferent
345
 as between the application of the Kamada-Kawai
346
 
or Fruchterman-Reingold
347 visualization algorithms. In Figure 3.6, we provided both a 
wide and close view of the network following the application of the respective algorithm. 
While there exist a number of nuanced distinctions between placement algorithms, the 
primary differences in their approaches lie in their calculation of the optimal distance for 
                                                
 
345 
See WOUTER DE NOOY, ANDREJ MRVAR & VLADIMIR BATAGELJ, EXPLORATORY SOCIAL NETWORK 
ANALYSIS WITH PAJEK 17 (2005) (discussing the proper application of competing graph visualization 
algorithms).  
346 
See Kamada & Kawai, supra note 126, at 3–5. Kamada-Kawai define energy as follows:  
! 
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2 where pk is the position of vertex k , lij = c . dij is proportional to the 
topological distance dij of vertex i and j. Id. at 3. Kamadi- Kawai uses a heuristic approach that individually 
selects vertices with the maximum gradient value of  
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. Id. at 5. 
347 
See Fruchterman & Reingold, supra note 127. Fruchterman & Reingold use an alternative heuristic 
approach to force-directed layout. The basic idea is to just calculate the attractive and repulsive forces at 
each node independently and to update all nodes iteratively. 
The Attractive Force is defined as: 
! 
fa (x) =
x 2
k
 where k is selected as 
! 
k = areaV
. 
The Repulsive Force is defined as: 
! 
fr (x) =
k 2
x
. 
The maximum displacement for each node in a given iteration of the algorithm is limited through a 
constant. To account for the removal of nodes at each iteration, this constant is consistently decreased. 
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edge length, interpretation of Hooke’s Law,
348 and the time iterations until the automated 
drawings cease. 
Figure 3.6: Energizing Algorithm Drawing Stages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above Kamada-Kawai visual is a useful depiction of how the energizing 
algorithms process the information contained in the adjacency matrix to produce the 
visual depiction of a network. Stage 1 reflects an initial representation of the information 
on a random circular ring lattice. Stage 2 represents the early stage of the Kamada-Kawai 
spreading algorithm where certain nodes are fixed based on their centrality. Additionally, 
                                                
 
348 
Using Hooke’s Law, a spring force can be approximated by  where len0 is the length of the spring at rest.  
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nodes that are highly connected are pulled together while other less connected nodes 
begin to repel. Although the graph is in flux, a subset of the graph still maintains its 
initial circular structure. By Stage 3, the graph is no longer circular. However, the 
connections appear long and are thus strained according to Hooke’s Law. In Stage 4, the 
graph has reached a degree of equilibrium as connection lengths are balanced between 
the forces that attract and repel.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
NETWORK ANALYSIS REVEALS THE STRUCTURAL POSITION OF 
FOREIGN LAW IN THE EARLY JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT1 
 
 
The foreign sources debate is a contemporary normative debate that has captured the 
attention of many social scientists and legal scholars.2 In reduced form, the controversy 
turns upon whether in interpreting the U.S. Constitution it is appropriate to consider the 
views of foreign legal sources. Commentators have criticized the usage of foreign law in 
Supreme Court decisions - deriding it as new3 and unprecedented.4 While the debate is 
                                                
 
1 A previous version of this chapter was presented at the 2011 Meeting of the Society for Evolutionary 
Analysis in Law (SEAL 2011 Loyola – Los Angeles).  
2 See e.g. Timothy Kuhner, The Foreign Source Doctrine: Explaining the Role of Foreign and 
International Law in Interpreting the Constitution, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1389 (2007); Austen L. Parrish, 
Storm in a Teacup: The U.S. Supreme Courts Use of Foreign Law, U. Ill. L. Rev. 637 (2007); Mark 
Wendell DeLaquil, “Outsourcing Authority?” Citation to Foreign Court Precedent in Domestic 
Jurisprudence: Foreign Law and Opinion in State Courts, 69 Alb. L. Rev. 697 (2006);  
Steven G. Calabresi, A Shining City on a Hill: American Exceptionalism and the Supreme Court’s Practice 
of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 Bos. Univ. L. Rev. 1335 (2006); Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson 
Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the 
Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 William & Mary L. R. 743 (2005); Joan Larsen, Importing 
Constitutional Norms from a “Wider Civilization;” Lawrence and the Rehnquist Court’s Use of Foreign 
and International Law in Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 65 Ohio St. L.J. 1283 (2004); Gerald 
Neuman, Agora: The United States Constitution and International Law: The Uses of International Law in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 98 Am. J. Int’L L. 82 (2004); Michael D. Ramsey, Agora: The United States 
Constitution and International Law: International Materials and Domestic Rights: Reflections on Atkins 
and Lawrence, 98 Am. J. Int’L L. 69 (2004). 
3 A careful review of the historical record demonstrates that the foreign sources debate is almost as old as 
the republic itself.  As Professor Seipp has noted “During the early codification movement three states – 
New Jersey in 1799, Kentucky in 1808, and Pennsylvania in 1810 – passed statutes specifically forbidding 
citation of English cases decided after July 4, 1776. The statutes did not last long in force, and there is some 
evidence that they were not enforced. In New Hampshire, a rule of court was adopted forbidding English 
citations.” However, even the Pennsylvania statute approved of the use of post-1776 maritime law.  See 
David Seipp, Our Law, Their Law, and the Citation of Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. Rev 1417 (2006). 
4 For example, the response has been quite strong particularly from various members of Congress. See 
Seipp, supra note 2 citing American Justice for American Citizens Act, H.R. 1658, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005); 
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particularly focused upon the modern application of foreign law, commentators have not 
confined their discussion to application of foreign law in the modern era. Indeed, while 
the normative debate is robust and ongoing,5 the discourse surrounding the appropriate 
use foreign sources is compelling because it exposes broader questions regarding the role 
of foreign legal sources in the development of American law.  For example, how 
“American” is American jurisprudence? What precisely is our experience with invoking 
foreign legal sources?6 
In response to the controversy generated in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Roper v. Simmons7 and Lawrence v. Texas8 several scholars explored the 
extent to which the Supreme Court has cited foreign law as at least a partial guide its 
                                                                                                                                            
 
House Resolution on the Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of the Constitution of 
the United States: Hearing on H.R. Res. 97 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2 (2005).  H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005) (“Whereas the Supreme Court has 
recently relied on the judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions to support its 
interpretations of the laws of the United States, most recently in Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2474 
(2003) . . . .”) (emphasis added).  See also 151 Cong. Rec. S3113, 3127 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 2005) (statement 
of Sen. Cornyn) (“In a series of cases over the past few years our courts have begun to tell us that our 
criminal laws and our criminal policies are informed not just by our Constitution and by the policy 
preferences and legislative enactments of the American people through their elected representatives, but 
also by the rulings of foreign courts.”) (emphasis added)).   
5 The debate has inspired many law review articles and even a public debate between two sitting justices. 
See Scalia-Breyer Debate on Foreign Law (American University, Jan. 13, 2005) available at 
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1352357/posts  
6 As Professor Seipp notes “[T]he objection to citation of foreign law is bad history because it is a new 
complaint (that has been made to appear old) about an old practice (that has been made to appear 
new).”  While his position is certainly supported by the balance of this article, there exists a general 
lack of systematic evidence regarding the historical practices of the early United States Supreme 
Court.  
7 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) 
8 Lawrence v Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) 
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decisions. Two leading papers - Calabresi & Zimdahl (2005)9 and Seipp (2006)10 - 
surveyed the history of the Court and revealed that the Court’s practice of citing foreign 
law is actually longstanding.  Their combined analysis demonstrates that some the 
Court’s more prestigious Justices and some of its better-known decisions draw at least 
partial support from foreign legal sources.  
As an initial inquiry and a response to those that who argued that references to 
foreign law were somehow unprecedented, both Calabresi & Zimdahl (2005) and Seipp 
(2006) succeed, unambiguously.11 However, as a disciplined and systematic exercise 
their approach has real shortcomings.  Specifically, by selecting breadth over depth the 
authors are unable to answer a number of the substantive questions they raise in their 
respective papers. For example, after delimiting the proper scope for the usage of foreign 
legal material, Calabresi & Zimdahl (2005) expressed sympathy with the spirit of Justice 
Scalia’s arguments and alarm over the apparent increase in citations of foreign law, 
especially in recent years. Yet, their concern is dependent on an accurate knowledge of 
the frequency of citations to foreign law across different periods in the Court’s history.  
The analysis offered in their work is simply unable to assess this question for any period 
in the Court’s history. Simply put, magnitude claims cannot be made without a 
                                                
 
9 See Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: 
Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 William & Mary L. R. 743 
(2005). 
10 See Seipp supra note 2. 
11 See Calabresi & Zimdahl supra note 7. 
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systematic approach designed to identify whether the rate of foreign legal citations 
increased, decreased or remained constant.   
Seeking to apply a systemic approach to the question, this paper takes an 
alternative method - one that privileges depth over breadth.  Relying upon the full corpus 
decisions of through the end of Chief Justice Marshall’s term (1791 - 1835), this study 
both identifies and classifies the more than 35,000 references contained therein. This 
analysis highlights both the extent of reference to foreign legal sources and situates these 
references in the broader universe of cited sources. Justices on the early United States 
Supreme Court relied upon a variety of sources as evidence in support of their arguments. 
Rather than rely upon lower courts or the internal logic of its decisions, the early United 
States Supreme Court built its jurisprudence by jumpstarting it from foreign legal 
commentators and sources.    
While many scholars have identified specific qualitative instances where the 
Court invoked some foreign legal case or commentator, the lack of a rigorous and 
overarching framework prevents any form of systematic evaluation.  For example, how 
important are these early foreign infused cases? Are they core or are they peripheral? To 
consider these and other related questions, the analysis offered in this paper both offers 
descriptive data regarding the magnitude of citations to foreign source in the early Court 
and leverages various tools of network science to consider the “structural importance” of 
these foreign infused decisions. While the empirical results are perhaps relevant to the 
current debate regarding the Supreme Court's reliance upon foreign sources, there is 
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something far more fundamental at stake. Specifically, this paper offers an initial sketch 
of the legal genome project - a theory of common law evolution.  
DATA ACQUISITION 
Data for this project was acquired from two sources - Lexis-Nexis and 
bulk.resource.org .12 We acquired a full text decision for every Untied States Supreme 
Court decision recorded in the United States Reports from 1 U.S. 1  - 34 U.S. 711.13  This 
period covers all 1,021 decisions rendered from the start of the Jay Court through the end 
of John Marshall’s term as Chief Justice (1791 – 1835).  Many scholars identify this as a 
critical period in Supreme Court history as under the leadership of Justice Marshall 
(1801-1835) the Court solidified its position as an independent and co-equal branch of 
government.14  In particular, the Court authored a number of important rulings on topics 
including federalism and enumerated powers thereby developing the cannon upon which 
future courts would rely.15   
                                                
 
12 We cross-validated our list of decisions using both sources. While it is possible to rely exclusively on the 
content offered by http://bulk.resource.org/ the representation offered by Lexis including its digital 
demarcations and tagging proved to be very helpful.  Free access to the relevant information is available at  
http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/US/.    
13 We excluded from our analysis the other decisions included in the United States Reports including those 
authored by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 
14 Scholars have long debated Chief Justice Marshall’s role in the development of the modern court.   
15 For a visual depiction of the development of the cannon of the early United States Supreme Court see 
Michael Bommarito, Daniel Martin Katz, Jon Zelner & James H. Fowler, The Development of Structure in 
the Citation Network of the United States Supreme Court — Now in HD! available at  
http://computationallegalstudies.com/2010/02/11/the-development-of-structure-in-the-citation-network-of-
the-united-states-supreme-court-now-in-hd/. 
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For each of the decisions in our selected corpus, we recorded the identity of each 
citation and the location of the citation within each case.  Figure 4.1 offers an example of 
our in-text citation identification using selected text from the Court’s decision in Doe on 
the Demise of Elmore v. Grymes.16 
Figure 4.1:  An Example of Citation Identification 
 
After flagging all formal and informal references contained with our corpus, we 
next categorized each citation using one of 24 different citation source codes.  In 
addition, we included an explicit binary indicator 0=domestic, 1=foreign.  These 
combined classifications allow us not only to build a more accurate picture of the role 
that foreign legal material played in the early years of the Court, but will also provides a 
glimpse toward the different forms of source material that Justices found suitable to use 
                                                
 
16 Doe on the Demse of Elmore v. Grymes, 26 U.S. 469 (1828). 
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as evidence in support of their arguments.17  Table 4.1, displayed below, offers each of 
the citation codes we applied in this study.18 
Table 4.1: Citation Source Codes 
  
1 Supreme Court of the United States 
2 Federal Court of Appeals 
3 State Court 
4 Other Domestic Court 
5 Federal Statute 
6 State Statute 
7 Domestic Legal Commentator / Treatise 
8 Foreign Legal Commentator 
9 English Court 
10 French Court 
11 Another Foreign Court 
12 Foreign Statutes and Other Legal Materials 
13 Treaties 
14 Roman Law 
15 Constitution of the United States 
16 Law of Nations (jus gentium)/ General Law of War / Law of Prize 
17 Federalist Papers 
18 Domestic General Books (Non-Legal commentaries, compendiums, etc.) 
19 Foreign General Books (Non-Legal commentaries, compendiums, etc.) 
20 Speeches / Public Messages / Presidential Statements & Messages  / State Letters 
21 State Constitutions 
22 Writs 
23 Executive Orders / Pardons 
24 Declaration of Independence / Articles of Confederation 
  
 
The classification framework provided in the database is useful not only for the 
analysis presented herein but also could serve as a framework to make comparisons 
                                                
 
17  The range of materials used by the early Court was quite substantial.  In addition, a number of the 
citation formats used by the Court has since fallen out of favor.  The Google Book repository as well as 
various indexes of legal abbreviations were invaluable in identifying the source material relied upon by the 
early Court.  
18 It is, of course, possible to aggregate/collapse some of these citation types.  Given the one-way nature of 
this possibility (i.e. it is far easier to aggregate than disaggregate), we selected relatively granular citation 
source codes. 
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across different periods in the Court’s history. For example, this taxonomy could be 
applied systematically investigate whether the overall frequency of citations has changed 
over time, whether citation to different sources has changed over time and the time 
varying differential citation propensities of various members of the Court.  
A SUMMARY PORTRAIT OF THE DATASET 
We begin our analysis by providing some summary information regarding the 
dataset. Table 4.2 offers a variety of summary statistics including the total number of 
cases, total number of citations and the average foreignness of a case in this time period.  
Table 4.2:  Summary Statistics (1791-1835) 
Total Cases  1,021 
Total Number of Citations 36,390 
Mean Number of Citations Per Case 35.2 
Average % of Foreign References  35.9% 
% of Foreign References in the Median Case 28.5% 
 
While Table 2 provides an aggregate portrait of the dataset, it is also useful to explore 
some of the temporal patterns contained therein. Thus, Figure 4.2 displays the frequency 
of cases over the 1791-1835 period.  It demonstrates a marked increase in the volume of 
cases heard by the Court during this formative period.  While the case volumes are 
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substantially lower than those entertained by the modern Supreme Court, by the late 
1820’s, the court consistently considered more than 30 cases per term.   
Figure 4.2:  Case Frequency 1791-1835 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As noted, most of the 1,021 decisions in the dataset contain references to sources 
such as prior decisions, statutes, treatises, legal commentators, treaties, etc. Figure 4.3, 
below, displays frequency of these combined citation types over the 1791-1835 period.  
Figure 3 reveals a significant spike in citations in the year 1817. This result is attributable 
to a series of maritime and prize decisions decided by the Court in the 1817 term.  As 
previously discussed in Bommarito, Katz, Zelner & Fowler (2010) these 1817 maritime 
decisions were important as from a graph / structural perspective this was the first year 
that Supreme Court meaningfully cited its own prior decisions.      
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In addition to citing their own prior precedent, members of the court cited 
extensively the law of admiralty and developed a lengthy appendix that includes a 
tremendous number of foreign legal references.19  Consistent with many forms of raw 
data, the underlying trend can be masked by various intervening events.  However, 
notwithstanding such intermittent variability, a trend in favor of greater citations per year 
is displayed.  Yet, it is important to note that this raw trend is driven in part by the 
increases in case volume displayed in Figure 4.2 above.   
Figure 4.3: Citation Frequency 1791-1835 
 
 
 
                                                
 
19 Much of this spike in citations is attributable to an Appendix included at the end of several of the Court’s 
1817 maritime/prize decisions.  For an example, see e.g. The Anna Maria, 15 U.S. 327, 335 (1817).  
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An alternative presentation of the data is offered in Figure 4.4 below. The 
stackplot separates the references shown in Figure 4.3 above into two classes -- foreign 
law citations (blue) and citations to domestic legal sources (red). While the majority of 
the references in any given year are to domestic sources, in virtually every year a 
significant percentage of references are directed toward foreign legal sources. Indeed, for 
those interested in exploring the extent and nature of Court’s the reliance upon foreign 
sources, Figure 4.4 reveals a consistent pattern.20 As percentage of total citations, the 
final years of the Marshall (i.e. post 1825) witnessed a relative decline in the court’s 
references to foreign legal sources.  
Figure 4.4: Citation Frequency (By Source) 1791-1835 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
20 It is important to note that this is simply raw citation data and does not take account of the nature of the 
reference or the context in which it arose.  
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When presented with such summary or longitudinal information it is reasonable to 
question whether the observed trends are being driven by certain peculiarities such as a 
few outlying cases within a particular year, etc.  To assuage such concerns, Figure 4.5 
modifies the unit of analysis from years to cases within a year.  Next, each case in a given 
year is separated into two stark classes.  Within a each year cases that are entirely 
domestic (i.e. have zero citations to foreign law) are colored in red while cases that have 
at least one reference to a foreign legal are colored in blue.  The results presented in 
Figure 4.5 below demonstrate the presence of foreign law is not reserved a few isolated 
cases.  Rather, in most years the majority of cases feature at least some reference to a 
foreign legal source.    
Figure 4.5: Citation Source (By Case) 1791-1835 
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A related pattern is displayed in Figure 4.6 below.  While the mean proportion of 
foreign references declines in through the end of the Marshall Court, there are still a 
steady and non-trivial number of foreign references in the average decision.  We suspect 
that this decline is attributable to end of the Supreme Court’s jumpstarting phase -- where 
the early Court felt it necessary to jumpstarting its jurisprudence from a mixture of 
foreign and other domestic legal sources. Although the Court could have relied entirely 
on either domestic legal citations and/or on the force and/or coherence of its own 
decision, as practical matter the Court’s early decisions on a given topic tended to build 
support from a variety of sources including foreign sources.  Although a subject worth of 
subsequent study, we believe that the Court’s overall propensity to cite foreign sources 
continued to declined after it had reasonably developed a set of decisions that were more 
or less on point.   
Figure 4.6: Citation Source (By Case) 1791-1835 
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NETWORK ANALYSIS OF THE LAW: AN OVERVIEW 
While historically allied with mathematical sociology, developments in network 
science have been generated by a wide range of disciplines, with major recent 
contributions offered by fields such as applied mathematics and statistical physics.21 
Applied graph theorists often refer to networks as dependency graphs because they 
formalize the underlying linkages between objects.  Whether the objects in question are 
webpages on the internet, individuals in a social network such as Facebook or software 
dependences in computer programming, the study of networks is the ‘science of our 
times.’   
Building upon the developments in this interdisciplinary field, legal scholars22 and 
social scientists23 have recently begun to apply the tools of network science to bring new 
                                                
 
21 See e.g Aaron Clauset, Cristopher Moore & Mark E. J. Newman, Hierarchical Structure and the 
Prediction of Missing Links in Networks, 453 Nature 98 (2008); Gregory Palla, Alberto Laszlo Barabási & 
Tamás Vicsek, Quantifying Social Group Evolution, 446 Nature 664 (2007); Michelle Girvan & Mark E. J. 
Newman, Community Structure in Social and Biological Networks, 99 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 7821 
(2002); Albert-László Barabási & Reka Albert, Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks, 286 Science 
509 (1999); Duncan J. Watts & Stephen Strogatz, Collective Dynamics of ‘Small World' Networks, 393 
Nature 440 (1998). 
22 See e.g. Daniel Katz, Joshua Gubler, Jon Zelner, Michael Bommarito, Eric Provins & Eitan Ingall, 
Reproduction of Hierarchy? A Social Network Analysis of the American Law Professoriate, 60 Journal of 
Legal Education (2011 Forthcoming); Daniel Katz & Derek Stafford, Hustle and Flow: A Social Network 
Analysis of the American Federal Judiciary, 71 Ohio State Law Journal 457 (2010); Daniel Katz, Derek 
Stafford & Eric Provins, Social Architecture, Judicial Peer Effects and the “Evolution” of the Law: 
Toward a Positive Theory of Judicial Social Structure, 23 Geo. State L. Rev. 975 (2008); Gregory Todd 
Jones, et al., Homogeneity of Degree in Complex Social Networks as a Collective Good, 24 Geo. State L. 
Rev. 929 (2008); Thomas A. Smith, The Web of the Law, 44 San Diego L.R. 309 (2007); James Fowler, 
Timothy R. Johnson, James F. Spriggs II, Sangick Jeon & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Network Analysis and the 
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insight to a variety long standing questions. Among the possible questions, one very 
fruitful application for the tools of network science is in the study of judicial citations and 
the ‘evolution’ of the common law. Indeed, a distinguishing feature of a common law 
system is the precedential weight that judicial actors attach to prior decisions.  Judges 
presented with questions in a given case consider how to apply doctrines from prior 
cases.  Disagreement often ensues as to the “proper” form of analogical reasoning that 
should be applied to the case at bar.24   
Taken in the aggregate, common law systems produce vast amounts of citation 
data and although there is a rich literature studying these citations,25 relatively little 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Law: Measuring the Legal Importance of Precedents at the U.S. Supreme Court, 15 Pol. Analysis, 324 
(2007); Katherine J. Strandburg, et. al., Law and the Science of Networks: An Overview and an Application 
to the "Patent Explosion", 21 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1293 (2005); How Long is the Coastline of the Law? 
Thoughts on the Fractal Nature of Legal Systems, 29 J. Leg. Stud. 545 (2000).  See also Frank B. Cross, 
Thomas A. Smith & Antonio Tomarchio, Determinants of Cohesion in the Supreme Court's Network of 
Precedents, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=924110. 
23 See infra note 9 and supra notes 11-12. 
24 Analogy is at the core of legal reasoning and one way for an entrepreneurial judge to raise his/her relative 
standing is to develop set of novel conceptual bridges that broader community of legal actors comes to see 
as well-reasoned. From a graph-perspective, this sort of legal arbitrage is akin to fusing two or more 
otherwise unrelated decisional clusters.  
25 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross et al., Citations in the U.S. Supreme Court: An Empirical Study of Their Use 
and Significance, 2010 U. Ill. L. 489 (2010); Michael Abramowicz & Emerson H. Tiller, Citation to 
Legislative History: Empirical Evidence on Positive Political and Contextual Theories of Judicial Decision 
Making, 38 J. Legal Stud. 419 (2009); Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Bias in Judicial Citations: A Window 
into the Behavior of Judges?, 37 J. Legal Stud. 87 (2008); Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Choosing the 
Next Supreme Court Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 23 (2004); 
Mita Bhattacharya & Russell Smyth, The Determinants of Judicial Prestige and Influence: Some Empirical 
Evidence from the High Court of Australia, 30 J. Legal Stud. 223 (2001); Richard Posner, An Economic 
Analysis of the Use of Citations in the Law, 2 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 381 (2000); David Klein & Darby 
Morrisroe, The Prestige and Influence of Individual Judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28 J. Legal Stud. 
371 (1999); Montgomery N. Kosma, Measuring the Influence of Supreme Court Justices, 27 J. Legal Stud. 
333 (1998); William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig & Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Influence: A Citation 
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scholarship has applied the tools of network science.26 As applied to legal citations, each 
reference between the various cases in the network is represented by a directed edge (arc) 
and each case is represented by a node.  Citation networks are a special class of network 
called a dynamic directed acyclic graph (D-DAG). Figure 4.7, offers the general form 
representation of a D-DAG.     
Figure 4.7: General Form Representation of a Dynamic Directed Acyclic Graph 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. Legal Stud. 271 (1998); David Walsh, On the Meaning 
and Pattern of Legal Citations: Evidence from State Wrongful Discharge Precedent Cases, 31 L. & Soc’Y 
Rev. 337 (1997); William Landes & Richard Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Analysis, 19 J.L. & Econ. 249 (1976). 
26 See e.g. Michael Bommarito, Daniel Katz & Jonathan Zelner, Law as a Seamless Web? Comparing 
Various Network Representations of the United States Supreme Court Corpus (1791-2005) in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 12TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW (UAB 
BARCELONA -2009); Frank B. Cross, Thomas A. Smith & Antonio Tomarchio, The Reagan Revolution in 
the Network of Law, 57 Emory L. J. 1227 (2008); Thomas A. Smith, The Web of the Law, 44 San Diego 
L.R. 309 (2007); James Fowler, Timothy R. Johnson, James F. Spriggs II, Sangick Jeon & Paul J. 
Wahlbeck, Network Analysis and the Law: Measuring the Legal Importance of Precedents at the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 15 Pol. Analysis, 324 (2007); How Long is the Coastline of the Law? Thoughts on the 
Fractal Nature of Legal Systems, 29 J. Leg. Stud. 545 (2000).  See also Frank B. Cross, Thomas A. Smith 
& Antonio Tomarchio, Determinants of Cohesion in the Supreme Court's Network of Precedents, available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=924110.  
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The properties of such graphs are a matter of active study in the physical science 
community.27 As described in Bommarito, Katz & Zelner (2009a) “Citation networks are 
inherently directed graphs. The citing node asserts that a relationship exists with the cited 
node, never vice versa. Citation networks are the result of a generative process with 
identifiable constraints: arcs are only created when the tail node of the arc is created, and 
the head nodes must exist prior to the tail node.” Many traditional graph methods rely 
upon closed triangle or cycles.  The strict head and tail ordering of a legal citation 
network yields a graph without cycle (i.e. an acyclic graph) as documents written at a 
given time cannot cite documents written in the future.  Finally, citation networks are 
dynamic as the relative relationships between objects are updated as each additional 
document (and its citations) are added to the existing graph.   
Citations generated by decisions in common law systems display these precise 
properties and the tools of network science, offer a rigorous and well-specific analytical 
apparatus useful for exploring the evolution of doctrine within common law systems. 
Consider the example offered in Figure 4.8 below.  Dickerson v. United States both 
                                                
 
27 See e.g. Michael Bommarito, Daniel Katz, Jonathan Zelner & James Fowler, Distance Measures for 
Dynamic Citation Networks 389 Physica A 4201 (2010); Brian Karrer & Mark E. J. Newman, Random 
Graph Models for Directed Acyclic Networks, 80 Phys. Rev. E 046110 (2009); Brian Karrer & M. E. J. 
Newman, Random Acyclic Networks, 102 Phys. Rev. Lett. 128701 (2009); Michael Bommarito, Daniel 
Katz, Jonathan Zelner, On the Stability of Community Detection Algorithms for Longitudinal Citation Data 
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 6TH CONFERENCE ON APPLICATIONS OF SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS – ETH-
ZURICH (2009); E. A. Leicht et al., Large-Scale Structure of Time Evolving Citation Networks, 59 Eur. 
Physical. J. B 75 (2007).	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references Oregon v. Elstad and Miranda v. Arizona.28 Elstad references Miranda, but 
not vice versa.  
Figure 4.8:  Legal Citations as a Dynamic Directed Acyclic Graph 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Even this trivial example reveals an important feature present in most document 
citation networks.  Whether the documents in question are academic articles, patents or 
judicial decisions or some other class of similar documents, topical clustering is a 
fundamental feature of virtually every document citation network. For example, in Figure 
8 above, both Elstad and Dickerson are cases that help illuminate the contours of the 
Miranda doctrine.  Thus, they are highly likely to cite other Miranda related cases and are 
rather unlikely to cite cases from otherwise topically unrelated domains.  Taken to the 
extreme, this would imply an overall network with large disconnected components.  Yet, 
most document citation networks also contain edges that span clusters and memorialize 
                                                
 
28 Obviously, Dickerson v. United States contains lots of additional references.  The example above is 
designed to be exemplarily.  
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the cross-fertilizing links between particular topics.  Taken together, this mixture of 
clustering and bridges yield a network that is actually rather well-connected.  
Specifically, as highlighted in Bommartio, Katz & Zelner (2009b), the United States 
Supreme Court’s citation network can reasonably be thought of as a seamless web.29           
Figures 4.9 – 4.11 below, highlight the rapid growth in the size and density of the 
United States Supreme Court citation network.  In the formative period of interest in this 
study 1791-1835, the Court developed a cannon of relevant decisions on a variety of 
topics.  Furthermore, using citations the early Court developed linkages between a wide 
range of substantive areas of law.  Taken together, these linkages yield at network that by 
the end of the Marshall Court displayed meaningful structure.30     
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
29 See Michael Bommarito, Daniel Katz & Jonathan Zelner, Law as a Seamless Web? Comparing Various 
Network Representations of the United States Supreme Court Corpus (1791-2005) in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
12TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW (UAB BARCELONA -2009).  
The idea of law as a seamless web is long standing as can traced back to the well known legal historian 
F.W. Maitland .  See F.W. Maitland, A Prologue to a History of English Law, 14 L. Qtrly Rev. 13 (1898).  
See also Larry Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: The Law Is a Seamless Web (January 18, 2009) available at 
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2009/01/legal-theory--5.html. 
30 For a dynamic visualization see Michael Bommarito, Daniel Katz, Jon Zelner & James Fowler, The 
Development of Structure in the Citation Network of the United States Supreme Court — Now in HD! 
available at http://computationallegalstudies.com/2010/02/11/the-development-of-structure-in-the-citation-
network-of-the-united-states-supreme-court-now-in-hd/  
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Figure 4.9:  United States Supreme Court Citation Network 1810 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.10: United States Supreme Court Citation Network 1820 
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Figure 4.11:  United States Supreme Court Citation Network 1835 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THREE PERSPECTIVES ON THE STRUCTURAL IMPORTANCE OF 
FOREIGN LAW IN THE EARLY JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 
 
The summary statistical information regarding the citation patterns of the early 
Court demonstrates the significant number and fairly consistent presence of references to 
foreign legal material.  However, this information alone neither reveals the importance of 
the cases that contain foreign law not does it provide a complete picture of the role of 
foreign law in the development of the early court. With respect to these two propositions, 
network science offers several different approaches useful for considering the importance 
of particular nodes in an overall network. Stated more precisely, what is structural 
importance of the cases that contain references to foreign legal materials. Are these 
foreign law infused cases peripheral?  Or are they core to the development of the 
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Supreme Court’s jurisprudence?  Applying three alternative approaches, this section 
demonstrates that foreign law infused cases are central to the early jurisprudence of the 
United States Supreme Court. Although a number of these early decisions are rarely cited 
today, in the formative years of the Court, these cases serve an important structural 
function.  Namely, these are the decision that imported many doctrines from abroad 
thereby populating the American legal genome with foreign genetic material.  
Network Visualization: An Ocular Test for Structural Importance 
A simple approach to consider the structural importance of foreign law infused 
decision is through network visualization.  While certainly not a definitive form of 
analysis, visualization allows for a quick first-order review of the patterns contained with 
a set of network data.  While manually generating visualizations of a network of this size 
is a nearly impossible task, there exist a number of automated drawing procedures 
developed in computer and information science, that can be used to generate clear and 
transparent depictions of networks such the Supreme Court citation network.  Such 
automated graph layout algorithms generate graphs with attractive properties such as 
minimized edge crossings, effective use of the planar area, inherent symmetry, and 
minimized differences in edge lengths.   
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We apply a spring spring-embedded, force-directed placement algorithm31 to 
visualize the case-to-case citation network of the United States Supreme Court as of 
1835.  As displayed in Figure 12 below, each case within the network is assigned to a 
category based upon the “foreignness” its citation material.  More formally, let the 
foreignness of a case’s citations lie on a spectrum between 0% and 100%.  We assign 
each case in the network a color and shape that corresponds to the “foreignness” of its 
embedded citations.  Cases with relatively few {0% - 33%} references are assigned a red 
square node coloring, cases with moderate to majority {34% - 66%} of foreign references 
are assigned a green triangle node coloring and cases with a high number of foreign 
references {67% - 100%} are colored blue and assigned a circle.  
In Figure 4.12, we applied our automated layout algorithm to visualize the 
Supreme Court Citation Network and cases are colorized as described above. In addition, 
each case is size by indegree - a raw count of the number of inbound references that are 
directed to a given decision. Thus, large and otherwise centrally located cases are those 
that might be characterized as structurally important.    
 
                                                
 
31 For additional information on such graph algorithms see e.g. Ivan Herman, Graph Visualization and 
Navigation in Information Visualization: A Survey, 6 IEEE Transactions on Visualization and Computer 
Graphics 24, (2000); Peter Eades, A Heuristic for Graph Drawing, 42 Congressus Numerantium 149 
(1984).  See also Thomas M. J. Fruchterman & Edward M. Reingold, Graph Drawing by Force-Directed 
Placement, 21 Software Practice & Experience 1129 (1991); Tomishia Kamada & Satoru Kawai, An 
Algorithm for Drawing General Undirected Graphs, 31 Information Processing Letters 7 (1989). 
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Figure 4.12:  United States Supreme Court Citation Network 1791-1835 
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With respect to an ocular analysis, it is useful to generate the equivalent of 
hypothesis test prior to reviewing the results of the visualization.  If foreign law infused 
cases were not structurally important than we might expect a strong core of clustered red 
cases surrounding by two increasingly peripheral layers of green and blue cases where 
heavily foreign cases (i.e. blue cases) would generally occupy the extreme boundary of 
the network.  A review of Figure 4.12 above does not follow any such pattern.  Rather, a 
significant number of cases with a moderate to large proportion of references to foreign 
law occupy positions of relative structural importance while a large number of cases that 
largely rely upon domestic law occupying less significant positions.  While not 
dispositive, this lends credence to our broader claims and justifies additional analysis.  
Statistical Perspective on Structural Importance 
Building upon the results initial results offered in infra, we sought a more formal 
analysis of the relationship between foreignness and structural importance.  Specifically, 
we sought to evaluate the mapping between the network centrality of a given case and 
that cases’ proportion of foreign references.  Given the results in infra, we suspected that 
the centrality of a given case was either unrelated to its foreignness or that foreignness is 
perhaps even a weak predictor of centrality.  We converted this into the following 
testable proposition: 
H1: Higher the Proportion of Foreignness, the Lower the Centrality in the Network 
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To test the proposition, we calculated the eigenvector centrality32 for each node in 
the network.  Eigenvector centrality is a commonly used measure of network centrality.  
As described in Perra & Fortunato (2008) with eigenvector centrality method “the 
prestige xi of node i is just proportional to the sum of the prestiges of the neighboring 
nodes pointing to it: 
 
 
From Eq. (3) we see that xi is just the i-component of the eigenvector of the 
transpose of the adjacency matrix with eigenvalue λ.”33  Those with some familiarity with 
                                                
 
32 For some useful example and explanations see e.g. Gabriele Lohmann, et. al., Eigenvector Centrality 
Mapping for Analyzing Connectivity Patterns in fMRI Data of the Human Brain, 5 PLoS ONE 5(4): e10232 
(2010); De Wu Ding & Xiao Qing He, Application of Eigenvector Centrality in Metabolic Networks in 
PROCEEDINGS OF IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY 
(2009); Nicola Perra & Santo Fortunato, Spectral Centrality Measures in Complex Networks, 78 Phys. Rev. 
E. 036107 (2008); Arzucan Özgür, Thuy Vu, Günes ̧ Erkan & Dragomir R. Radev, Identifying Gene-
Disease Associations using Centrality on a Literature Mined Gene-Interaction Network, 24 Bioinformatics 
277 (2008); Phillip Bonacich, Some Unique Properties of Eigenvector Centrality, 29 Soc. Networks 555 
(2007); Mark E.J. Newman, The Structure and Function of Complex Networks, 45 SIAM Rev. 167 (2003); 
David C. Bell, John S. Atkinson & Jerry W. Carlson, Centrality Measures for Disease Transmission 
Networks, 21 Soc. Networks 1 (1999) Phillip Bonacich, Factoring and Weighting Approaches to Clique 
Identification, 2 J. of Mathematical Soc. 113 (1972).  
33 “We notice that the trivial eigenvector with all components equal to zero is always a solution of Eq. (3). 
The true EV is then associated to the existence of non-trivial solutions of the eigenvalue problem of Eq. (3). 
From Eq. (3) we see that nodes with indegree = zero also have zero centrality: in general, nodes pointed at 
by nodes with zero centrality also have zero centrality and this effect will propagate to other nodes, so that 
in many cases EV would not give any information about a big number of nodes. To avoid this, it is useful 
to make the following modification: to each node we assign a prestige ε, which is independent of its 
relationships with the other nodes. Eq. (3) is then modified as follows: xi = α (At x)i + ε .” 
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these approaches will observe the close relationship between the eigenvector method and 
related spectral methods such as to Google’s PageRank Algorithm.      
Given the construction of our hypothesis, in a deep sense, a no-result could be 
considered a result.  A no-result or a positive coefficient would imply that the foreignness 
of case do not undermine it likelihood of being central in the network.  Consistent with 
our expectations and in the opposite direction as our hypothesis, Figure 4.13 reveals that 
proportion foreign actually has a positive relationship upon centrality within the network.  
Indeed, the relationship is highly significant (**.01 level) and is thus more than sufficient 
to reject the notion that the foreignness of a case is a negative predictor of network 
centrality.34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
34 A similar result was obtained when we ran several other measures of centrality such as indegree. The 
result is also robust to the inclusion of variables such as year of decision, etc.  The simplest version is 
presented in Figure 4.13 above.  
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Figure 4.13: Eigenvector Centrality and Proportion Foreignness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Node Removal, Robustness and Joint Structural Importance 
There exist a number of well-specified and commonly used metrics to evaluate 
the structural importance of particular node in a broader network.  While measures such 
as eigenvector centrality are commonly used throughout the literature, it is reasonable 
wonder whether a node level measure is entirely dispositive of the question considered 
within this paper.  While we believe the analysis offered in Section V (b) is on point, to 
assuage any concerns, we apply an approach designed to capture the joint structural 
importance of set of nodes with a particular attribute or characteristic.  In other words, we 
convert the analysis from microscopic resolution to mesoscopic resolution.  In this vein, 
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the matter of joint structural importance is better informed by the literatures on 
community detection35 and network robustness36 than by the literature on network 
centrality.     
Building from the basic principles outlined in these literatures, we consider the 
robustness of United States Supreme Court citation network to a particular form of 
targeted attack.  As displayed in Figure 4.14 below, we start with network visualized in 
Figure 12 above and then engage in two stages of node removal.  As displayed below, for 
Cut #1, we remove all Blue Circle nodes {67% - 100% foreign} and the regenerate the 
remaining network.  In Cut # 2, we pursue a similar approach and remove the Green 
                                                
 
35  See e.g. Peter J. Mucha, et al., Community Structure in Time-Dependent, Multiscale, and Multiplex 
Networks, 328 Science 876-878 (2010); Mason A. Porter, Jukka-Pekka Onnela & Peter J. Mucha, 
Communities in Networks, 56 Notices to the Amer. Mathematical Soc. 1082 (2009); E. A. Leicht & Mark 
E. J. Newman, Community Structure in Directed Networks, 100 Phys. Rev. Lett. 118703 (2008); S. 
Fortunato & M. Barthélemy, Resolution limit in community detection, 104 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 36 
(2007); Mark E.J. Newman, Finding Community Structure in Networks using the Eigenvectors of Matrices, 
74 Phys. Rev. E 036104 (2006); G. Palla, I. Derényi, I. Farkas & T. Vicsek, Uncovering the Overlapping 
Community Structure of Complex Networks in Nature and Society, 435 Nature 814 (2005); Mark E.J. 
Newman, Detecting Community Structure in Networks, 38 Eur. Phys. J. B 321 (2004); Michelle Girvan & 
Mark E.J. Newman, Community Structure in Social and Biological Networks, 99 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 
USA 7821 (2002).  
36 See e.g. E. Estrada, Network Robustness to Targeted Attacks: The Interplay of Expansibility and Degree 
Distribution, 52 Eur. Phys. J. B 563 (2006); A. Beygelzimer, G. E. Grinstein, R. Linsker & I. Rish, 
Improving Network Robustness by Edge Modification, 357 Physica A 593 (2005); Duncan S. Callaway, 
Mark E. J. Newman, Steven H. Strogatz & Duncan J. Watts, Network Robustness and Fragility: 
Percolation on Random Graphs, 85 Phys. Rev. Lett. 5468 (2000); G. Paul, T. Tanizawa, S. Halvin & H. E. 
Stanley, Optimization of Robustness of Complex Networks, 38 Eur. Phys. J. B 187 (2000); Rika Albert, H. 
Jeong & Albert-László Barabási, Attack and Error Tolerance of Complex Networks, 406 Nature 378 
(2000); R. Cohen, K. Erez, D. Ben-Avraham & S. Havlin, Resilience of the Internet to Random 
Breakdowns, 85 Phys. Rev. Lett. 4626 (2000).  
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Triangle nodes {34% - 66% foreign}.  The residual network is then visualized in Figure 
15 below.  
Figure 4.14: SCOTUS 1835 After Targeted Removal Cut #1 
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Figure 15: SCOTUS 1835 After Targeted Removal Cut #2 
 
 
 
Table 3 displays the results from each stage of the targeted attack.  The size of the 
largest weakly connected component is expressed with respect to vertices (nodes) | V | 
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and edges | E |. The targeted attacked imposed significant consequences for the size of the 
network’s largest weakly connected component and its edges.  Indeed, there is significant 
decline in the number of vertices and most importantly a more than three fold decrease in 
the number of edges.   
Table 4.3:  Targeted Attack and Network Robustness 
Largest Weakly Connected Component  | V | | E | 
Original Network  754 1260 
Residual Network: Cut #1 585 816 
Residual Network: Cut #2 426 404 
 
While also not itself dispositive of the question, we believe this node removal 
strategy is a more rigorous method to consider the question of joint structural importance 
than the ocular approach offered in infra Section V(a).  It represents an alternative to the 
approach presented in infra Section V(b). Taken together, we believe that the collective 
results offered through across three approaches point to a similar conclusion - foreign law 
is deeply woven into the fabric of the early American jurisprudence. 
THE LEGAL GENOME PROJECT: A PERSPECTIVE ON THE ‘EVOLUTION’ 
OF THE COMMON LAW 
 
Reviewing the early jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, one 
observes the blending of foreign legal sources and commentators with legal rules and 
principles of domestic origin.  Across sets of cases and even within individual decisions, 
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the Court either relies exclusively on foreign law or in many instances draws support for 
its position by legal principles developed by foreign legal actors.  This basic insight 
encourages one to more formally consider the dynamics present in the precedent based 
development of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.   
Thus, beyond its obvious appeal as a historical investigation, this project has 
much broader aims. While this paper does not fully resolve all of the difficult theoretical 
and empirical questions, it provides a perspective informative to both positive legal 
theory and the long-standing literature on common law ‘evolution.’37 Indeed, in order to 
develop a positive model of legal doctrine and thereby “take law seriously”38 it is 
necessary to have a well-specified notion of the relevant doctrinal topology. To consider 
such questions requires a framework that can meet the methodological ante. I propose a 
“legal genome project” – an informatics based project designed to trace our legal origins 
and better understand the “evolution” of the common law.39  
Legal scholars have long described changes in the common in evolutionary terms. 
As noted in Hutchinson (2005) “In championing an evolutionary methodology, common 
lawyers trade off the established theories of biological development and benefit from its 
scientific pedigree. . . . Perhaps because of its own insecurities, jurisprudence jumped on 
                                                
 
37 See infra notes 39-42. 
38 See Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 Persp. on. Pol. 261 (2006) 
39 It is important to note the dynamics associated with a genome of ideas is not strictly equivalent to the 
human genome or strict evolution. The relevant question is whether the analytical apparatus can be 
meaningfully retrofitted to application within this intellectual domain.  We believe the answer is yes.  
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the Darwinian bandwagon of the nineteenth century more quickly and more zealously 
than most other disciplines. Indeed, from the pioneering work of Maine, Holmes, 
Wigmore, and Corbin through to more recent technical efforts, the evolutionary motif has 
always loomed large over jurisprudential efforts to explicate the nature of the common 
law.”40  Indeed, the relevant literature commonly evaluates the outputs of the legal 
system and conceptualizes the underlying process as one of purification41 or move toward 
to selection of efficient rules.42 As noted in Katz, Stafford & Provins (2008) “the 
conditions necessary to conclude the Darwinian mechanism is the driver, is fairly strict. 
The common law may very well be working itself pure or moving toward trajectory but 
there is genuine tension between claims of trajectory and the reliance upon evolutionary 
mechanisms.43 While a legal genome project implies the weak invocation of evolution 
                                                
 
40 See ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, EVOLUTION AND THE COMMON LAW (2005). 
41 As Professor Hutchinson notes, “[t]he leading so-called purist among the elite of modern jurisprudence is 
Ronald Dworkin. He has placed the notion that the law works itself pure at the dynamic core of his legal 
theory.” HUTCHINSON, supra note 14, at 70–71. It is not clear, however, that the law is working itself pure 
as the Darwinian program is about selection and adaptation—neither of which is necessarily related to the 
matters of morality or justice that occupy much of Dworkin’s project.       
42 See Daniel Katz, Derek Stafford & Eric Provins, Social Architecture, Judicial Peer Effects and the 
“Evolution” of the Law: Toward a Positive Theory of Judicial Social Structure, 23 Geo. State L. Rev. 975 
(2008) citing RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW (1973) (arguing that the common law 
tends toward efficiency in the aggregate because jurists maximize efficiency at the individual level). 
Subsequent scholars extend these claims. See Robert Cooter, Lewis Kornhauser, & David Lane, Liability 
Rules, Limited Information, and the Role of Precedent, 10 BELL J. ECON. 366 (1979); George Priest, The 
Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977). For a recent 
attempt to reconcile this puzzle, see Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, The Evolution of Common Law, 
115 J. POL. ECON. 43 (2007) (arguing that under a set of conditions legal evolution can be beneficial even if 
policy-motivated judges act in an interested fashion.). However, these scholars acknowledge they “have 
ignored several institutional features of appellate review that might affect our results.” Id. at 63. Namely, 
while these scholars identify panel effects as a source for moderation, their analysis might also engage 
other factors such as those considered herein. 
43 See Daniel Katz, Derek Stafford & Eric Provins, Social Architecture, Judicial Peer Effects and the 
“Evolution” of the Law: Toward a Positive Theory of Judicial Social Structure, 23 Geo. State L. Rev. 975 
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(i.e. small ‘e’), it offers greater promise than the prior discussions of common law 
evolution.  
In addition to the evolution of the common law, the results offered herein 
contribute to the development of a positive model of law and legal reasoning. At its base, 
legal analysis is exercise in analogical reasoning. While historically a qualitative 
endeavor the sheer act of highlighting similarity and dissimilarity between various 
multidimensional objects is a task for which artificial intelligence has made significant 
strides. Among other reasons our interest in a “legal genome project” is motivated by the 
success of other related genome projects.44  Starting at our origins, the foreign sources 
results in this paper represent an initial attempt to classify an important subset of material 
in the relative genome.45  Moving forward, a legal genome project could help develop a 
“null model” for positive legal theorists and legal information engineers.  It could be used 
to evaluate a variety of important dynamics including path dependence, recombination 
                                                                                                                                            
 
(2008) noting “Again, Professor Hutchinson has articulated this point quite succinctly. ‘[N]ature and law 
are simply moving on largely in response to the demands and opportunities of their changing environmental 
situation. Neither always getting better (or worse) nor advancing in any particular direction, they are simply 
changing.’ See HUTCHINSON, supra note 14, at 238. 
44 Of direct relevance to this concept, is the so called “music genome project” which has been popularized 
by the online radio station Pandora. Pandora relies upon a vector of nearly 400 song attributes to “place” a 
song in multidimensional space.  Next, a distance measure or distance function is applied.  With the 
distance function and the raw attribute data in place it is possible to generate a similarity score between 
each object in the relevant universe. Of course, the initial selection of any distance function can be 
considered somewhat arbitrary.  However, the basic distance project is really the initial organization of the 
information.  Using an individual’s click-data and a machine learning algorithm, Pandora can tailor its 
recommendation to the specific preferences of particular individuals. For a citation based distance measure 
and a related set of possible functions see Michael Bommarito, Daniel Katz, Jonathan Zelner & James 
Fowler, Distance Measures for Dynamic Citation Networks, 389 Physica A 4201 (2010). 
45 In a sense, the legal genome project has already begun as both Lexis-Nexis and Westlaw have begun to 
provide their own version of recommender systems (from which click data can subsequently be obtained). 
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through analogical reasoning, fitness, selection and mutation through historical accident 
(or intentional reinterpretation).   
CONCLUSION 
Developing a new population level dataset of more than 35,000 references made 
the early United States Supreme Court, this paper systematically investigates the citation 
practices of the early United States Supreme Court 1791-1835.  In this period, the Court 
transitioned from significant reliance on outside sources to systemically citing its own 
prior decisions.   Although members of the Court could have either chosen to exclusively 
cite domestic legal sources or forgo references altogether, our analysis indicates that the 
Court combined multiple sources of authority and populated the American legal genome 
with a significant amount of foreign legal materials. Applying three separate approaches 
to consider the question, this analysis reveals that foreign law infused decisions populate 
both the core and periphery of the early citation network of the United States Supreme 
Court.  Whether referencing decisions from the Courts of England, legal commentators 
such as Blackstone and Valin or decisions from other foreign jurists, the record indicates 
that when authoring some of the Court’s original decisions on various substantive 
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questions, members of the Court jumpstarting American jurisprudence and did so with 
the substantial aid of foreign legal sources.46 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                
 
46 For the all of the insight the paper provides, it also leave many questions unanswered.  For example, to 
what extent does the American common law retain the foreign character that populated many of its earliest 
decisions?  Is there a decay function for a second, third, fourth degree references? While foreign law is our 
law, future scholarship is needed to develop a measurement of the foreignness of the overall American 
legal genome.   
 
